

ARID ZONE RESEARCH

AGRICULTURAL
PLANNING AND
VILLAGE COMMUNITY
IN ISRAEL



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ARID ZONE RESEARCH—XXIII
AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND VILLAGE COMMUNITY
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- XXIII. *Agricultural planning and village community in Israel*

The reviews of research are published with a yellow cover ; the proceedings of the symposia with a grey cover.

✓ AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND VILLAGE COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL

Edited by

JOSEPH BEN-DAVID

The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

U N E S C O

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FOREWORD

IN the framework of the Major Project on Scientific Research on Arid Lands, the programme approved by the General Conference of Unesco in 1960 foresaw, under resolution 2.81, several studies on the human implications of settlement in the arid zones. The purpose behind this book was a description of the planning and the social processes which went into the settlement of the arid southern part of Israel, with special emphasis on the problems of creating new communities. The project did not entail new investigations but aimed mainly at presenting the results of researches undertaken by the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in co-operation with the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency.

Unesco hopes that this volume will serve a particularly useful purpose as a reference work for all those interested in the social planning of rural settlements in a pluralistic ethnic setting and that it will be of considerable value also to those interested in the general problems of social planning and social and cultural change.

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INTRODUCTION

Joseph Ben-David

THE purpose of this book is to describe the main facts and problems of agricultural development and settlement in Israel with special reference to the arid southern part of the country.

Agriculture in Israel, as we shall see, has been planned from the beginning. The main factors determining this particular type of development were scarcity of water on the one hand, and the absence of an autochthonous rural population on the other. The first condition governing the agricultural settlement of former townspeople was that the types of farming introduced would be such as to ensure a standard of living for agricultural workers comparable with that enjoyed by the urban workers. Only highly intensive farming would make this possible. The task of the planners was, therefore, to develop intensive farms in a partly arid and partly semi-arid country. This could be achieved only by irrigation and by very careful exploitation of all the available resources. The early chapters of this volume tell the story of the constant search for water and for the most suitable crops and types of farm in order to make the utmost of the meagre resources. In this description the emphasis is on the considerations which influenced the thinking and the behaviour of the policy-makers and planners; no attempt is made to draw up a balance sheet of agriculture in Israel or to evaluate its efficiency.

The solution of agro-technical and economic problems has been a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of successful settlement of people on the land. Further incentives were needed in order to attract people from the town to the country in counter-action to the world-wide trend of urbanization. New types of rural community, whose way of life was a desirable alternative to city life, had to be found. In response to this need there emerged the 'kibbutz' and the 'moshav', two types of rural community peculiar to Israel. By combining agricultural settlement with social experiment in collective and co-operative living, these villages, especially the kibbutzim, became the centres of a broad social movement. They were looked upon as the realization of Utopian socialist ideals and as a result they were able to attract educated young people and to create a rich cultural and social life, in spite of their modest standards of living. The kibbutzim and the moshavim played a decisive part in the pioneering task of opening up barren lands and creating a modern type of agriculture in the country. These social experiments are the subject of succeeding chapters: Chapter IV describes the development of the kibbutz and moshav with special reference to their general social and political importance (especially that of the kibbutzim), while Chapter V is concerned with the role of the kibbutzim in the settlement of the arid Negev.

Except in the areas described in Chapter V, agricultural settlement ceased to be a

pioneering task once the State of Israel was established. For one thing, the State and other central organizations have now taken over the task of promoting, planning and guiding the new settlers on the land to an extent which leaves little room, or at least does not encourage, a great deal of experimentation and initiative on the part of the settlers; for another, recent immigrants no longer feel impelled, nor are the relatively settled conditions of the country any longer conducive, to pioneering social experiments under challenging conditions. Agricultural settlement has been expanded under these conditions mainly through the direction of immigrants to rural areas according to centrally devised plans. The highly organized and collectivistic framework of the kibbutz was obviously unsuitable for these settlers who had no intention of changing their accustomed ways of life, and no wish to engage in Utopian experiments. The relatively flexible co-operative framework of the moshav has therefore been adopted as the standard type of agricultural settlement for the new immigrants. It turned out, however, that even this type of settlement did not suit the requirements of the new settlers, especially of those—and they were the majority—who came from the different countries of North Africa and the Middle East. The difficulties which arose and the various adjustments and new developments which took place in the moshav as a result are described in the final chapters of this work. Some of the research on which this latter part of the report is based has not yet been completed: moreover the oldest of these moshavim have been in existence for only about fourteen years, so that many of the conclusions reached are necessarily tentative.

The various chapters, it is hoped, provide a picture of the main social problems of agricultural settlement in Israel and of the main directions in which solutions were sought. The space devoted to the oldest villages which maintain a large part of the citrus plantations and vineyards is less than commensurate with their economic importance. But these villages developed early, changed little, and their organization and economy do not greatly differ from those of similar-sized villages populated by land-owners with medium-sized holdings elsewhere. A more important omission is that of the properly economic aspect; namely the questions of what investments were made in the different branches of agriculture and types of settlement, and what the returns on these investments were. This omission is mainly due to lack of relevant data. As will be shown, the main decisions concerning the development of agriculture were not taken on the basis of economic considerations. The high priority given to agricultural settlement over other types of development was motivated by political and ideological considerations. Agriculture was developed because some self-sufficiency in farm production and the existence of a widespread rural population were considered necessary conditions and/or necessary symbols of nationhood. The relative importance of these considerations gradually changed, but it is only recently, since the country's achievement of a high level of agricultural production, including surplus output in some branches, that economic considerations have seriously entered into agricultural planning. The research needed for such planning, however, is still in its initial stages.¹

Another regrettable omission is a separate discussion of the regional development schemes which are rapidly transforming rural life in the southern part of the country. There is a brief description of the development of these schemes in Chapter III, and much of Chapter V deals with certain special types of regional co-operation involving new kibbutzim. Unfortunately, no systematic social study has yet been made of these schemes which were initiated only a few years ago.

It must be pointed out, finally, that this work does not pretend to be a systematic study. The general plan was based on a report entitled 'The Interplay of Social and Economic Factors in the Settlement of the Arid Areas of Israel' submitted by the editor to Unesco in 1960. This report was circulated among the different authors, and in addi-

1. Cf. Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, *Fifth Report, 1959, and 1960*.

tion the authors and the editor held numerous discussions both before and while writing their various papers. But apart from the effort made to cover the topic as a whole, as far as possible, and to avoid repetitions, no attempt has been made to arrive at a uniformity of view or approach or even to co-ordinate the individual reports in detail.

If the conclusions which emerge from the various chapters are, nevertheless, not very contradictory, this is due partly to the common background of the authors, and partly to the subject matter itself. With the exception of Avshalom Rokach, who is an agricultural economist from the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, all the authors are on the staff of the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. The work here presented is an outgrowth of several studies which have been conducted in the Department in recent years: a comprehensive study of immigrant absorption initiated more than ten years ago by S. N. Eisenstadt; a study of kibbutzim directed by Y. Garber-Talmon; a study of youth movements conducted by S. N. Eisenstadt and the editor; and several studies of urban and semi-urban communities undertaken by the editor and several other members of the Department.

A more important factor in lending unity to this report, however, has been the overwhelming theme of the transformation of Israel society during the past fourteen years. The effective basis of the political and military strength of the Jewish population under British mandatory rule had been a variety of social frameworks based on common ideals and group solidarity. Without the active and voluntary support of these semi-spontaneous systems the effectiveness of the formal representative organizations of the Jewish population would have been minimal. The Utopian collectivistic kibbutz communities—and to a smaller extent the co-operative villages (moshavim)—were the most outstanding manifestations of this pioneering and idealistic group spirit and have thus attained, as we noted earlier, the position of an élite.

Since the establishment of the State the basis of political action has considerably broadened. All the strata of the population have been drawn into the orbit of citizenship, and of military service, and experts and bureaucrats have increasingly assumed the kind of leadership functions previously performed by voluntary groups. This change has deeply influenced the social structure of agricultural settlements. The expansion of such settlement and the forms it was to assume have increasingly been decided by central planning; and the village population has completely changed its characteristics. The kibbutzim largely preserved their autonomy in the face of central planning and have been trying out various ways of finding their place in the new frameworks of central and regional planning without compromising their particular way of life. However, in spite of the ingenuity of these experiments, the main expansion of agricultural settlement took place outside the kibbutz movement. The planners used and changed freely the moshav economy according to the needs of agricultural production; and the immigrants from different cultures changed its relatively flexible social framework in order to bring it more into conformity with their habits and traditions. All these experiments and changes are as yet in their beginnings, and it is too soon to pass any final judgement upon them. What is recorded in the following chapters represents but the first stages of a process of evolution in which planners, members of kibbutzim and immigrant inhabitants of moshavim are learning to adapt and change a situation still largely unknown even to themselves.¹

1. The manuscript of this book was completed at the end of 1961. At the time of printing (1963) the text was corrected so as to avoid misunderstandings and errors. It was, however, impossible to bring the tables and some of the other data up to date. Nevertheless, the authors feel that the description of the situation and the conclusions are still valid in their main outlines.

Land and water

Avshalom Rokach

Although the area of the State of Israel is relatively small, there exist among the different regions of the country a great variety of topographical, geographical and climatic conditions. These have a decisive influence on its agricultural potential and they determine the branches of agriculture and the types of farming suitable for the different regions of the country.

In Israel, climatic conditions are influenced by two factors. The first is the geographical structure of the country; it is a narrow elongated strip of land situated on the Mediterranean coast, to the east of which deserts spread. The second factor is the topographical structure of the country which varies conspicuously even within limited areas.

Climatically speaking, the country is generally divided into four main regions:

1. The Region of the Coastal Plain is divided into two sub-regions: the coastal fringe characterized by a typical maritime climate, and the more inland strip of the Coastal Plain influenced to a certain extent by the dry desert climate. To this sub-region belongs also the Valley of Jezreel, the climate of which is like that of the inland strip of the Coastal Plain.
2. The Mountain Region rises to a height of 600 to 1,200 metres above sea level. This region comprises the Hills of Galilee, the Hills of Samaria and the Judean Hills. It also includes the sub-region of elevations ranging from 150 to 600 metres above sea level. The mountain region is partly influenced by the sea and partly by the desert situated to its east and its climate is less temperate than that of the Coastal Region. Daily average temperatures in Jerusalem are about 8° C. in January and 26° C. in August, compared with a range of about 13° to 27° C. in the Coastal Region.
3. The Region of the Inland Valleys is divided into four sub-regions: the Hule District, the Jordan Valley, the Beisan Valley, and the region of the Dead Sea. These regions differ considerably from one to another, mainly with regard to temperature. The influence of the desert is common to them all but most strongly felt in the Beisan Valley and in the region of the Dead Sea.
4. The Region of the Negev occupies more than half of the area of Israel. It is divided into three sub-regions: the Coastal Strip and the plains of the Negev; the Negev mountains; and finally the Aravah district. Aridness, which is more marked as one travels from north to south and from west to east, is a common feature of all these three sub-regions. Temperatures are usually high, especially in the Aravah, with averages of about 15° C. in January and 32.5° C. in July and August.

The rainy season starts in Israel at the end of October. Precipitation becomes heavier and more frequent until February. From then onwards, however, it gradually lessens until May, which is usually the last month of rain. In the most rainy regions of Israel the annual rainfall is almost equivalent to that recorded for the whole year in western and northern Europe. But there is an important difference in intensity, since the total annual amount of rain all falls within a period of five months. Total precipitation varies considerably throughout the country, ranging from 700-1,000 mm. in the Safed District in Galilee to 600 mm. in the northern coastal region, 500 mm. in Tel Aviv, 400 mm. in Ashkelon, 300mm. in the Beisan Valley, to 50 mm. south of the Dead Sea and as little as 30 mm. in parts of the Negev.

As a whole the Negev has the lowest rainfall of all the main regions; the annual average for Beersheba is about 200 mm. and for Nir-Yitzhak about 150 mm., but it drops to 50 mm. in Aravah and 30 mm. in Eilat. Thus, half of Israel is an arid region with an annual rainfall of less than 200 mm., and, since this is an average, the total for individual years may be even less.

Any estimate of the potentialities of the country in general and of the Negev in particular, for human settlement, must therefore be based on a reliable knowledge of soil and water resources.

In 1955 the Department of Soil Conservation in the Ministry of Agriculture published the results of a survey of land suitable for cultivation, carried out during the period 1950-55. This survey included the area of the State of Israel extending from the north to a point about 15 km. south of Beersheba, comprising about 9.5 million dunams.¹ We should however note that land apparently suitable for cultivation as far as its physical and chemical structure is concerned is also to be found south of the region under survey. Of the total area, only about 8.7 million dunams have been surveyed in detail, since the remainder is urban area, lakes, roads, etc. Of the surveyed area only 5.6 million dunams are suitable for cultivation: 4.6 million dunams without irrigation and 1 million dunams only with irrigation. It has to be noted, however, that much of the 4.6 million dunams, though suitable for some kind of cultivation without irrigation, will in fact yield very poor crops if not irrigated. For economically worth-while cultivation most of the area has to be irrigated.

In contrast with these figures, Table 1 below shows the area of land actually under cultivation. It will be noted that in 1949 there were only 1.4 million dunams of land under cultivation, i.e. considerably less than the area cultivable without irrigation and soil conservation. This was the result of the majority of the Arab inhabitants having left the country during the war. Soon afterwards, however, Jews coming mainly from the Arab countries arrived in Israel and settled on the abandoned lands. But this process, as the figures demonstrate, was not a simple resettlement of previously abandoned lands.

A great deal of land formerly cultivated in an extensive way has been improved and prepared for intensive cultivation. Furthermore, the Hule Drainage Scheme created 30,000 dunams of new cultivable land, and the bringing in of certain mountain areas added another 150,000 dunams which had formerly not been cultivated at all or had been cultivated in an unprofitable way. In the Negev, too, about 30,000 dunams in all have been improved and made available for cultivation. The rate of growth of cultivated land in Israel from 1949 to 1959 is shown in Table 1 opposite.

The extension of the cultivated area came to a standstill in 1958, since practically all the lands suitable for reclamation and cultivation had been prepared. Further expansion will only be possible when the large water scheme intended to transfer the water of the Jordan to the Negev is completed. The cultivated area then will be extended

1. 1 dunam = 0.1 hectare or 0.2471 acre.

chiefly in the south of the country, where only the lack of water prevents the productive use of vast fertile areas.

TABLE 1. Growth of cultivated agricultural land, 1949-59 (in million dunams)

Year	Cultivated land	Year	Cultivated land
1949	1.4	1955	3.3
1950	2.2	1956	3.5
1951	2.6	1957	3.6
1952	2.9	1958	3.9
1953	3.1	1959	3.9
1954	3.2		

Source: Israel Ministry of Agriculture, *Haklauth BeYisrael 5714 (Agriculture in Israel 1953/54)*, Jerusalem, 1954, p. 47, table 14; *Reports of the Joint Agricultural Planning Centre for 1955-59* (stencilled, in Hebrew).

There are two main sources of water for agricultural and urban use: underground water and surface water. The reserves of underground water are fed by the winter rainfall, part of which percolates through the layers of the ground till it reaches the underground catchments where it is stored. This underground water is also the source of flowing springs. The surface water is rain water which flows from the mountain and hill regions to the wadis. Part of this water which flows westwards vanishes on its way to the sea, while most of the water drained in an easterly direction supplies the River Jordan and its lakes. Nearly all the rivers and rivulets which carry water the whole year round obtain their water from underground springs. The three lakes of Israel are the Sea of Galilee, the Dead Sea and Lake Hule. But the Sea of Galilee is today the only large reservoir of fresh water, since Lake Hule has been drained, and the water of the Dead Sea is not suitable for agricultural use or for drinking purposes. The total volume of water in the Sea of Galilee is some 4,000 million cubic metres and its southward outflow is estimated at 498 million cubic metres a year.

Not all the water, either ground or surface, to be found within the boundaries of the State of Israel is suitable for exploitation or use. Estimates of available resources, based on a series of hydrological research projects, vary considerably, and there are further differences of opinion as to the economic value and possibilities of exploiting such resources.

Tahal, the Government Water Planning Authority, has expressed several opinions concerning the quantities of water available for utilization in Israel. In 1957 it estimated the total quantity of water at 2,000 million cubic metres.¹ As a result of continued research carried out by the Authority the estimate was revised and according to the last figures announced by Tahal in 1960 the quantity of water available for utilization is not more than 1,800 million cubic metres, of which only about 1,540 million cubic metres can be considered certain. Table 2 shows the classification of the resources according to this estimate.

In ancient times, Israel had no parallel to the large irrigation schemes developed in neighbouring countries with the waters of the Nile and the Euphrates. Its storage systems were mainly for the purpose of providing drinking water. In the period of the Roman conquest some progress was made, again principally in the form of water-carrying systems and reservoirs. Relics found in the Negev show that some waterworks for agricultural purposes had been constructed there during the Byzantine period, but few traces of these ancient works remain.

At the beginning of the modern Jewish settlement of the country, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there were no efficient water utilization schemes, and the uti-

1. Previous estimates had been even higher, 2,100-3,000 million cubic metres.

TABLE 2. Water planning authority estimate of available water by source (1960)

Source	Available water
	million cubic metres
Rivers	670
Ground water	650
Spring water	260
Flood water	90
Sewage	130
Total	1 800
Less an uncertain quantity	260
Total certain for utilization	1 540

Source : Tahal's unpublished memorandum.

lization of water resources was even less developed than in ancient times. Using the same methods as the Arab farmers, the Jewish settlers started digging wells, mainly in the Coastal Region, where underground water is to be found fairly close to the surface. The water was extracted by pumps operated by cattle. Later on, pumps driven by petrol engines were introduced. With the development of these wells the expansion of the orange groves, which represented the main irrigated plantation in the country at that time, was started. The most important water utilization scheme carried out a short time before the First World War was the pumping station for the water of the Yarkon, which supplied 300 cubic metres an hour and was regarded as the most perfect scheme in the country.

After the First World War, in the period of the British Mandate, the water supply systems were improved and extended. The main extension took place in the early thirties, when water utilization schemes were set up in the Valley of Jezreel, in the coastal plain to the south of Haifa, in the Jordan Valley, etc. The additional water supplies made it possible to turn these areas over to intensive agriculture, not only for the cultivation of citrus groves but also for the production of fodder and vegetables.

The Jewish settlement agencies were well aware that the semi-arid conditions prevailing in the country made irrigation a necessity. The extension of the existing irrigation schemes was accelerated, and the construction of new schemes was envisaged with the purpose of irrigating the south of the country. For it should be remembered that while 85 per cent of the total water potential of the country is to be found in the north, 50 per cent of the land suitable for irrigation lies in the south.

At the end of 1946 eleven new settlements were set up in the northern Negev and cultivation was begun immediately, using water conveyed by a temporary six-inch pipeline. Intensive agriculture was thus made possible in this area for the first time. In addition to the installation of this pipeline, which brought water from the north of the country to the south, drilling was begun in the northern Negev itself and water was found in a few places.

The water resources developed by Jewish organizations up to the time when the State was established, in May 1948, produced 27 million cubic metres a year, much of it from drillings and the exploitation of underground water. When the State was established, the irrigated area amounted to 292,000 dunams, 202,000 of them situated in the coastal plain, 70,000 in the inland valleys, and 20,000 dunams in the remaining area including the mountain regions, the south and the Negev.

Up till 1948 the exploitation and development of local water resources was designed specifically to increase the immediate yield of the land and thus to augment the income

of the local farmers. What has happened since then has been part of a comprehensive scheme to discover all the potential water resources in the country by means of systematic geological and hydrological research, to develop them to the utmost by up-to-date technique, and to distribute the available water supplies throughout a country-wide co-ordinated network. The object has been to create the conditions for highly mechanized agriculture and to ensure civilized conditions of living for a densely settled population in a partly arid and partly semi-arid country which lies in one of the economically backward areas of the world.

The development has proceeded by stages. In the first stage large regional water projects in the north and south were completed which, besides tapping unused water resources, also included local waterworks already in existence. The countrywide scheme to connect the Jordan in the north with the irrigation network of the Negev is still in preparation. The following regional projects are in progress.

The Yarkon-Negev Scheme. This is the most important of the regional projects. Its main purpose is to provide the Northern Negev with water, but various unirrigated lands in the southern part of the coastal plain and the Judean hills are also included. The main sources of water are the springs of Rosh Ha'ayin which feed the River Yarkon.

Since the Yarkon-Negev system is linked up with other water schemes it is impossible to calculate its consumer pattern in detail, although a more general outline of the distribution of the water can be given. Fifteen million cubic metres will be supplied annually to agricultural consumers in the vicinity of the Yarkon, who previously pumped water directly from the river. Except during the peak months of agricultural consumption in the summer, the urban needs of the Tel Aviv district will also be largely supplied by this line. The remainder of the water will flow to the south and provide for the needs in the south coastal region, in the Negev and in the Jerusalem Corridor. The connexion of irrigation schemes with urban water projects, a method applied to the Yarkon-Negev line, makes it possible to base the urban supply on intensified pumping from local wells in summer, thus saving the maximum quantity of water for irrigation; in winter when little water is needed for irrigation, the urban supply can take in the water surplus accumulated by the pipeline and thus replenish the local wells.

The Yarkon-Negev line, in fact, consists of two separate lines—an eastern and a western. The greater part of the eastern line was completed in 1955. It is 106 km. in length, the maximum diameter of the pipes being 66 inches and the minimum 48 inches (at the end of the line). It has three pumping stations, one at Rosh Ha'ayin, the second near Lod and the third near Kibbutz Doroth in the Northern Negev. About 100 million cubic metres of water are carried annually.

The western line, not yet completed, is mainly meant to conduct water to the Western Negev. The first part will supply Tel Aviv and the surrounding districts. The length of the western line will be 62 km. and its diameter 17 inches. This line will be equipped with two pumping stations and it, too, will carry about 100 million cubic metres of water a year.

The Western Galil-Kishon Project is the second largest of the regional systems. It collects its water from drillings and springs in Western Galilee and is also to absorb the water of the cleaned sewage of Haifa and the flood waters of the River Kishon. The water will be diverted to the Valley of Zebulun, to the Haifa district and the Valley of Jezreel. The total amount which this system will supply when completed is 180 million cubic metres annually, of which 135 million are to be used for agricultural purposes and the remainder for urban and industrial needs. Up to now only part of the line has been completed, the annual output of which amounts to 50 million cubic metres.

The Northern Border Project, fed by springs in Galilee, supplies water to the agricultural settlements situated in the north of the country near the Lebanese border. The present output of 6 million cubic metres will be doubled when the work is completed.

During the period 1949-59 the output of water for irrigation increased from 300 million to 1,200 million cubic metres with a resultant increase in the area of irrigated land, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. Area under irrigation, 1949-58

Year	Irrigated area dunams	Year	Irrigated area dunams
1949	290 000	1956	1 033 000
1952	500 000	1958	1 280 000
1954	750 000		

Source: *Annual Reports of the Joint Agricultural Planning Centre* (stencilled, in Hebrew).

Out of the total quantity of about 1,200 million cubic metres consumed by the country, the greater part is destined for agricultural needs; urban and industrial requirements are considerably less. Table 4 shows the distribution of water consumption for both urban and agricultural needs in the different districts of the country in 1957. The districts are: from Haifa northwards (North); between Haifa and Tel Aviv (Central); and from Tel Aviv to the south (South).

TABLE 4. Water consumption in Israel in 1957

District	Amount consumed (million cubic metres)		
	Town and industry	Agriculture	Total
North	40 (Haifa incl.)	355	395
Central	40	215	255
South	135 (Tel Aviv incl.)	240	375
TOTAL	215	810	1 025

Source: Tahal (Water Planning Authority), unpublished memorandum.

In recent years the urban and industrial consumption of water has considerably increased as a result of general population growth, improved standards of living and increased industrial output. The growth of the population of Israel in the last ten years has been particularly rapid mainly as a result of immigration from abroad. From 1948 to 1951 the annual rate of increase was as much as 24 per cent. At the same time domestic water requirements have also been increasing. The annual domestic needs per person amounted to 110 cubic metres in 1954 against 113 in 1957.

These figures are the average for the country. There are, however, considerable differences in the water consumption of different cities, due mainly to the cost of water. In Jerusalem, the annual consumption per person was 34 cubic metres in 1954 and 43 in 1957. In Haifa, the consumption was 61 cubic metres in 1957. In both towns there are water meters in every house and householders have become accustomed to saving water wherever possible. Contrasted with this, the consumption per person in Tel Aviv was 120 cubic meters in 1955 and 136 in 1957. Figures for Natanya (207) and Hadera (250) were even higher. In all these towns there are no water meters, and the people pay water rates according to the number of rooms in their flats, regardless of the quantity consumed. In the places where water meters have been installed the water consumption was noticeably diminished.

The quantity of water consumed by industry in 1957 amounted to 31 million cubic metres for 540 industrial enterprises and factories, and intensified industrial development will no doubt cause consumption to go up considerably in the future.

In addition to the supplies needed for growing urban and industrial use, large quantities of water have been conveyed from the surrounding areas of the principal towns, mainly from Tel Aviv, to the regions in the south and in the Negev, in order to extend the irrigated area and increase agricultural production. This has created serious water problems in the environs of the larger towns in recent years. In the Tel Aviv district the capacity of the Yarkon has conspicuously dropped and the depleted wells are showing signs of salinity.

This precarious situation was due mainly to three continuous years of drought, of which the 1959-60 period was the most serious. In fact, planning which preceded the diversion of water of the River Yarkon from the surroundings of Tel Aviv to the Negev had taken the needs of the town into account and but for this exceptional period of drought there would have been practically no problems of water supply in the centre of the country. However, as we have already mentioned, it is expected that the difficulty will be overcome when the National Scheme comes into operation.

The Jordan-Negev scheme, also called the National Scheme, is at present under construction and the first stage will be completed by the summer of 1964. This scheme includes three main operations: diverting a considerable part of the waters of the River Jordan to the south and the Negev; storing water from the winter for use in summer; and regulating the regional water projects by combining them into a single scheme. This combination will make it possible to supply water to parts of the country where there is a shortage and to draw additional supplies from places where a surplus has been accumulated. At present, in the absence of suitable installations, the surplus of water existing in the north cannot be diverted to the south. The National Scheme is to solve this problem.

At full capacity this scheme will convey 320 million cubic metres of water annually from the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee to the south. An additional amount of 130 million cubic metres will be used for irrigation in the northern region. The scheme will also be used to co-ordinate and supplement other water-systems along its way from north to south, and to store flood waters which at present are lost before they can be utilized. The starting point of the scheme will be in the Sea of Galilee. The water will be pumped from the northern part of the Sea of Galilee and will flow in an open channel to an operating pool from which it will be pumped into the Beith Netufa depression; from there the channel will continue its way to a pool to be situated in the Jezreel Valley near Nahalal. From this point the water will be conducted in pipelines, 108 inches in diameter, through the Valley of Jezreel, through the Hills of Menashe by means of a tunnel and on to the south. The total length of the scheme will be 142.5 km. The southern end of the main scheme will be in Hevel Lakhish from which point the water will be distributed in secondary pipelines of smaller diameter.

With the completion of the National Scheme, agriculture will be considerably expanded, mainly in the Negev, and the irrigated area will be increased from 1.2 to more than 2 million dunams.

We have seen that the development of water schemes in the last ten years has mainly concerned irrigation in the hotter regions of Israel—the south and the Negev. The main purpose of the largest project in this field—the Yarkon-Negev line—is the expansion of irrigation in the Negev. The National Scheme now under construction is also intended for the same purpose. Large sums of money had been invested in these schemes. Up to 1959 about 70 million Israeli pounds had been invested in the Yarkon-Negev line. This sum comprises only the investment in the main line itself and not in the divided

network of the irrigated area. By the time the Yarkon-Negev line is completed a great deal more money will have been invested. The financing of this additional work, however, is also connected with financing of the National Water Scheme. The basic investment in the National (Jordan-Negev) Water Scheme from beginning to completion will amount to about 350 million Israeli pounds.

It is thus evident that heavy financial investments are involved in the development of these irrigation schemes. In addition, of course, the annual expenses of maintaining and operating such schemes are great, which means that water in the Negev is expensive today and will remain so in the future, much more than in the other regions of the country. Furthermore, because of the diversion of water to the Negev, considerable areas in the north and the centre of the country, where it would have been both cheaper and easier to instal irrigation works, will now have to remain unirrigated. Why then have the planning authorities preferred to invest such enormous sums in irrigating the south? The reasons are the following:

1. The relative absence of rain in the Negev during the winter months means that there are less 'idle days' for the farmer so that his working capacity can be utilized to a great extent.
2. Because of the drier climate the natural deterioration of roads, houses and other buildings is much less in the Negev than in the rainy regions.
3. Land holdings are larger and more concentrated in the Negev, which considerably reduces the cost of transport. Large tracts of land can be cultivated more efficiently by mechanical means.
4. The diversion of large quantities of water to irrigate the Negev instead of the north of the country will eventually increase the agricultural potential of Israel. In the north and in the centre, crops of many kinds—grain, and in some parts even cotton and vegetables—can be harvested from unirrigated cultivation. In the Negev, however, there is no hope of profitable crops without irrigation, with the possible exception of grain, which is not to be compared with that grown in the north and may even be wiped out completely in a year of drought. The total increase in agricultural production resulting from the irrigation of the Negev is therefore potentially greater than the increase which might be obtained by irrigating other parts of the country.
5. The present distribution of the population in Israel is not satisfactory. The Negev region represents about half the total area of the State, whereas its population is nowhere near commensurate with its size.
6. Certain regions in the Negev, mainly in the west, could well be used for first-class agricultural production for export.

For all these reasons the prevailing opinion among the planners is that even heavy financial commitments are worth while in order to irrigate and fertilize the Negev or, to put it more exactly, the northern part of the Negev, even at the expense of leaving some of the cultivated lands in the north and centre of the country without irrigation.

Whether it would pay to irrigate certain areas suitable for agriculture in the southern Negev and in the mountainous region is another question; although a comprehensive and detailed survey of these regions has not yet been carried out, a preliminary survey has already shown that such suitable areas are to be found there. The real difficulty is that any scheme for conveying water to the distant south (where the lands suitable for cultivation are situated on a high plateau) would be very costly, quite apart from the fact that the quantity of water available is extremely limited. Any extension of agriculture in the southern Negev must therefore be based entirely on local water resources, either from drillings or flood water. According to present estimates such local water resources are too small to support anything but small-scale agricultural development programmes.

The development of agriculture in Palestine and Israel

Avshalom Rokach

Modern Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine started at the end of the nineteenth century. The first settlers were immigrants who came to the country determined to reconstitute the Jewish way of life as in ancient times. As a result of a series of anti-Jewish outbreaks in Russia and Rumania they were arriving in considerable numbers in the early eighties. This wave of immigration is usually called the First Aliyah. The new immigrants founded a few villages, mainly in the centre and in the north of the country, but their almost complete ignorance of the conditions of the country endangered the very existence of these agricultural settlements. It was only thanks to the aid of Baron Edmond de Rothschild who offered financial support and sent experts from France that the ruin of the settlements was avoided.

The main branches of farming were vine-growing and almond-growing. Both crops were cultivated without irrigation, in a semi-extensive way, and with poor results. The plantations were of different sizes, generally of some tens of dunams. The structure of these farms was completely different from that of the Arab farms in which a variety of field crops were cultivated for the purpose of supplying the family's needs. The Jewish farms cultivated one crop only (vineyards or almonds) and, of course, their products were intended for the market.

In the nineties important changes were introduced in the structure of the Jewish farm. Instead of plantations, farms more similar to those of the Arabs were set up. The living standard on these farms was lower than on the plantations, but they brought an immediate income, and it was not necessary for the farmers to wait several years before productive results were obtained. On an average family holdings amounted to about 200 or 300 dunams. They raised some livestock and grew grain and, in the rainy season, vegetables. All these farms were in the north of the country, mainly in the Lower Galilee area which experiences the highest rainfall in the country, and grain yields were much higher than in the centre and the south.

At the same time, farmers in the villages in the central district (Rishon-Le-Zion, Zikhron Ya'acov), partly neglecting their vine and almond plantations, began to change over to citrus growing, which of course requires irrigation. Limited water resources and primitive methods of irrigation prevented this type of farming from being carried out on a large scale, but notwithstanding these difficulties some hundreds of dunams of citrus groves were planted and the fruit exported to foreign countries.

The second wave of Jewish immigration, known as the Second Aliyah, began arriving in 1905 and continued until the First World War. Most of these immigrants settled in the towns. Those who had chosen an agricultural life wanted to earn their living

by manual work in the fields, and rejected the colonial type of agriculture introduced by the first immigrants who had been trained and guided by the experts of Baron de Rothschild. Their attitude was supported by Zionist public opinion and brought about a new form of agricultural settlement based on the settler's own labour.

Such settlements were founded in the north of the country and in the Jordan Valley. The first, Kinereth, was established in 1908 and the second, Degania, in 1909. During the early years these settlements were organized as agricultural farms from which, in particular Degania, the collective way of life of the kibbutz developed.¹ The main products of Kinereth were grain, potatoes and beans. They were cultivated by extensive methods without irrigation and without a regular crop rotation.

In 1910 the first attempt was made to explore the possibilities of the south. An isolated agricultural settlement, Ruhama, was set up in the northern Negev. This was a farm of plantations of almonds and olives. The plantations did not flourish owing to the lack of regular water supplies and with the outbreak of the First World War the experiment was abandoned.

Between 1905 and the beginning of the First World War, Jewish agriculture developed most in the coastal regions where citrus plantations were permanently cultivated. The area was increased from 200 dunams in 1890 to about 2,000 in 1900 and 9,000 in 1914. As we have already mentioned, this was the sole example of irrigated agriculture in Palestine at that period.

With the end of the war and the setting up of a British Mandate in Palestine in 1918, immigrants began to arrive in the country in considerable numbers. They came from Europe and mainly from Russia. This influx of immigrants led to the extension of Jewish agriculture. Whereas in the period preceding the First World War no more than one or two agricultural settlements were set up each year, twenty-four such settlements were founded between 1921 and 1923. In 1921 the first moshav (co-operative smallholders' settlement), Nahalal, was established.¹

Diversified farms, which were to become typical of Jewish agriculture during the Mandate period were now founded for the first time. These farms supplied the entire needs of the family, with fruit, vegetables, milk, eggs and meat. In the eyes of the founders this kind of farm had many advantages. It supplied the farmer's family with food and could be run entirely as a family affair without the need to employ labourers. Furthermore this kind of farm offers a high degree of security against the vicissitudes of nature—if one type of production is adversely affected the others still remain a source of income.

The first diversified farms in Nahalal and elsewhere were, in fact, not very different from the Arab farms. They were unirrigated and extensive, based mainly on the cultivation of grain crops. The 'diversification' consisted in the introduction of dairying and the cultivation of some vegetables for domestic needs. All the settlements founded at that time were in the north of the country where crops could be grown without irrigation.

Table 5 outlines the development of cultivated lands in the Jewish farms from the first settlements up to 1927.

We thus see that up to 1922 citrus groves were the only irrigated branch of agriculture. Only towards the end of the twenties did other branches of intensive agriculture begin to expand gradually.

At the beginning of the thirties important progress was made towards the establishment of irrigated farms. With the development of additional water resources, Professor Volcani, head of the Agricultural Research Station, recommended that the allotment of land for agriculture should be drastically limited and that unirrigated farms should thenceforth be irrigated. He thought that this would bring about an increase in the

1. See Chapter V.

TABLE 5. Development of cultivated lands by type of produce in Jewish agriculture (1890-1927), in dunams

Type of cultivation	1890	1900	1914	1922	1927
Citrus plantations	179	2 124	9 490	10 155	17 079
Vineyards	10 950	25 690	13 920	16 030	19 593
Deciduous fruit trees	281	—	1 450	1 269	1 361
Bananas	—	—	—	—	374
Almonds and olives	1 702	7 786	44 360	38 675	26 997
Various plantations	478	3 114	590	—	272
Unirrigated grains	26 211	67 552	142 010	284 065	243 905
Unirrigated vegetables	—	—	—	—	7 826
Irrigated fodder	—	—	—	—	1 501
Irrigated vegetables	279	—	—	—	1 366

Source: D. Gurevich and A. Gertz, *Haklouth Vehithyashvuth Haklaith Ivrit B'Eretz Yisrael (Hebrew agriculture and agricultural settlement in Palestine)*, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 103, table 51.

farmers' incomes and at the same time maintain the principle of 'self work' (i.e., no use of hired labour) by which the Jewish settlers had been guided.

The new intensive farm was to be of 25 to 30 dunams in area, growing mainly fodder, some vegetables and fruit trees. Each farm was also to have three milking cows and poultry. It was assumed that it would in fact be a kind of ideal version of the diversified farm, whence the name 'the organic diversified farm' by which it was known. But in practice the experiment did not come up to expectations. In answer to the demands of an increasing urban population a considerable number changed over to dairying, others to market gardening, and only a few remained 'diversified'.

For the regions in which there was not sufficient water for intensive farming, the creation of a type of semi-irrigated farm was suggested with 10 dunams of irrigated and 40 dunams of unirrigated fields. Finally, there was a third type of farm, which was based on 6-10 dunams of citrus groves out of an entire allotment of 25 dunams. Perhaps the most remarkable thing in this transition to intensive agriculture was the fact that the division of originally allotted farm lands was carried out without any resistance on the part of the farmers, who had to give up the major part of their holdings. They seem to have realized that their incomes would not be reduced as a result of the change-over.

In the thirties, the increase of immigration to Palestine as well as the acquisition of new lands and the development of the water resources led to a rapid expansion of Jewish agriculture. The area of agricultural settlement was now extended to the south. In 1930, Beer Tuvia, the southernmost Jewish agricultural settlement was established and this was later followed by several others. Nevertheless, the majority of the agricultural settlements were still to be found in the north and in the centre of the country.

The agricultural planning agencies were mainly concerned with the settlement of small farmers and agricultural workers in newly founded moshavim and kibbutzim. In addition, they endeavoured to extend the areas of settlement, especially in the Jezreel and Beisan Valleys, and in the Galilee area. The expansion of private agricultural enterprise took place primarily in the coastal plains extending from Haifa in the north to a few kilometres beyond Tel Aviv in the south, in the area where most of the Jewish settlements, founded prior to the First World War, were situated. Citrus plantations cultivated by seasonal labour became the most important branch of agriculture in these areas.

Table 6 shows the rate of growth of the cultivated lands in the Jewish sector in the thirties and at the beginning of the forties.

TABLE 6. Extension of cultivated lands by types of produce in the Jewish agricultural sector (in dunams), 1936-44

Type of cultivation	1936	1941	1944
Citrus plantations	148 860	130 920 ¹	120 000 ¹
Vineyards	15 886	18 469	20 000
Fruit trees	4 402	8 169	10 300
Bananas	736	2 809	3 100
Almonds and olives	11 604	6 174	6 500
Various plantations	491	1 823	2 000
Unirrigated grains	307 250	436 919	475 000
Unirrigated vegetables	—	1 564	
Irrigated fodder	13 004	32 800	42 000
Irrigated vegetables	8 344	25 363	32 000

Source: Gurevich and Gertz, *op. cit.*

1. This decrease in the area of citrus plantations was due to reduced exports during the war.

The expansion of irrigation shown by these figures is particularly noteworthy. For example, the irrigated cultivation of fodder crops which was almost non-existent till the thirties covered 42,000 dunams in 1944. Many areas growing vegetables, vines and fruit trees were also brought under irrigation in the thirties.

It should be noted that these figures do not show the real development of the Negev. The turning point in the development of this part of the country was the completion of the water pipeline in 1946.

Although this book deals with the Jewish settlement only, it is impossible to appreciate the development of this settlement without taking into account the types of *Arab farming* practised in the past and still practised on a limited scale today. Prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 Jewish agriculture represented only a small part of the country's agriculture as a whole. Apart from citrus farming, which was equally divided between the Jewish and the Arab sectors, the Arab farmers cultivated 93 per cent of the agricultural lands of the country and brought in 71 per cent of the total agricultural income. We have already seen that the Arabs cultivated a total of 2.7 million dunams in the northern and central parts of the present area of the State of Israel and they cultivated seasonally another 2 million dunams in the south, though here the yields were low. As a result of the outbreak of war in 1948, changes in the population of the country took place. Most of the Arab population—about 700,000 persons—left the territory of Israel and in their place about a million Jewish settlers came in, half of them from Arab countries. The war caused considerable damage to agricultural properties. Plantations and irrigation installations were destroyed and neglected, natural pastures were burnt and livestock exterminated, with the result that everything had to be restored and rehabilitated. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, even without these disastrous events, all the lands cultivated by the Arabs would not have been suitable for modern cultivation.

Arab agriculture might be roughly classified as modern, traditional or primitive. The more modern type was mainly concentrated in the Coastal Plain and consisted for the most part of citrus plantations. The methods used were much the same as those used in the Jewish sector. Most of the Arab agriculture in the country, however, was what we could call 'traditional'. The farms were not organic units planned according to the requirements of complementary cropping, seasonal labour, etc.

Almost all the farmers in a given region practised the type of farming characteristic

of that region, because the experience of many generations had shown that it was successful there. In Galilee tobacco and olives were grown, in the other mountain regions small livestock, olives and figs, and in the south field crops. No attempt was made to introduce new crops or to adopt new agricultural methods. Agricultural machinery, fertilizers and insecticide sprays were not used. As a result of this conservatism the living standard of the Arab farmer remained low, and even this low standard of living was achieved only by enlisting the aid of the whole family, including the wife and young children.

For all these reasons it was scarcely worth while carrying on farming by such methods. Much of the land was not suitable for the type of intensive cultivation developed in Jewish agriculture, and certain branches of farming were not sufficiently profitable to be worth developing. Thus there was a lack of continuity between Arab and Jewish agriculture in the northern and central regions of the country also, and much of the development work had to be started again from scratch.

In the Negev the differences between Arab and Jewish agriculture were still greater. Agriculture in this region was of a primitive type practised by wandering Bedouin tribes. Theoretically, about 2 million dunams were under cultivation, but the entire population supported by the region did not exceed 80,000 persons, mostly Bedouins, who frequently shifted from place to place in search of pasture and water for their cattle. During the winter months they cultivated meagre crops of grain and kept flocks of sheep and cattle fed on poor natural pasture and stubble. This way of living had not changed for centuries and even for thousands of years. The standard of living remained low and the balance between man and nature was preserved by hunger, disease and a high death rate. The settlement of the Negev (since 1948) thus opens an entirely new epoch. For the first time, in this region, farming offered the possibility of a standard of living above mere subsistence level.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE

With the establishment of the State, agriculture in Israel faced a difficult test. Vast numbers of immigrants were arriving in the country and had to be settled on the land. Table 7 gives some idea of this influx.

TABLE 7. Immigrants arriving in Israel, 1948-59

Year	Number of immigrants	Year	Number of immigrants
1948 ¹	101 825	1954	17 485
1949	239 424	1955	36 327
1950	169 720	1956	54 996
1951	174 014	1957	71 100
1952	23 408	1958	26 093
1953	10 388	1959	23 045

Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 10, p. 62, and No. 11, p. 67.

1. 15 May to 31 December.

The bulk of this increase in population took place simultaneously with the closing down of the frontiers and the breaking off of trade relations between Israel and its neighbouring countries. Imports of vegetables, fruit, eggs and meat from neighbouring countries were completely stopped and, at the same time, most of the Arab farmers left the country. A means of livelihood had to be found urgently for the thousands of new immigrants, and fresh food supplies from a source not too far distant had to be sought

for a steadily growing population. The establishment of the immigrants as farmers provided at least a temporary solution to both problems. The number of farmers grew rapidly. In 1947 the number of Jews engaged in agriculture and forestry was 32,000, or 12.2 per cent of the total Jewish labour force ; by 1958 the number has risen to 95,800 (or 15.7 per cent of the labour force).¹

THE SETTLEMENT OF UNINHABITED AND FRONTIER AREAS

By the end of the 1948-49 war between the Arab States and Israel, large parts of the country had become uninhabited. The Negev and the district of Ashkalon (also known as the Lakhish region) were virtually emptied. The Negev had never had much of a settled population. The Ashkalon sub-district has had a settled population prior to 1948, but it had left the area during the war. Since only armistice agreements and no peace treaties were signed between the Arab States and Israel, the uninhabited areas presented a danger to the security of the country.

Agricultural settlement seemed to be the most efficient way to repopulate these areas: 60-80 families (300-400 persons) are enough to constitute a viable agricultural settlement, while a town needs at least 3,000 people (600 families). Thus, much wider areas can be populated by networks of agricultural villages than by more concentrated urban settlements and this in fact was the view adopted by the agencies dealing with the absorption of immigrants. From 1948 onwards 440 agricultural settlements were founded, 69 of which (with a population of 18,000 persons) are in the Negev, and 42 (with a population of 13,000) in the Lakhish region (see Table 8).

TABLE 8. Population of Israel and population density by administrative districts, 1948-58

Name of district	Population							
	1948		1951		1954		1958 ¹	
	Numbers	Density per sq. km.	Numbers	Density per sq. km.	Numbers	Density per sq. km.	Numbers	Density per sq. km.
North	146 879	43.5	261 823	75.9	285 659	82.9	317 890	95.9
Haifa	150 481	218.2	283 830	403.2	285 363	405.3	350 286	410.2
Central	108 964	80.1	321 014	231.2	358 505	258.3	395 436	304.9
Tel Aviv	305 827	1 829.3	493 605	2 991.5	549 198	3 328.5	641 777	3 775.2
Jerusalem	85 665	178.5	153 624	313.5	157 367	321.1	179 171	321.7
South (total)	19 384	1.4	63 929	4.6	81 722	5.8	147 112	10.3
Ashkalon Sub-district (Lakhish)	n.d.	n.d.	27 568	25.8	35 092	32.8	66 282	55.2
Beersheba Sub-district (Negev)	n.d.	n.d.	36 361	2.8	46 630	3.6	80 830	6.3

Source : *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 10, 1958/59, p. 10, 12.

1. The boundaries of the administrative districts were changed in 1957 so that to some extent the figures for certain parts of the country are not strictly comparable.

The above table shows that the density of the population in the south has increased more than sevenfold, i.e. from 1.4 persons per square kilometre to 10.3. In absolute numbers, roughly 128,000 people were settled in the area during the period. Although this was the largest proportional increase, the south, and especially the Negev, is still the most sparsely populated part of the country. The proportion of agricultural population in this newly settled region is much greater than elsewhere. Farmers represent

1. *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 4, p. 22, and No. 10, p. 294.

about 30 per cent of the population of the Negev and even more of the population of the Lakhish area.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE ECONOMY AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Israel has few natural resources. The absorption of such a great number of immigrants was thus bound to cause a considerable gap in the trade balance. The urgent problems of the early years of the State somewhat overshadowed this aspect of the economy. But since 1954 it has become one of the central aims of the economic policy to close this gap, and production for export and as a means of reducing imports has become one of the most important considerations of agricultural policy. This tendency was strengthened by the surpluses of vegetables, eggs and milk produced by the Jewish farms and by experiments with modern agricultural methods which showed that certain new products could also be placed competitively on the international market.

Tables 9 and 10 give an idea of both the quantitative growth and the qualitative changes which took place in Israel farming during the decade 1948-58.

TABLE 9. The cultivated area of Israel, 1948-59, in thousands of dunams¹

Land use	1948/49	1951/52	1953/54	1955/56	1956/57	1957/58	1958/59
Total cultivated area	1 650	3 475	3 560	3 700	3 820	3 940	4 040
Total irrigated area	300	540	760	980	1 100	1 185	1 290
Unirrigated field crops	1 066	2 299	2 454 ²	2 365	2 359	2 376	2 365
Area under preparation ³	—	300	—	25	30	50	50
Irrigated field crops	64	127	191	305	368	414	465
Vegetables, potatoes and groundnuts	70	198	270	262	275	262	285
Plantations	355	410	475	560	598	645	680
Fishponds	15	30	35	40	41	42	42
Miscellaneous	80	111	135	143	149	151	153

Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 10, p. 131.

1. Relating to crop area and not to physical area, i.e. an area is included as many times as it is sown. Generally, the physical area of irrigated field crops, vegetables and potatoes constitutes about 80 per cent of the crop area.
2. No more unirrigated land was brought into cultivation.
3. Lands ploughed and prepared for sowing winter grains the following year.

It is obvious that production for export and replacement of imports has increased more rapidly than other branches. While production for the home market of milk, vegetables, eggs, etc., has grown about threefold, the production of peanuts has increased from 300 tons to 18,000 tons, i.e. sixtyfold, since the establishment of the State. The production of meat has increased about five-and-a-half fold, whereas sugar beet and cotton are completely new products introduced in 1951 and 1952 respectively.

Although the increase in citrus production is only 60 per cent, we must remember that the groves planted since 1955 were not yet bearing fruit and that those planted a few years before 1955 have not reached their full maturity. The area of citrus groves has grown from 125,000 dunams in 1948 to 300,000 dunams in 1960. Exports have increased from 4 million cases a year, worth 17 million dollars, to 8 million cases, worth 50 million dollars. The total value of exports and of savings resulting from the reduction of the importation of food has increased from 19.5 million dollars in 1948 to 62 million in 1959-60. Total agricultural production, for export as well as for the home market, increased by 367 per cent during the period from the establishment of the State up to 1959.

TABLE 10. Agricultural production, 1948/49-1957/58, in thousands of tons

Type of produce	1948/49	1951/52	1954/55	1956/57	1957/58
Green fodder	372.8	568.5	866.5	1 217.6	1 301.3
Vegetables and potatoes	106.0	225.0	291.0	335.0	363.0
Groundnuts	0.3	3.1	19.2	17.9	12.7
Cotton fibres	—	—	2.2	4.1	4.9
Sugar beet	—	4.5	21.0	56.0	94.0
Citrus	272.7	349.5	392.0	439.0	435.5
Other fruit	39.2	54.8	57.8	97.4	125.5
Milk (millions of litres) ¹	86.0	137.7	192.1	224.8	258.0
Meat (live weight) ²	7.6	10.4	26.9	37.9	52.7
Eggs (millions of units)	242.5	366.5	503.5	630.0	886.0

Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 10, p. 144-5.

1. The number of milking cows in the country increased from 19,000 in 1948 to 50,000 in 1958.
 1. Including cattle, sheep and poultry.

A considerable share of the increased agricultural production of recent years is due to the development of the Negev and the Lakhish area. When the State was established in 1948, dairying was confined mainly to the north and centre of the country. Of the 18,960 milking cows in the Jewish sector in that year, only 5,510 (29 per cent of the total) were in the south of the country. In 1956, the total rose to 41,240, of which 16,210 (37.8 per cent) were in the settlements of the south. A similar development took place in practically all other branches of agriculture, while in some crops—mainly industrial—the share of the south is even greater. In 1957/58 the area of sugarbeet in the south constituted 43 per cent of the total (in the Negev alone 26 per cent) and that of cotton 40 per cent.

Not only the agrotechnical and climate advantages of the south, but sociological factors, too, have led to the extension of cultivation in this area. The farming economy in the older settlements situated mainly in the northern and central parts of the country is based on vegetables, dairy products, poultry, etc. The country is saturated with these products, and there are no possibilities of increasing such exports beyond the present level. The extension of settlement in these regions would thus only give rise to further over-production. Theoretically, of course, the old settlements could take up the newer types of farming, but experience shows that conservative attitudes and established investments prevent them from doing so.

Up till 1948 Jewish agriculture had little influence on the farming practice of the Arabs. This situation has changed during recent years. After the establishment of the State, there remained 700,000 dunams of cultivable land in the hands of the Arabs, about 200,000 dunams of which were used by Bedouins for unirrigated field crops in the Negev. Irrigated Arab land amounted to only 2,500 dunams. Since then, the irrigated area has steadily increased, to reach a total of 22,000 dunams in 1960. This is still very limited compared with that usual in intensive farming, but it is nevertheless nine times larger than the irrigated area in 1948.

Another conspicuous development in Arab farming is the steadily growing use of heavy machinery. Ten or fifteen years ago, there were no tractors at all on Arab farms. Today, many have heavy machinery, including tractors. Even the Bedouins of the Negev have begun to use tractors. This progress in irrigation and working methods was responsible for a 55 per cent increase in agricultural production from 1951/52 to 1957/58.

TABLE 11. Value of agricultural production in the Arab sector

Year	Value of output at current prices [£ (I) thousands]	Quantitative production index (1951/52 = 100)
1951/52	17,113	100
1952/53	20,584	99
1953/54	28,547	127
1954/55	21,168	98
1955/56	37,604	157
1956/57	39,109	159
1957/58	39,524	155

Source: *Din Veheshbon HaVaada Hatziburith LiVdikath Matzav Hahaklauth BeYisrael* (Report of the Public Committee for the Investigation of the State of Agriculture in Israel), Jerusalem, January 1960, p. 114, table 105.

Unirrigated lands constitute about 75 per cent of the total area cultivated by Arabs. The plantations (mainly olives) account for 17 per cent and vegetables, potatoes and miscellaneous crops for 8 per cent. About 50 per cent of the unirrigated area is situated in the north of the country, 7 per cent in the centre and 43 per cent in the south, mainly in the Negev. Livestock are particularly important in Arab farming. Fifty-six per cent of all sheep and goats in the State and 20 per cent of the cattle are on Arab farms. Stock raising is one of the main sources of livelihood of the Bedouins in the Negev. All the irrigated Arab lands are in the north or the centre.

As Arab farming is particularly dependent on seasonal rains its production varies from year to year. The year 1957/58 may be taken as an average year, not a particularly rainy one—in certain regions of the south it was even on the verge of being a year of drought. In that year, the value of agricultural production in Israel amounted to 675.7 million Israeli pounds and the value of the production of the Arab farms to 39.5 million Israeli pounds, i.e. 5.8 per cent. In the same year the cultivated area of the Arab farms amounted to 18 per cent of the total cultivated area. These figures show that Arab agriculture is still far from being intensive in spite of the progress made in irrigation and mechanization.

The rapid development of agriculture which followed the establishment of the State has now come to a standstill. Such increases in production as have been achieved are mainly due to the steady improvement of the standard of crops. Almost no new settlements were founded and the addition of new cultivated or irrigated lands was only small. There are two main reasons for this slowdown:

1. Israel is approaching its extreme limit of exploitation of agricultural lands under the present water conditions. Even many of the existing settlements are still not supplied with all the water they need.
2. Immigration has also considerably diminished during the last few years and as a result there are no more candidates for agricultural settlement. In fact many settlements are not occupied to their full capacity and new settlers are thus first directed to these settlements.

This situation will continue for a number of years. At the present rate of construction of the National Water Scheme, it appears that the line, in its first phase, will only be completed in 1963-64. Even then, the water will be required for the needs of existing settlements. Only after the completion of the other stages of the National Water Scheme will the establishment of additional agricultural settlements in the Negev become possible.

Although the project for bringing water to the southern Negev is at present in abeyance, a certain number of isolated settlements have been established in this part of the country and more may yet be established in the future. For three reasons, the settlement agencies continue to make every effort to extend settlement:

First, with the exception of the port of Eilath, on the Red Sea, there are neither inhabitants nor settlements in practically the entire area of the southern Negev. In order to maintain communication with this southern port it is desirable to found as many settlements as possible in the area between the northern Negev and Eilath. A considerable number of the settlements in this area are and will be based on industry and mining, mainly on the exploitation of phosphate quarries and copper mines.

Secondly, the transportation of fresh agricultural products, particularly vegetables, to Eilath and to the regions of the quarries in the southern Negev, is expensive. Local production would reduce the price of such commodities in the area.

Thirdly, the climatic and soil conditions of certain regions in the southern Negev and in the Aravah allow the cultivation of special products. In a few regions of the Aravah there are good date plantations; climatic conditions in Ein Gedi near the Dead Sea, for example, make it possible to cultivate all the year round vegetables which grow elsewhere only in summer.

The experimental settlements in this desert region use local water, mainly spring water, which allows the creation of artificial 'oases'. The situation of agricultural settlements in the region is thus determined by the places where water is found. As a result the settlements are scattered and not concentrated around regional centres as in the irrigated regions of the northern Negev.

Agricultural settlements of this kind were established in Ein Gedi, in Ein Yahav and Yotvata in the Aravah; in addition there is another settlement at Beer Orah, in the Aravah, organized as an agricultural training farm. Here farmers live for a few months and are then replaced by others.

In addition, a few agricultural settlements near Beersheba—Sdeh Boker, Revivim and Mashavei Sade—have flood water reservoirs and also use small quantities of water brought from the north. Agriculture here was fairly well developed in the past, but such methods of water exploitation cannot serve as a basis for large-scale settlement today.

Agricultural planning since the establishment of the State of Israel

Avshalom Rokach

Agricultural planning during the mandatory period was restricted to individual villages, and to the types of farm within each village. But there were no national or even regional plans of development. Planning on a larger scale began only after the establishment of the State. Its short-term and most pressing aims were to ensure an adequate supply of food for the population and to settle the immigrants on the land in the shortest possible time. The long-range purpose of economic efficiency could not always be sufficiently taken into consideration, nor were its requirements properly understood at the outset. All this led in the beginning to quite unrealistic forecasts and economically and socially inefficient plans.

The first of the development plans was drawn up by the Committee for Joint Agricultural Planning, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency.¹ This was not a permanent organization but a committee which met from time to time in order to discuss and co-ordinate the plans of the two participating departments. The ideas of the committee were published in a mimeographed booklet entitled *The Settlement of the Land* (Tel Aviv, 1950).

This publication contained a four-year plan of agricultural development for 1951-54. The assumptions of this plan, as can be seen from the examples cited, still represented the unrealistic thinking of the first years of independent statehood. It was assumed that between 1951 and 1954 another 50,000 agricultural units would be added to the 16,000 units established in the new immigrant settlements from 1948 to 1950, giving a total of 66,000 new units for the period 1948-54. Actually less than half this number (32,000 units) were established in a period twice as long (1948-60). It was also assumed that by 1954 there would be an annual volume of 1,850 million cubic metres of water available, and that 3.3 million dunams of agricultural land would be brought under irrigation. In fact, however, water for irrigation totalled no more than 1,250 million cubic metres and only 1.3 million dunams of land were irrigated in 1961.

Not only the forecasts but the assessments of the country's needs contained in this early plan were erroneous. The percentage of farm workers in the labour force, according to this plan, was to rise from 13.1 per cent in 1950 to 26 per cent in 1954. Such a high proportion of farm workers would today be considered economically undesirable. The plan aimed at autarky in the production of all types of food, except grain and meat, whereas the decision as to what to produce domestically and what to import from abroad should have been based on considerations of relative costs.

1. A non-governmental public body representing Zionist and other international Jewish organizations aiding the settlement of immigrants in Israel.

Finally, no serious departure from existing types of dairy and vegetable farming was envisaged. Expansion of agriculture, according to these assumptions, would have led to the production of very large quantities of some of the products of these types of farm. Excess production would be obviated, it was thought, by changes in the consumption habits of the people. For example, it was assumed that the yearly milk consumption *per capita* would be 300 litres in 1954; actually it was less than half that in 1960.

These errors of estimation and judgement were due to the conditions prevailing in the country during the early years of independence. The rate of immigration was extremely rapid, the foreign currency reserves high, and it was not yet recognized that the habits and tastes of the newcomers pouring into the country would be different from those of the existing population. In addition there were only comparatively few trained engineers, economists and sociologists (with hardly any experience in large-scale planning) who were able to appraise the possibilities realistically, interpret the assumptions and forecast the consequences of alternative courses of action. The economic thinking of the populations and of the political leadership was conditioned by physiocratic traditions which implied an uncritical belief in the economic advantages of agriculture. In particular there was great confidence in the efficiency of the methods of settlement and farming practised during the mandatory period.

The turning-point in national planning came about 1953. In 1952 a permanent organization, the Joint Planning Centre, was set up. The first Seven-Year Plan prepared by the centre and completed in 1953 was still based on assumptions similar to those of the 1950 plan, although by 1953 it was already known that the quantity of water available for irrigation would fall far short of the original estimates, and that the country's balance of payments and problems of local demand would have to be given far more careful consideration than had been the case in the past.

In consequence, the proposed plans were severely criticized, especially by the growing number of Israel agricultural economists as well as foreign experts, sent here by FAO and other technical assistance agencies who had based their conclusions on systematic research. Under their influence planning began to be based on a more scientific approach. The existing Seven-Year Plan was hastily revised, and three years later (in 1956) a new Four-Year Plan was published for the remaining period. The plans and forecasts of the revised Seven-Year Plan and the Four-Year Plan are given in Table 12 alongside the figures describing the actual situation in 1960—the last year of both plans.

TABLE 12. Agricultural production forecasts and actual production in 1959/60

	Seven-year plan (Projections for 1959/60)	Four-year plan (Projections for 1959/60)	Actual situation (1959/60)
Irrigated area (dunams)	1 854 000	1 770 000	1 300 000
Non-irrigated area (dunams)	1 796 000	1 695 000	2 600 000
Cows	62 000	56 000	63 000
Sheep	100 000	147 000	115 000
Poultry	2 250 000	3 800 000	6 500 000
Value of agricultural exports (million dollars)	50.7	58.7	61.6 ¹
Value of imported foodstuffs (million dollars)	16.8	39.7	65.3
Water available for irrigation (million m. ³)	1 300	1 040	990

1. Not including processed products worth \$14 million.

The differences between the Seven and the Four-Year Plans stemmed from recognition of the following facts: (a) the development of the water resources had proceeded much more slowly than expected; (b) the population growth had also been slower than expected; (c) the consumption of proteins—meat, eggs, fats—grew faster than expected owing to the rise in the standard of living; (d) it was not worth while growing certain types of food in the country. Therefore, instead of aiming at self-sufficiency in agricultural production, it was realized that the growing trade gap would have to be closed by increasing exports. This led to the extension of citrus groves and the cultivation of other agricultural products suitable for export.

The table shows that even the objectives of the Four-Year Plan were not fully realized. This was due mainly to the lag in the development of the water resources which in its turn was the result of insufficient investment capital. The lag was greatest in the development of the industrial crops, especially in the south. On the other hand, in 1960 in a few branches actual production exceeded the 1956 forecast: the area of citrus groves increased to 300,000 dunams, instead of the projected 260,000 dunams; laying hens numbered 6.5 million whereas the plan envisaged only 3.8 million; and there were 63,000 head of cattle, as planned originally in 1954, which was more than the revised estimate of 1956 (56,000).

More accurate forecasting was only one of the purposes of the new Planning Centre. For the actual implementation of the plans it was also necessary to survey the agricultural potential of all the villages of the country and prepare plans for the most efficient exploitation of the existing resources of land and water. This survey was published in 1955 under the title *The Balance of Land and Water*. Every village was classified in accordance with the following considerations:

1. The farms should grow products envisaged in the Seven-Year Plan.
2. They should use water as economically as possible.
3. They should provide all-year-round employment for the farmer and his family.
4. They should provide the farmer with an income equal to that of the average urban family.

The types of farm envisaged in this plan and actually established since then are as follows:

The fully-irrigated dairy farm comprising 28 dunams, four or five of which are planted with orchards (citrus and other fruit), the rest being used for field crops, mainly fodder for the milch-cows. The quantity of water allotted to such a farm varies according to the region in which it is situated: in the coastal regions, about 16,000 cubic metres annually; in the Hulah Valley, 17,600 cubic metres and in the south, about 20,000 cubic metres. The dairy is the mainstay of the farm and should eventually be stocked with five milking cows, with poultry-breeding (100 laying hens) as a secondary activity.

The semi-irrigated dairy farm: a variation of the above type devised for the Negev. For an average area of 40-42 dunams the allocation of water is 20,400 cubic metres a year, which suffices only for partial irrigation.

The citrus farm has 28 dunams of irrigated land, of which citrus groves account for 10 dunams, while the rest is in irrigated field crops, particularly vegetables. The citrus grove supplies about 60 per cent of the total income of the farm. The annual water allocation is about 15,000 cubic metres per farm. In addition there is a poultry-run with 100 laying hens. These farms have been developed mainly in the coastal plain where the land is suitable.

The field crops farm comprises 40-50 dunams of irrigated land intended mainly for industrial crops (cotton, sugar-beet, groundnuts) vegetables for the canning industry (tomatoes and cucumbers), and potatoes. About 4-5 dunams are used for plantations. The volume of water allotted for such a farm in the central district is about 15,000 to 16,000 cubic metres and in the Negev between 19,000 and 20,000 cubic metres annually.

Secondary activities are cattle- and sheep-breeding for meat and poultry-raising (about 200 laying hens). The raising of beef cattle is dependent upon locally available pasture lands.

Hill farms: 35 dunams per unit of which 10-15 dunams are irrigated and the rest unirrigated. The irrigated land is intended for fruit-growing—mainly vineyards and deciduous fruit trees. Four dunams of the irrigated area are under field crops. The quantity of water allotted for the farm unit is between 3,500 and 6,000 cubic metres annually. The unirrigated area is also cultivated with field crops, mainly tobacco, in rotation with beans, etc. Carob trees are also included among the unirrigated plantations. Sheep or cattle are raised for meat where there is pasture land and 200-400 laying hens are kept. Most of the hill farms are in the Jerusalem Corridor, in the regions which are 200-450 metres above sea level.

The mountain farm: usually 18-25 dunams per unit of which about 10 dunams are intended for irrigated plantations, 2-4 dunams for irrigated field crops and the rest for various unirrigated crops, mainly tobacco. The volume of water allotted for a farm unit is 3,000-5,000 cubic metres annually. There are 200-400 laying hens, and, if local conditions are favourable, also cattle. The mountain farms are in the Jerusalem Corridor and in Galilee at altitudes of 500-800 metres above sea level.

The tardy realization of water plans and the surpluses of certain farm products in 1959 made the preparation of a new development plan necessary. This comprehensive plan was prepared at the beginning of 1960. It takes into account the exploitation of the water resources which can be developed pending the completion of the Jordan Project, but not the water from the project itself which, according to estimates, will not be in operation before 1964. The estimated additional volume of water available in the meantime is only about 50 million cubic metres. This will be needed mainly for the young plantations now being established. The water problem is, therefore, regarded as serious and the plan suggests:

1. That the Government should use the authority given to it under the Water Law to prevent any use of water exceeding norms established for each region.
2. That the additional water should be allotted to farmers who have not yet been given sufficient means of production and who cannot support themselves fully by farming operations.
3. That, in the allocation of water, the needs of the agricultural population should be given preference over those of farming estates belonging to large companies.
4. To refrain, until 1964, from establishing new villages and to restrict further agricultural settlement to the 5,400 unoccupied farms in existing moshavim. The limited additional volume of water available and further economies in the use of water should make it possible to increase the area of irrigated land from 1.3 million dunams at the beginning of 1960 to 1.67 million dunams in 1964.

The total cultivated area will be 4 million dunams; in other words, little increase in the area of farm lands is expected until 1964. The basis for the agricultural production plan was the new standard food basket, incorporating changes in food consumption habits observed since the Seven- and the Four-Year Plans (increased consumption of animal proteins—eggs and meat—and also a certain growth in the consumption of fruit), and taking into account an estimate of the prospects of agricultural exports.

According to the proposed plan a comparatively low rate of increase is envisaged for dairy herds: from 62,000 in 1959 to about 70,000 in 1964. On the other hand, however, a considerable number of dairy farms are still without really profitable herds. Taking these factors into consideration planners suggested the switch-over of several thousand dairy farms to other types of agriculture—mainly to citrus-growing and field crops. Poultry farms are to remain as in 1960, with a total of 6.5 million laying hens. Similar restrictions are proposed for vegetable growing. The plan suggests a small increase in

deciduous fruit orchards, an expansion of citrus-growing (from 300,000 dunams in 1960 to 365,000) and the doubling of the area under sugar-beet and groundnuts (from about 85,000 dunams in 1960 to 170,000 dunams). According to the plan, agricultural exports will increase in value to 104 million dollars in 1964 as compared with about 60 million dollars in 1959.

Prior to the establishment of the State in 1948 there was no comprehensive regional planning, the reason being that the settlements were founded singly and at different periods; when one settlement was established there was no knowing whether others would follow in that region. For these reasons services were usually set up separately for each settlement. Only in a few cases, when, after a period of time a number of villages had been founded in the same neighbourhood, was the setting-up of joint institutions—e.g., a district school, etc.—contemplated.

Following the establishment of the State the situation was changed. The mass immigration reaching Israel was mainly diverted to unsettled regions especially in the south of the country. But though the agricultural settlements were founded in large clusters, the settlement authorities continued to work according to the conventional methods. Furthermore the volume of this mass influx was so great that agricultural settlements had to be founded with the utmost despatch, and, naturally enough, many mistakes were made. The experience gained and the problems generated by unplanned settlement led, in the course of time, to the adoption of new methods of planning and development and to a system of comprehensive regional planning.

Here we shall survey the progress of the methods of planning from the unplanned settlement to the latest methods of regional planning.

The first stage (1949-51). The most intensive period in the establishment of new agricultural settlements was between 1949 and 1951. During these years about 250 agricultural settlements were founded in all parts of the country, that is more than half of all settlements founded in Israel between 1948 and 1960. In many cases the settlements were founded without any detailed planning or preliminary survey of the soil. This sometimes resulted in the establishment of settlements without a sound economic basis.

Only in the Negev was there any preliminary planning at all. First of all a soil survey of the area was undertaken. This survey included preparation of a geographical map of the region, and an analysis of the physical and chemical properties of the soil and its suitability for various crops. According to this survey the number of agricultural units of the future settlement was decided. Later, a committee consisting of the representatives of the settlement authorities, the Settlement Department and the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency, and the Ministries of Agriculture, the Interior, and Defence determined the site of the farm buildings to be erected. Planning of each village was made separately without taking into account the structure of neighbouring settlements. This sometimes resulted in the establishment of villages in the same area which practised quite different types of farming so that, at a later stage, they could not make use of common services.

The second stage (1952-54). The first changes in rural planning were introduced in the Negev, where groups of three to five settlements which were called by the planners 'garinim' (nuclei) were founded. Each settlement comprised 80 to 100 agricultural farm units. The settlements were sited as close to each other as possible, and in the middle of the group a common service centre was built within walking distance of each settlement. Its sole function was to serve as the location for common services and institutions for the villages in the neighbourhood, such as the school, tractor station, marketing facilities, stores, etc.

On the basis of these principles two such groups of villages were founded in the Negev at the end of 1952 and in 1953. One group included the villages of Brosh, Tidhar and

Teashur. In Brosh and in Tidhar newcomers from Morocco were settled. Teashur had a more heterogeneous population—immigrants from Morocco, Rumania and Hungary. A second group included four settlements: Givolim, Meliloth, Shibolim and Sharshereth. Sharshereth was founded as far back as 1949 and in 1953 the other three settlements were added in order to make possible the foundation of a rural centre. Givolim, Meliloth and Shibolim were settled by new immigrants from Persia and Iraq, Sharshereth by immigrants from North Africa.

The 'garin' method, however, was not the only method of settlement. Lone settlements were still founded, both in the Negev and in other regions. Indeed, of all the Negev settlements only the two groups mentioned were planned according to the garin method. A third group of settlements which originally had not been planned as a garin was reorganized on these lines later.

The third stage (since 1954)—comprehensive regional planning. The garin method demonstrated the advantages of planning a number of settlements together, but its limited range prevented the development of services on a high level. Therefore a new system—regional planning—was initiated by Dr. R. Weitz, director of the Settlement Department. This comprises all the levels—the agricultural village, the village centre and the regional town.

In the agricultural settlement there are about eighty farm units. In the village itself there are only a few services: a co-operative store, a kindergarten, a local clinic with a nurse, a synagogue and sometimes a recreation room. The rural centre serves a group of four to five agricultural settlements and, as stated, is conveniently located for all of them. In the Negev these centres also have a youth club, a clinic staffed by qualified physicians, a larger co-operative store where shoes and clothing are available, and municipal institutions. All the service staff—physicians, nurses, teachers, technicians and workers of the co-operative store—live in the centre itself.

The urban centre (the provincial regional town) serves a number of rural districts. It is planned for a population of several thousands and is the location for industries processing the agricultural production of the district (cotton gins, oil presses, sugar refineries, etc.), of central garages and workshops, a bank, secondary school, government offices, etc.

Such over-all regional planning facilitates assessment of the dimensions of the various branches of agriculture to be developed in the region and accordingly the determination of the size of the industries for the processing of local farm produce and of the packing houses, stores, etc., to be erected in the rural centres.

Regional planning also ensures higher incomes for the farmers. Joint services are better and cheaper than separate village services. The rural centre also makes it possible for specialists to settle in the rural regions. Teachers, technicians, nurses, physicians and other public workers who do not want to settle in the villages are willing to settle in a rural centre.

In addition regional planning has included attempts to solve the complex social problems connected with mass immigration from countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. The patriarchal family structure of the newcomers from the Oriental countries, which is supported by the kinship groups (hamula), made it impossible to settle different ethnic groups in the same village (cf. Chapter VIII). On the other hand, a strict and definite separation of the ethnic groups is against the policy of bringing the different groups together to weld them into a single nation. Regional planning makes it possible to settle in each village only one ethnic group, and at the same time to promote frequent contacts in the common institutions in the centre which will, it is hoped, gradually break down the barriers separating new immigrants without disturbing the even tenor of life in the villages themselves. The children from all the villages and all the ethnic groups go to the school in the rural centre.

We shall now proceed to describe the foundation of the regional settlement in the Lakhish region, in the south of the country, bordering on the Negev. In the past, indeed, parts of the present Lakhish region were usually included in the Negev. The planned settlement of the region was begun towards the end of 1954. At that time nine agricultural settlements, founded between 1949 and 1952, were already in existence in the area and these were included in the over-all planning of the region. In 1956 another district was also included in the new administrative framework of Lakhish—the Ashkelon area with twenty-eight settlements, most of which had been established in 1949-51.

The first stage of the planning begun in the middle of 1954 included, as usual, a detailed survey of the soil. The area of the project is about a million dunams, about 280,000 of which are fit for intensive cultivation. The survey enabled the planners to determine the crops suited to the climate and soil of the region, and the principal branches of agriculture to be developed. Three major farming types were chosen: field crops for the level country in the western part of Lakhish, hill farming for the north-eastern region, and extensive farming suitable for kibbutz settlements for the eastern district bordering on Jordan. In this latter case the kibbutz was chosen mainly for security reasons. In view of the fact that there is little prospect of irrigation in the eastern district a generous allotment of 80 to 100 dunams of land was made for each farm unit.

In the next stage the number and location of the settlements and the number of families to be settled in the region was decided upon. It was resolved to establish twenty-four agricultural settlements: fourteen moshavim, and six kibbutzim and four large farms to serve as agricultural training centres or as commercial farming estates. Four rural centres were planned to serve these twenty-four villages.

On the basis of the number and variety of farming units and of the candidates for settlement, estimates were made of the volume of agricultural production and of the industrial plants (chiefly cotton gins, sugar factories and other agricultural processing plants) and services needed for the region. Most of these were to be established in Kiryat Gath, the planned urban centre of the region. The location of the town was determined so that it should be easily accessible from all parts of the region. Its immediate sphere of influence includes, however, only the settlements situated within a radius of 20 kilometres. This area should be inhabited by 4,900 agricultural families. The size of the institutions to serve the farming population was determined by the number of inhabitants in the Kiryat Gath district. In addition, the establishment of factories not directly connected with the agricultural hinterland but with the processing of the finished products—mainly textile factories—was contemplated. Kiryat Gath, it was estimated, would have a population of 8,000 (about 2,000 families).

The actual settlement of the region began in 1955 after the comprehensive planning of the region and the building of the houses had been completed. From May 1955 to the end of that year eighteen settlements were established; six other settlements and two rural centres were set up in 1956. The other two rural centres envisaged in the plan have not yet been established, owing to lack of funds. The settlement of Kiryat Gath was begun in January 1956. Simultaneously with the construction of the settlements the laying of water pipes to serve the agricultural settlements from the Yarkon-Negev Project, which passes through the Lakhish region, was begun. The water was available in 1956 and thus the development of intensive agriculture was made possible. The new agricultural settlements were run as 'managed farms'.

The development of the region has proceeded satisfactorily. At the end of four years the total number of agricultural units in the twenty-four agricultural settlements established under the Lakhish project (not including the settlements previously existing or those added subsequently) was 1,400. In addition, about eighty families lived in the rural centres, while Kiryat Gath had a population of 11,000. Kiryat Gath has thus exceeded the dimensions for which it was planned. Owing to the rapid tempo of development, changes were made in the plans for Kiryat Gath. These mainly envisaged

more industries. According to the revised plan the town is eventually to accommodate a population of 25,000.

Most of the projects included in the original plan of the town, and some which were not, are now in existence. In the two rural centres too, most of the planned services are in operation. The agricultural settlements proper are not yet fully developed. This is due to financial difficulties and to a delay in the development of the water projects. In the field crop farms which prevail in most of the settlements, there were in 1960 on the average 20 to 25 dunams under irrigation out of the 45 originally planned for. Many of the 4-dunam citrus groves planned as secondary activities have not yet even been planted, and others are still very young and yield no fruit. Poultry-breeding, another secondary branch, has not yet been developed in many of the settlements. For these reasons the income of the farmers, in spite of the gratifying development of the region as a whole and the relatively satisfactory development of the farms themselves, still falls short of that contemplated at the outset.

A preliminary survey made by the Settlement Department has shown that in the settlements built within the frameworks of regional planning the costs of services are considerably lower than elsewhere. Furthermore the percentage of settlers who abandoned their villages and left for other places was lower in the Lakhish region than in other parts of the country. The rural centres provided satisfactory accommodation for those employed in public services and for professional personnel who usually possess higher cultural and educational standards than other settlers.

Following the introduction of comprehensive regional planning, two other settlement regions were developed in this manner: one in the north of the country near the town of Afula and the other in the Jerusalem corridor, in the Adullam region. The development of a new region in the Negev, the B'sor region, is now in progress.

The basic investments in Israel's agriculture—and the same was true for Jewish agriculture in Palestine under the Ottoman and the British mandatory administrations—were financed mainly out of public funds. The bulk of agricultural land is national domain leased to the farmers on a long-term basis, while a variety of public agencies have been active in financing and planning the actual settlement. Since 1948 this function has been mainly concentrated in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. The Ministry deals chiefly with the problems of the existing settlements; while the Settlement Department is primarily responsible for the establishment of new settlements, especially those intended for immigrants.

The existence of public agencies for financing the farmers eliminated most—though not all—of the problems of agricultural debt. Here we shall describe the main arrangements for loans and their repayment which have been operative in the country for the last thirty years. Until 1930 there were no clear regulations regarding the repayment of loans made by the Jewish Agency. Indeed the farmers were under no clear obligation to repay these sums. From 1930 the loans were given by the Jewish Agency for a term of forty-nine years at an interest of 2 per cent. The ownership of the property was to pass into the hands of the settler only after a certain period of training and experience and only after 70 per cent of the total sums lent had already been invested in the farm. During this training period, lasting at least five years, the farmer was considered as the occupant, not the owner, of the property. Only after this period were final contracts signed with the settlers whereby the property and agricultural equipment passed into their ownership.

The conditions for repayment of capital and interest have been changed several times. Today the loan is given for thirty years at an interest of 3.5 per cent. There are now also 'standards' for the different 'farm types' with which the Settlement Department is concerned. The standard states in detail the entire inventory of each farm unit to be financed out of the settlement budget. It does not include all the livestock, buildings,

equipment, etc., the farm will have when fully developed and covers no more than about 70 per cent of the total investment. The assumption is that the other 30 per cent will be furnished by the settler himself, out of his savings or through ordinary bank loans. The standard states, for example, that if he has a dairy farm the agricultural settler will get only one or two cows though this type of farm is planned finally to be stocked with five milking cows. The farmer, it is assumed, will build up his herd either by natural increase or by purchase. The standard also provides for the irrigation of 15 dunams, whereas the dairy type farm is to consist finally of 28 dunams of irrigated land. Again the balance will be provided by the farmer himself. The settlement loan is not given in money but in livestock, equipment and buildings erected by the Technical Department of the Jewish Agency. The budget provides not only for the items necessary for the development of the agricultural farm but also for a house and various public buildings. These public buildings—kindergarten, infirmary, synagogue, etc.—do not belong to the individual farmer but to the whole village. The farmers, however, are debited with a *pro rata* share of the cost. The average investment per farm unit according to 1959 price levels was about 30,000 Israeli pounds. A breakdown of the investment per farm unit (of the field crops type farm) in a village of eighty agricultural farm units is given in Table 13.

TABLE 13. Investment programme for individual farm unit (based on 1958/59 price levels in Israeli pounds)

Type of investment	Total investment value (for 80 farms)	Investment per farm unit
<i>Farm house</i>		
2½ rooms (45 square metres), water installations, shower, shutters, outside water-closet		6 150
<i>Communal buildings</i>		
2 classrooms	17 000	
Children's creche and kindergarten	13 000	
Assembly hall and club	14 000	
Grocery	12 000	
Clinic	8 000	
Armoury	7 000	
Office	6 000	
Kindergarten kitchen	12 000	
Synagogue	11 000	
Ritual bath	7 000	
	107 000	1 330
<i>Farm buildings</i>		
Multi-purpose shed (24 square metres) with con- crete floor		1 750
Open farm shed (24 square metres), tin roof, 2 walls		850
Chicken run for 300 chickens and equipment (15 square metres)		780
Stable (30 square metres)		750
Poultry batteries for 100 layers		250
		4 380
<i>Communal farm buildings</i>		
General warehouse-storeroom (210 square metres)	18 000	
Sheep dip (at village centre)	4 000	
Grading station for vegetables (at village centre)	4 600	
		322
		Carried forward 11 860

Type of investment	Total investment value (for 80 farms)	Investment per farm unit
	<i>Brought forward</i>	11 860
<i>Technical supervision</i> of farm buildings and houses (6 per cent of total value)		733 1 065
<i>Irrigation equipment</i>		
Central and lateral piping (permanent) for 24 dunams of irrigated land, including orchards, sprinklers and 13 metres aluminium per dunam		4 320
Water-meter		160
Total investment in irrigation equipment		4 480
<i>Equipment</i>		
Half-share in auxiliary implements for traction animals		460
Poultry equipment		100
		560
<i>Stock</i>		
100 pullets or cocks and chicks		400
8 head of sheep or 2 beef cows		800
Half-share in traction animal or one work cow		450
		1 650
Settler's share in heavy equipment (at Rural Centre)		1 240
<i>Orchards</i>		
Planting and maintenance of 4-dunam orchard		2 400
<i>Electrical installations</i> , including cost of linking to main national network	30 000	375
<i>Roads</i>		
To storehouse, centre of village, etc.	24 000	300
<i>Deep plough</i>		
Cost of ploughing 29 dunams of irrigated land		290
<i>Circulating capital</i>		
For 20 dunams at £(I)100 per dunam		2 000
<i>Water rights, etc.</i>		1 000
Total investment in equipment and stock		27 200
Planning, instruction and administration costs [15 per cent of £(I)27,200]		4 100
Total investment per farm unit		31 300

The first investment is made in the erection of the houses and public buildings. Next comes the development of the different branches of the farm itself. The structure of the farm largely determines the length of the period of development. Thus, for instance, in a farm of which the major branch is fruit-growing it is necessary to provide for cultivation costs for a period of six years until the grove becomes fully productive.

The development of the new farms established in Israel since 1948 has been slower than expected. Technically it is possible to bring a farm to the stage of full development on the average within six years. In fact, however, most of the new agricultural settlements established since 1949 are still not yet fully developed owing to financial difficulties and to delays in the installation of the regional water projects, which slows down the development of irrigated areas.

The basic development of the soil and its preparation for agricultural cultivation is undertaken by a special public institution, the Jewish National Fund, whose funds come from contributions in Israel and abroad. The improved land is transferred to the farmer on a lease for forty-nine years (a period which may be lengthened). The land remains the nation's property. The lease is low—in fact only nominal. Additional basic investments which the farmer does not have to pay for include the roads which connect the different agricultural settlements, the development of the central water projects, electricity, etc. Most of these investments are furnished by the central government.¹

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN VILLAGE PLANNING²

During the early years of statehood settlement plans envisaged the establishment of moshavim with a minimum of delay. It was appreciated that the settlers might need help and guidance; and it was the task of a team of instructors to provide such help and guidance. Neither the settlers nor the team, however, knew in advance what problems they would have to face. They dealt with them as they came up, but their number and complexity left little time to consider—and even less to act on—the fact that the entire moshav framework as it existed was not suitable for the initial absorption of immigrants. Of course, adjustments of various kinds had been made in every moshav, but these were more in the nature of palliatives adopted to deal with emergencies. They were, therefore, not always as effective as they might have been. Furthermore they left behind a sense of frustration and failure, since they only seemed to prove that the goal originally envisaged—a co-operative village of independent farmers—could not be realized.

The main measures adopted in more recent stages of planning have not in themselves greatly differed from those *ad hoc* measures instituted earlier. But now they have been consciously incorporated in the plan of the moshav, the basic assumption of which was that development should be phased over a prolonged period and that the problems of each stage should be anticipated. A new term—the 'managed farm'—was introduced to describe the immigrants' settlement in its early stages. We shall now describe these stages of planned development. Obviously they differ in different types of farm, but the basic problems are the same everywhere. Our description is mainly founded on the experience of the managed villages of the Lakhish area, the farms of which are based upon the cultivation of industrial crops.³

Introductory stage. On arrival in the village the settler is provided with a standard house, including basic furniture and kitchen equipment. He is also allocated about 4 dunams of land (of the 40-odd that will ultimately be given to him) on which to grow vegetables. He is then given work as an agricultural labourer by a public or private organization which acts as a contractor for the arable land of the village. The contractor is obliged to employ only settlers from that particular village, and is forbidden to bring in workers from outside. He has to develop and work the land in accordance with the crop rotation scheme and water schedule planned by the settling authority. The wages paid to the settlers for this work are based on rates paid to unskilled labourers (approximately £(I)7 per day), and include about twenty working days a month per family. These earn-

1. As was noted earlier, the development of existing settlements is fostered by the Ministry of Agriculture by means of a special development budget. The funds allocated out of this budget are made available through the Agricultural Bank, which is a government bank handling loans and credits for farmers. The bank grants development loans on the recommendation of the Ministry of Agriculture. More favourable terms are offered for branches of agriculture which the government is interested in encouraging than for branches which the government wants to restrict. For those branches producing surpluses no loans are given at all. On an average the loan is given for seven years at 7 per cent interest. The new settlements financed by the Settlement Department are usually not entitled to such loans, although exceptions have been made.

2. This part was written by Dov Weintraub and Moshe Lissak.

3. Data and tables included in this chapter are from *The Composite Rural Structure*, Agricultural Settlement Department, Jerusalem, 1960.

ings, however, are supplemented by the vegetables grown for home consumption as well as for marketing.

After approximately one year of this experience, the settler is allocated another 13-14 dunams of irrigated land, and the area cultivated by the contractor is accordingly reduced. The settler now derives half his income from his work as a labourer for the contractor, and the other half from working his own land.

In the third year of the introductory stage an additional area of land is allocated to each household, and the contractor gradually withdraws until, by the fourth year, the settler is farming his own irrigated 20 dunams independently (though still, of course, under the control and supervision of the settling authority). By this time the entire income of the settler is supposed to be derived from working the land. This is still a period of development and consolidation, and the income is as yet far from that ultimately envisaged, approximating about £(I)1,800-2,200 per annum (1958 prices). Families which have fallen behind in developing their farms may at this stage still be allocated outside work to supplement their income, while needy cases are helped from a special fund established for this purpose.

Intermediate stage. By this time (in the fourth year) the settler is supposed to have been allocated his 20 dunams of irrigated land, as well as about one-half of the other resources he is scheduled to receive by the final development stage. Vegetables are an important source of income, otherwise the small irrigated plot would not provide a sufficient livelihood. The crop rotation scheme envisaged for this period is accordingly of an intensive nature, as is also the water schedule. The greater part of the budget in the intermediate stage is allocated for irrigation equipment to bring up the total area under intensive cultivation to 35-37 dunams. As has been said, this period continues until both the settling authority and the settler have invested the entire basic development and revolving capital, and the farm is brought into full production. Towards the end of this stage the income from the farm, by now supposed to be exclusively agricultural, should reach approximately two-thirds of the final output. The planned rate of investment and development, and the resources from which this investment originally derives, are shown in Table 14.

TABLE 14. Planned capitalization schedule

Period	Object of investment, and activities carried out with it	Source of capital	Percentage of total investment
Before actual settlement	Surveying, planning, water development, area development, roads, buildings (houses), school, armoury, office and other communal buildings	Settling Authority exclusively	% 30
First and second year of settlement	Costs of transportation, central irrigation pipes, agricultural equipment, initial provision of re- volving capital	Settling Authority exclusively	20
Third year	Construction of other communal buildings and farm sheds, acquisition of stock, planting of orchards and vineyards	Settling Authority mostly	15
Fourth to ninth year	The remaining investment, in irrigation, re- volving capital, electricity, etc.	Settler him- self mostly	35 (7% per year)

The financial responsibilities of the village, and the payments due from the individual settlers, are also subject to a process of gradual increase. Without discussing at this stage

the social conditions necessary for the assumption of these responsibilities, we should note that a village administration is supposed to be established very early—at the latest towards the end of the introductory period. Whether this is in fact the case, or whether the 'team' carries out the requisite functions, the various economic and municipal tasks have to be undertaken and paid for. These tasks are usually as follows:

1. Payment of salaries for staff engaged in various services, for which the village is itself responsible. These include (a) a part-time secretary; (b) a part-time treasurer or book-keeper; (c) the clerk of the village co-operative store; and (d) a school janitor.¹
2. Maintenance and services of public buildings and the village office; sanitation.
3. Other expenses, such as cultural activities, care of welfare cases, etc.

This expenditure is met by direct taxation of each household. In the early stages of settlement, the village dues are generally collected at a flat rate of 5 per cent of the settler's income, while later a progressive scheme might be worked out (this, however, is not a common procedure). In addition to this tax, the payments of each household include also the following dues: income tax (in the early years, however, the settlers' income is below the taxable limit); district council rates which comprise a poll-tax and a land tax, but are very low indeed; national insurance (which is compulsory), providing for benefits in case of old age, births, injuries incurred at work, etc.; sick fund; this payment is not legally compulsory, but there is no private medical service available in the villages, so that insurance in this fund is practically general;² payments for water and electricity.

Judging by the increase in agricultural production and in the average farm income over the last three years, there has been a steady and significant rate of progress which, while not approximating the theoretical calculation for the intermediate stage, is nevertheless regarded as satisfactory (see Table 15).

TABLE 15. Agricultural progress (on irrigated land)

Crop	Spring-summer 1957 (third year)	Spring-summer 1958 (fourth year)	Spring-summer 1959 (fifth year)
	dunams	dunams	dunams
Potatoes	37	130	140
Groundnuts	100	130	200
Various vegetables	197	325	240
Maize	35	65	—
Cotton	—	200	300
Legumes	—	—	250
Other crops	—	—	20
TOTAL	369	850	1 150

Note. By 1959 a total of 285 dunams of winter crops were grown, including 110 dunams of sugar-beet. Taking the over-all 1958/59 period (that is including the autumn-winter programme as well), the land exploitation ratio reached was 1.08.

The total net income of the village (calculated in 1958/59 prices) increased as follows: 1956/57, 136,000 Israeli pounds; 1957/58, 146,000 Israeli pounds; 1958/59, 168,000 Israeli pounds.

The average income of the farm unit (calculated in 1958/59 prices, and excluding the social case family) rose also, as the following figures show: 1956/57, 1,300-1,700 Israeli pounds; 1957/58, 1,800-2,000 Israeli pounds; 1958/59, 2,200-2,400 Israeli pounds.

It will thus be seen that while the farms have not developed as rapidly as planned, the

1. In the new villages all school expenses are paid by the Ministry of Education and Culture. As the moshav develops, however, it bears a progressively growing share: initially that of the salary of the janitor, and of repairs, replacement and acquisition of equipment, and later also a part of the other expenses.

2. In addition the Government and the Hadassah Medical Association provide some preventive medical services.

results still reflect a considerable improvement over the earlier methods of settlement. Farming has become more efficient, and the settlers' adjustment to the village has been better accordingly. The final test of the new methods, of course, will come only after a few years when it will be seen whether the managed villages can dispense with outside guidance and manage their own farms and affairs. This will not only be a matter of good farming and better definition and organization of the roles of the various instructors. The kind of village which will ultimately emerge will be to a large extent a function of the group structure, internal leadership and culture of the inhabitants of the villages. The problems, however, will be dealt with in the second part of this book.

The kibbutz and the moshav

Joseph Ben-David

The kibbutz is a village with a population ranging from 30 to 1,500 inhabitants. The smaller, more intimate type of these villages used to be—and sometimes still is—called a 'kvutza'. The land of the kibbutz is always nationally owned, allocated to the settlers for a nominal rent. All other property is communally owned except for a few personal belongings. Work and marketing are centrally organized, directed by managers and committees, which are elected by a meeting of all members. These meetings and elections are always fairly, though informally, conducted, and each member is free to express his views on the conduct of the office holders, or to suggest candidates and vote according to his best convictions. In principle, kibbutz democracy is unlimited. In fact, however, it is limited to the internal affairs of the kibbutz, since the village as a whole is, with few exceptions, attached to one of the four kibbutz federations which are more or less closely identified with certain political parties. The members are, therefore, expected to belong to a certain political party. Dissenters are tolerated, but party rivalry for supremacy in the kibbutz is shunned, since such contests have led in the past to serious conflict and even to the breaking-up of some communities.

All adult persons of both sexes work full-time and adolescents work part-time. All children go to school until the age of 18. The family is not a unit in the division of labour; work is allocated to each individual according to the needs of the collectivity. Children are brought up in special quarters from infancy. Nowadays, however, there is an indeterminate period during which the infant stays with the mother after birth, and in most kibbutzim children occasionally sleep with their parents. The children's houses are divided according to age; thus children of the same age from different families grow up together, while siblings of different ages live, eat, sleep and play separately. Nevertheless there are strong family ties and no doubts about family identity. Children and parents spend a great deal of their leisure time together, perhaps more than in urban families.

All income belongs to the community, and members' needs are provided for equally by communal institutions. They are allocated rooms or flatlets according to their marital status and seniority; most of the meals are taken in the common dining hall; there is a communal clothes' depot, laundry, dispensary, etc. Only for the yearly vacation and minimal personal needs do members receive a small cash allowance. While equality is maintained in the allocation of all the standard necessities of life—of course, what is considered as standard has risen considerably with time, like everywhere else—an effort is made to provide for the special needs of individuals. Kibbutzim are generous in providing for their members in case of sickness, etc., in caring for aged parents of

members, and contribute considerably towards satisfying the artistic and cultural interests of their members according to individual taste.

The most important point about the kibbutz is that for the large majority of its members it is a way of life voluntarily chosen. There are as yet few second-generation kibbutzim, and most of the existing ones were founded by groups of youth movement members who prepared themselves during a period of years for settling in a kibbutz. Among immigrants who founded most of the kibbutzim this preparation usually started abroad in agricultural training centres ('hakhsharoth'). After immigration, or if the group originated in Israel right from the beginning, they worked for a period as an organized group. This group was a 'gar'in' (nucleus) of a future kibbutz with a name, institutions and elected representatives of its own. A new kibbutz was usually founded by members of one such nucleus, but subsequently it absorbed further nuclei and individuals who, after a trial period, became part of the kibbutz. This prolonged process of preparation acquainted people sufficiently with the kibbutz way of life, so that only those who really preferred this life and were closely attached to their group stayed on.¹

The 'moshav ovdim' is also located on nationally owned land, but the land here is divided equally between the families. There is a ban on hired labour, and the farm is planned so that all the work can usually be done by the members of the household. A portion of the land, however, may remain under common cultivation. The families work their own plots separately, but have to provide work for the communally cultivated land.²

Marketing is co-operatively organized, and there are arrangements for mutual aid, provident funds, the provision of services, and usually also for obtaining credit and for the purchase of equipment and consumption goods. Thus the moshav self-government, working through the general meeting of members and their elected representatives (with similar titles as in the kibbutz; internal secretary, external secretary, work manager, etc.) has important functions, though not as important as those in the kibbutz.

Since, however, each family is here a separate consumption and residential unit, the communal life of the moshav is much less intensive than that of the kibbutz. Social and economic differentiation, though kept within limits, is considerable. Thus while it is impossible for one family to increase its holdings through the purchase of land, it can increase its livestock and its income through efficiency. Another source of differentiation is the presence of non-farmers, such as teachers, craftsmen, employees of the co-operative and in rare cases even a doctor. These people do not as a rule become members of the moshav, and would not be able to do so, because membership is dependent upon the possession and cultivation of an agricultural holding. In so far as these people settle in the moshav permanently, they are a further source of social inequality.³

Politically the large majority of moshavim are attached to one of two federations, one affiliated to Mapai (moderate Labour Party), the other to the Religious Party, and there is similar pressure towards political conformity in a moshav as in a kibbutz. But some of the arrangements of the moshav have been copied by other villages which have no political or ideological tinge, and have a non-political federation of their own.⁴

1. Today, recruitment of Israel youth to kibbutzim usually takes place through a special branch of the Army 'Nahal' which enables youth movement members to do their regular army service in units situated in kibbutzim where agricultural work is combined with military training. Members of such units have founded a few villages of their own, but usually those who stay on after the completion of their service are too few to establish a new village, so they are directed to existing kibbutzim.

2. There are a few moshavim where individual property is limited to the house and a small yard. In these moshavim ('moshavim shitufiyim') the organization of work is exactly like that in a kibbutz, except that the work-load of married women is reduced by a certain amount according to the size of their families and the age of their children, since they have to do their own housework.

3. Cf. Yonina Garber-Talmon, 'Social Differentiation in Co-operative Villages', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, No. 4, 1952, p. 338-57.

In principle such specialists can be members of a kibbutz, since membership thereof does not entail individual ownership of land. As a matter of fact, however, very few of them ever join a kibbutz. If they live in a kibbutz they present an even more difficult problem than in a moshav, since they share all the amenities with the members and are in addition paid a salary. They have, therefore, money which no kibbutz member has.

4. Officially this latter type is called simply 'moshav', while the former, socialist type is called 'moshav ovdim' (workers' settlement). In everyday speech, and in this book, 'moshav' usually refers to 'moshav ovdim'.

Furthermore, the moshav structure has of late undergone considerable transformation as a result of having been used as the standard pattern for the agricultural settlement of new immigrants.¹ Thus moshav also refers today to a variety of small villages with a variety of co-operative arrangements. The majority are officially affiliated to the socialist federations and adopt, in principle, the moshav constitution (equality, ban on hired labour, etc.), but this constitution is not very closely adhered to, especially in the newly established moshavim (cf. Chapters VI to VIII below).

As has been shown, the kibbutz is one of the most highly-organized human communities. It has a constitution which regulates more aspects of life than in any other modern community and its self-governing and legislative institutions are constantly functioning with all members—at least in principle—taking active part. Yet this most self-conscious of all communities came into being practically without any advance planning, as a result of an almost pure process of trial and error.

The first kibbutz—Degania—was formed in 1909-10, as the result of a successful experiment by seven agricultural workers (replaced later by twelve others) in working the lands given to them as a commune. This small-scale experiment was, however, an important event, closely watched by members of the world-wide Zionist Movement.²

One of the central ideas of the Zionist Movement was that only through the creation of a broad stratum of agricultural population could the Jews strike real roots in their homeland. Its members believed in physiocratic theories extolling primary production as the chief source of the wealth of nations, and they hoped that widely dispersed agricultural settlements would determine the Jewish character of the land. Jews in Europe and the Middle East rarely owned land and were concentrated in business and other middle-class occupations, the only ones open to them as long as they lived in the midst of other nations. In order to become an independent nation they had to perform all work necessary to a society. Agriculture, the most difficult and to Jews the most alien kind of manual work (though it had been the typical occupation of ancient Jews in their own country) became the symbol of national transformation.³ As a result the Zionist movement embarked on a policy of buying up barren land with a view to reclaiming it for purposes of agricultural settlement.

This policy, however, could not be realized under the conditions obtaining in Palestine prior to 1910. Jewish farming until then succeeded only in the most fertile coastal areas and only as a plantation type of agriculture, where most of the work was done by cheap labour (cf. above, p. 24). The conditions of the farm labourer were very poor and only Arab *fellahin* or Yemenite Jews were willing to put up with them. The creation of a Jewish agricultural population dispersed over the whole country was therefore out of the question.

This situation was, however, for a minority, a challenge and an opportunity. To an increasing number of young Jews in Russia, and later in other Eastern and Central European countries, agricultural work in Palestine became a personal ideal. Repelled by anti-Semitism on the one hand, and by the social and religious restrictions of the traditional communities of petty traders from which they originated on the other, they rebelled against everything connected with their social environment. They came to

1. See Chapter VII.

2. Zionism is the Jewish nationalist movement, the main purpose of which has been the establishment of a Jewish State and the revival of the Hebrew language in Palestine. Until the nineteenth century Jews had lived in Europe and the Middle East (including Palestine) in autonomous communities which preserved Hebrew as their literary and ritual language, observed the Jewish religion and customs as they existed in Palestine about 1,500 to 2,000 years ago, and never ceased to consider themselves as a nation whose homeland was Palestine. From the nineteenth century onwards an ever-increasing number of Jews drifted back to Palestine. Until the 1880s, the immigrants were mostly religious people who regarded settlement in Palestine as a ritually desirable action and were inspired by vague Messianic hopes. Subsequently they included increasing numbers of more or less secularized Jews whose avowed purpose was the creation of a modern Jewish nation and Hebrew culture. These were the Zionists. In 1896 they founded an organization which was later officially recognized in the Palestinian Mandate given to Britain by the League of Nations.

3. Many Zionists were also influenced by Tolstoy's ideas about the redeeming qualities of agricultural work.

Palestine first as individuals, and later as members of organized groups influenced by early Russian socialism.

Their collectivist ideals were well suited to the conditions under which they had to live in the new country, since only by the pooling of resources could they surmount the difficulties and feeling of loneliness which they had to face. Even before the foundation of the first kibbutz, there sprang up a variety of workers' co-operative kitchens and other semi-formal mutual aid societies, and the young immigrants were constantly organizing themselves into groups and 'parties'. This experience of organized group life led to the experiment of the kibbutz. Its success was due to the fact that the settlers did not regard their work as a means to an end, but as an end in itself; they wanted to prove to themselves and to others that they could become agricultural workers and maintain at the same time a civilized way of life.

There was from the very beginning widespread interest in the efforts of this handful of idealists who decided to leave school, university or white-collar careers and become farm labourers. These young workers came to be called 'halutzim' (pioneers); their failures and successes were widely commented upon in the local and international Zionist press; poems and songs were written about them, and thousands of members of Zionist youth movements regarded them as heroes.

These, then, were the factors which led to the creation of the kibbutz: the Zionist organization was in search of settlers willing to settle on difficult terrain; young unmarried people, imbued with socialist ideals of equality and labour, joined organized movements and became accustomed to co-operative or communal arrangements; and great public interest was aroused among Zionists throughout the world in the agricultural settlement of the country.

The same factors which explain the emergence of the kibbutz also explain its subsequent development. It took some years before Degania assumed a permanent character.¹ Then came the First World War during which the whole settlement movement was brought to a standstill. But among the youth growing up in the country, and even more among the members of Zionist youth movements abroad, the halutzim and Degania had become legends in the meantime. Even before the war ended three small new kibbutz-type settlements had been founded. At the end of the war there was a considerable influx of members of youth movements who arrived with the intention of becoming halutzim. Of the 35,183 immigrants who came to the country between 1919 and 1923, 16,751 belonged to the labour force. Of the latter, 4,952 (i.e., nearly one-third) registered as agricultural workers.² Since there were practically no such workers among Jews in their countries of origin, this figure refers mainly to the halutzim who intended to become agricultural workers and had probably gone through a period of agricultural training in a hakhshara (cf. p. 46) abroad.

The relatively large numbers of immigrants broke up the intimacy characteristic of the groups of 'workers' before the First World War. Besides, the newcomers were influenced by the ideas of Russian communism, and aimed at creating a large, centralized organization of workers' socialist enterprises. In 1920 a so-called Labour Brigade was founded, which acted as contractor for work performed by communistically organized groups of workers. In the same year was founded the General Federation of Jewish Labour (Histadruth) which was to become a central organization comprising trade unions, institutions for social and sickness insurance, as well as a variety of enterprises owned collectively or co-operatively by their members (including kibbutzim and moshavim) or directly by the Histadruth.

1. In the beginning, the question arose whether the pioneers who had successfully reclaimed the land should remain on the site at all, or whether they should return it to the Zionist organization for settlers who could not undertake the arduous task of pioneering, whilst they themselves moved on to open up new areas. Cf. Joseph Baratz, *Village by the Jordan: the Story of Degania*, London, 1954.

2. Moshe Sicon, *Immigration to Israel 1948-1953: Statistical Supplement*, Jerusalem, 1957, p. 16-17, tables A 24, A 26.

The new spirit stressed large-scale and national organization and was alien to the close, quasi-family spirit of the original kvutza. There was a search for more impersonal social forms. Besides the groups of the Labour Brigade, this was shown in the creation of the moshav ovdim in 1921. Two moshavim, Nahalal and Kfar Yeheskel, were founded in that year; among the founders were a number of former members of Degania.

Under the impact of these changed circumstances a new type of kibbutz, or more precisely the large kibbutz as distinct from the original small kvutza, came into being. This kibbutz, reflecting the ideas of the Labour Brigade, was to be open to all those applying for membership. No questions were to be asked about personal way of life and views, as long as the would-be member accepted the formal discipline of the organized community in matters of work, consumption and other things deemed necessary by the organization. Such a kibbutz was to include industry as well as agriculture, and all the kibbutzim were supposed to be organized in a central federation with ultimate and far-reaching authority over the individual settlements.

The founders of this new type of kibbutz regarded the kibbutz movement as a means for the creation of a working class and the crystallization of its politics. It had therefore to be an organized mass movement, and not something restricted to a few, spontaneously formed élite groups.

These trends towards the creation of a centralized and impersonally organized socialist economy in the country were, however, short-lived. They were supported by only a minority of the population, and had, of course, no support from the Mandatory Government which was the absolute ruler of the country. Socialist enterprise could be carried on only as part of an open economy, i.e., not as a centrally directed and compulsory organization, but as a number of separate enterprises the success of which depended on the quality and enthusiasm of their members and leaders.¹ The Labour Brigade could not last long under these circumstances, and it was dissolved after a few years. The kibbutzim, however, gained in importance and became in many ways the spearhead of political socialism in the country.

The reasons for this were as follows. Next to the promotion of Jewish immigration, the settling of the lands belonging to the Zionist organization was now even more than before the First World War the most important aim of the Zionist movement. But owing to insufficient funds this settlement was still regarded as a task which could be performed only by groups of dedicated young people acting out of idealism and not out of considerations of profit. The kibbutz, whose collective way of life and whose ideals concerning the dignity of work and equalitarian social relations had a great attraction for thousands of Zionist youth movement members abroad as well as in Palestine, still seemed the framework best suited for pioneer settlements.

Apart from establishing Jewish settlements all over the country, kibbutzim also performed an important task in the absorption of immigrants, especially in the 1930s. A great many of those who arrived in the country were neither properly prepared nor motivated for successful adjustment to conditions there. Getting away from European anti-Semitism, they hoped to live in Palestine a more dignified life than would have been possible in their countries of origin. They did not fully realize, however, that in a poor country like Palestine they would have to lower their standards of living, and that possibly they would have to exchange their middle-class occupations for working-class occupations. Nor were they aware of the difficulties of life in a 'colonial' situation, and the strain and dangers imposed by the constant strife with the Arabs. Many of these people entered a kibbutz for shorter or longer periods. There they learnt to become workers, and to endure poverty without loss of dignity; and how an organized community could withstand both physical and political adversity. Even if they later left and

1. This is true of economic enterprises only. In the organization of trade unions and social services, especially sickness insurance, centralization could be and was carried very far, since neither the government, nor anyone else, took any serious interest in such matters, so that the Histadruth had virtually a monopoly of these services from the beginning.

settled elsewhere, the kibbutz was the place where they received their real preparation for life in the country.

The Utopian socialist ideals of the kibbutzim became, therefore, the means for realizing the national aim of settlement. As a result, their ideas came to be regarded as the official ideology of the Yishuv. Even those who opposed socialism had to admit that the kibbutzim performed a national service and that the halutzim represented an élite. Thus the kibbutzim became the most rapidly expanding ecological structure in the country during the period of the British mandate (cf. Table 16).

TABLE 16. The growth of towns and villages in Jewish Palestine between 1922 and 1945

Year	Cities and urban settlements	Villages	Moshavim	Moshvei ovdim	Kibbutzim
<i>Population</i>					
1922	68 870	11 540	550	860	1 190
1931	136 160	27 740	2 350	3 400	3 800
1936	315 360	59 530	5 830	9 910	11 840
1945	439 200	80 700	13 200	18 000	37 400
<i>Number of settlements</i>					
1922	8	34	3	8	19
1931	19	42	14	16	31
1936	27	46	27	44	47
1945	27	44	35	63	116

Source: A. Gertz, (ed.), *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947*, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 38.

The growth of the kibbutzim became particularly rapid between 1936 and 1945. Until 1936 the population of the kibbutzim grew at about the same rate as that of the moshavim. In that year the Arabs launched a minor war against the Jewish population which led in 1939 to the publication of a British White Paper seriously curtailing immigration and the rights of the Jewish population to settle in parts of the country. Meanwhile, persecution in Europe made immigration a matter of vital importance for the Jews. In consequence the Jewish population found itself in a state of emergency from 1936 onwards, which ended in the Jewish revolt against the British and the granting of independence to the country in 1948. During these years, the absorption of large numbers of immigrants, the expansion of settlements, and the fostering of a spirit of altruistic pioneering became matters of even greater importance than before. The growth of the kibbutzim at this time is, therefore, evidence of the successful way in which they met these challenges.

As has been already pointed out (cf. p. 48) there were genuine differences of taste as well as ideology between kibbutzim. The original kvutzoth regarded the self-perfection of the individual settlement as their paramount goal. They were no less convinced of their national mission than the others, but believed that this mission could only be fulfilled by each group of settlers autonomously finding its own identity and way of life. They played down the importance of ideologies and political platforms, as well as party organization, and believed that the renaissance of the nation would be achieved by moral regeneration spearheaded by the kvutzoth.

In contrast were those brought up in the atmosphere of European socialism and communism of the early 1920s, for whom ideology and organization were of supreme importance. As a result of these differences, a federation founded in 1925 comprising all kibbutzim was dissolved after a short period of existence. In 1927 two kibbutz

federations, and in 1929 a third, were founded with distinct ideologies and political programmes.

Those founded in 1927 were the Kibbutz Meuhad, which fostered large open kibbutzim tightly organized in a centralized federation (cf. p. 49 above), and the Hakibbutz Haartzi shel Hashomer Hatzair, which held up the traditions of the small and autonomous kvutza, but restricted its autonomy to economic and social affairs. In matters of politics and ideology there was complete uniformity. The Hakibbutz Haartzi, the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement and a related political party which changed its name several times (now called Mapam) adopted a doctrinaire Marxist ideology, the propagation and the realization of which was to be one of the main tasks of the kibbutz.¹

The organization founded in 1929 was the Hever Hakvutzoth, the federation of the original, non-ideological and autonomous kibbutzim. Its foundation was to some extent a compromise with the original principles of kibbutz autonomy and opposition to ideology. It was recognized, however, that without the support of a youth movement and some representative organization these kibbutzim would lose their élite position to the organized, missionary kibbutz movements.

There was a real difference between the social atmosphere of the small kibbutzim of the Hever Hakvutzoth and the Hakibbutz Haartzi (average membership in the early 1940s was 93 and 123 respectively, not including children, parents, members of Hakhsharoth training at the kibbutz, etc.) and the larger kibbutzim of the Hakibbutz Hameuhad (average membership 264, with a much greater range of variation—one kibbutz had more than 600 members by 1942—than in the other two federations).²

The differences between the various federations gradually diminished, however, in the course of time. After a while it became obvious that not the particular ideologies of the federations but conditions common to the kibbutz movement as a whole determined its development. The most important of these was the pioneering function of the kibbutz.

Since, as has been pointed out, the carrying-out of pioneering tasks depended on voluntary action, the kibbutz needed people willing to undertake difficult missions. Those who had just chosen to live in a kibbutz out of preference for a collective way of life could not be absorbed in it, because they found after a while that the constant pressure for participation in the affairs of the community imposed on them too much of a strain. All kibbutzim, therefore, adopted measures for fostering youth movements, training groups (hakhsharoth), selecting candidates and furthering group cohesion and a sense of mission. Thus neither the exclusivist élite ideology of the original kvutza nor the idea of the open kibbutz could be realized in practice, and eventually similar methods of recruitment and social relations were adopted in all kibbutzim.

The relative autonomy of the kibbutz within the federation was also determined by practical considerations rather than ideology. All kibbutzim found that some sort of organization uniting a number of kibbutzim was necessary. Maintenance of contacts with youth movements abroad and in the country, the absorption of training groups, helping new kibbutzim, especially if they occupied strategically exposed positions³ and negotiating with central organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the various economic institutions of the Histadruth—all these called for some permanent form of co-operation.

On the other hand, the idea of central direction of the individual kibbutz as conceived by the Kibbutz Meuhad could nowhere be realized in practice. Each kibbutz was a separate economic enterprise and social entity which could not be moulded according to a central plan. Central direction would therefore have been inefficient. Furthermore, it would have been incompatible with the spirit of voluntary pioneering without which the kibbutz could not have existed.

1. Individual dissent is, however, tolerated in these kibbutzim too.

2. S. Landshut, *Hakvutza*, Jerusalem, 1944, p. 76.

3. Cf. Chapter V about the importance of these matters today.

Economic considerations of the individual kibbutz also proved stronger than the ideologies of the federations in shaping kibbutz enterprise. Industries were introduced in kibbutzim belonging to all the federations, in spite of the ideology of the Hever Hakvutsoth and the Kibbutz Artzi, according to which such complex division of labour was incompatible with the spirit of equality and fraternity in the kibbutz.

Finally the size of individual kibbutzim became determined in the long run by the requirements and absorptive capacities of their economy and by natural demographic growth on the one hand, and by social requirements probably inherent in the kibbutz structure in general on the other, rather than by the strongly differing ideas of the federations about the relative desirability of the large kibbutz or the small kvutza. Today, while the largest kibbutzim with populations of about 1,500 people are to be found in the Kibbutz Meuhad, kibbutzim of this size are exceptions rather than the rule, even in that federation. If we disregard the two largest kibbutzim in the Kibbutz Meuhad and the largest kibbutz in the Ihud (a new federation, cf. p. 53), we find kibbutzim of about the same size in the three large federations. The average size of the population of the kibbutzim is also about the same in these three federations, namely 380 in the Kibbutz Meuhad, 361 in the Kibbutz Artzi and 326 in the Ihud, and the variation between the sizes and characters of different kibbutzim in each of these federations is much greater than that between the federations themselves.¹

In view of all this one would have expected a gradual disappearance of the ideological differences between the federations, and perhaps even a merger of the federations. As a matter of fact, however, exactly the opposite happened; instead of uniting, the federations have become increasingly divided.

The causes of this development must not be sought in the internal structure of the kibbutz, but in its place within society. As pointed out, due to the pioneering mission of the kibbutz the federations had to recruit members actively and on a large scale, partly to be able to meet an ever-growing demand for the foundation of new settlements, and partly to replace the large number of members constantly leaving the kibbutzim.² Recruitment, however, was possible only through the creation of youth movements with ideologies justifying the particular kibbutz federation to which the movement was attached, to the exclusion of others. Competition for new recruits was only the most important means of obtaining public support for the different kibbutz federations. They also needed the support of the Zionist organization, which was a democratic body based on political parties. Thus the federations became involved in a contest for political influence.

In addition to these political interests of the kibbutz federations, there was the interest of the political parties in the federations themselves. Through their connexion with a kibbutz movement, the parties acquired an aura of pioneering, and the invaluable asset of an organized, disciplined and idealistic following. It seemed that parties which did not possess a kibbutz movement of their own would be unable to compete for public support, especially among the younger generation.³ As a result kibbutz movements arose among all the parties with the exception of those whose ideology was entirely incompatible with the kibbutz. The most important of these smaller federations has been the Kibbutz Dathi (religious kibbutz) attached to the National Religious Party.

Thus kibbutz federations became increasingly identified with political parties. Of course, the kibbutz movement as a whole has been political from the beginning. Its aim was the creation of socialist communities as a step towards building a socialist society. But, originally, the federations made deliberate efforts to safeguard the character of the kibbutz as an autonomous social movement, and to keep away from politics. They

1. Cf. *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, No. 12, Jerusalem, 1961, p. 34, about the total population of the different kibbutz federations. Data about individual kibbutzim were obtained from the Demography Department of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

2. Of the 1,927 members of a sample of seventeen kibbutzim, nearly half had left by 1937. (S. Landshut, op. cit., p. 61.)

3. On the political importance of the kibbutzim and agriculture in general, cf. also Amitai Etzioni, 'Agrarianism in Israel's Party System', *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1957, p. 363-75.

intended to serve the common aim of the creation of an organized working-class and, eventually, of a socialist society by preserving each its peculiar social characteristics. Thus, even though members of the Kibbutz Meuhad and of the Hever Hakvutzoth usually belonged to the same party, the federations remained separate.

With increasing political involvement all this changed, and the connexion with different political parties became the only reason for the existence of separate federations. So when in the early 1940s a split occurred in Mapai, to which the Kibbutz Meuhad was closely linked, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the unity of the federation. Eventually it was split in two. The majority which identified itself with the new party (Ahduth Ha'avoda) retained the original name Kibbutz Meuhad, while the large minority sympathizing with Mapai joined the Hever Hakvutzoth, which was also connected with the same party, forming a new federation—the Ihud Hakvutzoth Vehakibbutzim.

The function of the kibbutzim in the absorption of immigrants has practically disappeared, and their military importance has become negligible since the establishment of the State. Apart from certain border areas where kibbutzim are pioneers of settlement,¹ they have expanded very little since 1951 and not at all since 1955 (cf. Table 17). The new settlers on the land have not been inspired to create a new way of life or to be a pioneering élite, and have shown no willingness to enter kibbutzim. Most of the agricultural settlements were formed within the framework of moshavim, though, as will be seen below, in a rather modified form of moshav.

The political power positions gained by the kibbutzim during the 1930s and 1940s, have, however, been maintained. No new political ideologies to replace the socialist, halutzic myth have emerged, and only the beginnings of new organizations and cliques as well adapted to the formation of a political élite as the kibbutz movement have appeared.

As a result, active or former kibbutz members form a relatively large percentage of the members of the Knesset (Israel Parliament), and an even larger percentage of the members of the government (cf. Table 18). Two of the parties, Mapam and Ahduth Ha'avoda, are represented in the Knesset by a majority of kibbutz members. If members of moshavim are added, the representation of socialist agriculture is even higher. It has to be pointed out, finally, that kibbutz (and moshav) members are prominent in the present ruling parties, while there are none in the parties which have never participated in the government. Their political weight, therefore, is greater than their actual number in the Knesset implies.

While kibbutzim always saw themselves in the vanguard of socialist Zionism, their original aim was not to serve as cadres for leaders of political parties. Leadership fell to them only as a result of unforeseen circumstances. Their conscious intention has always been to serve their political ideals through the creation of unique socialist communities where people do their best out of loyalty to the group and its values, without any incentive of personal gain, and where a new, better way of life is created, based on a sense of belonging to the community as a whole, and on economic equality, fraternity and lack of competition.

Such Utopian values have always been attractive to a great many people all over the world, and most of the interest in the kibbutz has been due to its proneness to these values. A great number of studies have explored the extent to which the kibbutzim have succeeded in realizing their Utopian aims and resolving the problems and tensions arising out of this unique way of life.² The main problems seem to have been the fate

1. Cf. Chapter V.

2. E. S. Landshut, op. cit.; H. F. Infield, *Co-operative Living in Palestine*, London, 1946; M. Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, 1949; E. Rosenfeld, 'Social Stratification in a Classless Society', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 6, 1951, p. 766-74; Y. Talmon-Garber, 'The Family in Collective Settlements', *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. IV, London, 1956, p. 116-26, and 'Differentiation in Collective Settlements', *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, Vol. III, Jerusalem, 1956; M. Spiro, *Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1956; Y. Talmon-Garber, 'Hamishpaha Vehahatzava Hatafkidith shel Bnei

of the family in the commune and the difficulty of maintaining real equality. We shall comment briefly on them.

First, what is the position of the family in the kibbutz? The rules according to which the individual has to regard the kibbutz as his family, to the extent of sharing his room and other possessions with whomever necessary, working when and where it is most useful to the community, accepting the decisions of the collective about his accommodation and general level of consumption, may be quite acceptable to the individual who voluntarily chooses the kibbutz as his home. There is something of the atmosphere of a youth camp in these arrangements, and those who join the kibbutz are people who enjoy such a life, especially since it is to promote a higher purpose. As settlers, however, grow older and/or get married and have children, there usually arises a need for more privacy, and communal arrangements are often regarded as an intolerable interference with one's private life.

Indeed it took some time before the kibbutz adjusted itself to the existence of families. Until quite recently, housing was extremely limited in the kibbutzim. It was customary for three or more people to share a room, and many lived in tents for years. Sharing a room with only one other person was, therefore, an enviable luxury which could not always be afforded. Besides, there was the feeling that privacy should really not be encouraged. Another difficulty was the children. They were maintained by the kibbutz, and there was never any question of the parents having to make any financial sacrifices for their children. On the other hand, of course, there was collective pressure on couples to limit the number of children to what the community thought it could bear. At times actual decisions were taken in such matters though sanctions were never applied.

These were difficult problems between the 1920s and 1940s when many kibbutzim went through hard times for ten to fifteen years, so that married couples had to put up with not having a room of their own and had to postpone having children or refrain from having more than one child for years. Even if they recognized that the sacrifice demanded of them was under the circumstances justified, the strain was often very great.

These problems have disappeared during the last fifteen years. Married couples now have quarters of their own, even with some rudimentary cooking facilities and an extra small room for children or guests. But once these basic needs of family life were satisfied, new ones arose. Many families want to have the evening meal at home, some want their children to stay with them permanently or occasionally and/or want to have a decisive say in matters relating to their education.

Various kibbutzim have given in to these demands, to a greater or lesser extent, but have done so with some misgivings. It is felt that there is a limit beyond which the autonomy of the family becomes incompatible with the existence of the kibbutz. Yet in spite of such qualms great changes have occurred in these matters during the last ten years, and it seems that the communal arrangements of the kibbutz can be adjusted without much difficulty to quite an intensive family life.

Secondly, in the past it was feared, especially by the kibbutzim of the Hever Hakhutsoth, that a large-size and complex division of labour would run counter to the maintenance of a real spirit of fraternity and equality. As a result they deliberately restrained the growth of kibbutzim, even at the cost of some economic inefficiency. Other kibbutzim have never shared these apprehensions, and today they have ceased to be important considerations in all kibbutzim. There is now a complex division of labour in kibbutzim belonging to all federations. This, indeed, has created more or less permanent differences in status, authority and influence among the members, especially in the larger and older kibbutzim. Since, however, economic equality is more or less maintained, such differences

Hador Hasheni Bakibbutz' (Family and occupational placement of the second generation), *Megamoth*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, Oct. 1957, p. 369-92; M. Spiro, *Children of the Kibbutz*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1958; Y. Talmon-Garber, 'Social Structure and Family Size', *Human Relations*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1959, p. 120-46; A. Etzioni, 'The Functional Differentiation of Elites in the Kibbutz', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXIV, No. 5; M. Sarel, 'Shamranuth Vehidush Bedor Hasheni B'kibbutzim' (Conservatism and innovation in the second generation), *Megamoth*, Vol. XI, No. 2, 1961, p. 99-123.

TABLE 17. The growth of Jewish population in types of settlement between 1945 and 1961

Type of settlement	Number of settlements					Population					
	1945	1948	1951	1955	1960	1945	1948	1951	1955	1960	1961
Total (urban population)	27	42	46	49	57	439 200	576 207	1 067 647	1 215 564	1 588 780	1 620 000
Total (rural population)	258	326	606	732	723	149 300	110 631	310 706	371 240	322 409	312 535
Large villages	44	34	29	27	24	80 700	24 160	42 942	58 481	85 975	60 902
Private moshavim	35	104 ²	42	43	52	13 200	30 142 ²	24 974	21 162	29 326	40 172
Moshvei ovdim	63 ¹		191	273	345	18 000 ¹		60 810	92 503	115 122	120 046
Moshavim shitufiyim			28	27	19			4 024	4 856	3 625	3 909
Kibbutzim	116	177	217	225	229	37 400	54 208	68 156	77 818	77 955	77 209
Work camps	—	—	28	20	—	—	—	8 386	6 300	—	—
Other rural settlements	—	—	13	25	—	—	—	22 666	70 084	—	—
Temporary settlements	—	—	41	23	5	—	—	75 061	30 690	2 229	2 007
Agricultural schools of large farms	—	11	17	69	47	—	2 121	3 687	9 346	8 177	6 564
Immigrant camps	—	—	—	3	—	—	12 723	26 039	—	—	—
Not known	—	—	—	—	—	—	17 117	—	—	—	—

Source: A. Gertz (ed.), *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947*, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 38; *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, No. 9, p. 14, No. 12, p. 33, 494.

1. Includes moshvei ovdim and moshavim shitufiyim.

2. Includes all three types of moshavim.

TABLE 18. Members of Knesset and Government by party affiliation and relation to kibbutzim and moshavim, 1960

	Mapai ¹	Mapam ²	Ahduth Ha'avoda ³	National Religious Party ²	Other religious parties ⁴	Liberals	Heruth ⁵	Arab ⁵ Parties	Communists ⁵
Knesset total	42	9	8	12	6	17	17	4	5
Past or present members of kibbutzim	7	6	6	2	1	—	—	—	—
Past or present members of moshavim	5	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
Others	30 ⁴	3	2	9	5	17	17	4	5
Government ⁵ total	13	—	2	4	1	—	—	—	—
Those connected with kibbutz or moshav	5	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	—

1. Core party in all Governments since the establishment of Israel.

2. Supporting present (1960) coalition government (among the other religious parties and the Arab parties, only some support present coalition).

3. Have been permanently in opposition.

4. Including two closely identified with kibbutz and moshav movements as a result of long service in agricultural institutions of the Histadruth.

5. Includes sixteen senior and four junior ministers.

are not felt to be an affront to personal dignity. A high position in the division of labour does not automatically ensure a high status. If the person is unpopular or ideologically suspect, deference will be withheld from him, even if he has an economically important role. Status differences, therefore, are not necessarily perceived as social inequality, but as differences in popularity which do not diminish the essential equality of members. As a result differences in the congeniality of jobs, or in the formal authority which they carry, have not created permanent and rigid differences in status.

It seems, therefore, that neither family autonomy nor division of labour are necessarily disruptive of the peculiar social form of the kibbutz. Individual kibbutzim have adjusted flexibly and efficiently to these developments, and there is no proof that the strains caused have been greater than those with which families and communities normally have to put up in any given kind of social structure. The real problem of the kibbutz does not lie, therefore, in the feasibility of curtailing the autonomy of the family or in maintaining equality among its members, but in the threat to its pioneering and missionary functions. The kibbutzim did not grow just because intensive group life and equality were in themselves attractive to so many people, but because these characteristics enabled such people to endure the privations of pioneering. Kibbutzim, with few exceptions, do not undertake pioneering tasks today, and the movement has reached the stage of stagnation. It is unable to attract people from the outside, and members of kibbutzim are themselves assailed by doubts as to the value of their particular way of life. Adjustments to changing social and economic needs—which as such are not too difficult to make—are under these circumstances regarded as threatening, since even minor adjustments may prove fatal where the will to carry on does not exist.

The future of the kibbutz, therefore, depends either on finding some new national or social mission equally well suited to its peculiar structure as pioneering settlement, or else on consciously abandoning its claims to political and ideological leadership, and concentrating its efforts on perfecting its social and economic characteristics, until it becomes an attractive enough alternative to the individualistic way of life prevailing in other present-day communities.

It is unlikely, however, that this decision will be faced. Apart from the general reluctance to abandon an élite position once attained, the kibbutz movement, as has been shown (cf. p. 53 above), has become the main organizational and economic basis of

two political parties, and of important sections of two other parties, one of these latter being the largest political party in the country. Furthermore, the role of the kibbutz in the history of Zionist settlement and struggle for statehood is a central theme in the socialist myth which legitimizes the rule of left-wing parties in the country. As a result the kibbutzim are not free agents in deciding their own future, because their leadership is part and parcel of political organizations that have important vested interests in perpetuating the élite position occupied by the kibbutz movement.

Many of the political leaders representing the kibbutz movement and upholding its ideology are, however, no longer active members of kibbutzim, though some of them may still retain formal membership. Altogether, it seems that the politically most active element which was attracted to the kibbutz in the first place because it was an élite group has probably deserted it by now. Former members of kibbutzim abound in high political office (cf. p. 55 above), among high-ranking government officials and army officers, and in many other positions of responsibility.¹ The present membership of the kibbutzim is, therefore, probably composed of people who are more genuinely attracted to the kibbutz as a way of life than as an élite group. This deduction is also supported by a recent attitude survey of members in a sample of kibbutzim.²

The kibbutzim are, therefore, under cross-pressures from the claims of a pioneering ideology on the one hand, and the claims of members concerned with making the kibbutz a fairly comfortable place to live in, on the other. The first are backed up by tradition, the rewards attaching to an élite status, and political party interests; while the second derive strength from the growth of the families in the kibbutz and the diminishing importance of agricultural pioneering in the country. As long as this situation of indecision under cross-pressures lasts, there is little prospect of a renewed expansion of the kibbutz movement.

1. Cf. Joseph Ben-David, 'The Rise of a Salaried Professional Class in Israel', *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, London, 1956, p. 302-10.

2. Y. Talmon-Garber and Z. Stup, 'Histapkhuth Bemuath—Dfusei Thmura Ideologith (Secular asceticism-patterns of ideological change)', *Sefer Bussel*, 1961, p. 1-41.

Collective settlements in the Negev

Y. Talmon-Garber and E. Cohen

The collective movement¹ was the forerunner of the drive to settle the Negev. The initial settlement of the Negev by the kibbutzim occurred mainly in three waves which were motivated primarily by considerations of national policy and defence. Three kibbutzim were settled during 1943, nine were established simultaneously in 1946, and seven additional ones in 1947. These settlements played an important role during the war of independence by blocking the advance of the invading army from the south. Some of them were destroyed completely and were rebuilt after the war. All in all, there are at present twenty-one kibbutzim which were founded before the establishment of the State.

The collective movement continued, and even intensified, this settlement drive after the establishment of the State. Twenty-nine additional kibbutzim were settled in the Negev during the post-State period. Settlement in the Negev played an increasingly important role in the movement's over-all settlement plans. During the pre-State period only twenty-one out of the 138 kibbutzim were situated in the Negev. The proportion of kibbutzim settled there increased gradually; more than a quarter of the eighty-nine kibbutzim founded since the establishment of the State were settled in the Negev. Another important difference between the pre-State and post-State settlement drives is the penetration into more outlying and more arid regions. While the pre-State kibbutzim were concentrated mainly in semi-arid regions on the borderline between the arid and the non-arid areas, the post-State kibbutzim proceeded also to settle the more distant and more arid areas.

The increasing emphasis on settlement of the Negev did not, however, prevent the decline of the relative weight of the kibbutzim in the Negev. During the pre-State period, they were almost the only instrument of pioneering settlement there. As against twenty-one kibbutzim founded during this period, there were only two pre-State

1. Analysis in this paper is based on a research project on differentiation in collective settlements directed by Y. Talmon-Garber. So far, we have conducted intensive research in two of the four federations of kibbutzim. A. Etzioni assisted in the direction of the first phase of the project of research in the Ichud. R. Bar Yoseph took active part in the initial planning. The other main research assistants were E. Ron, M. Sarell, and J. Sheffer; M. Sarell and E. Cohen took over from A. Etzioni in the second stage of the project in the Ichud. The main research assistants were U. Avner, B. Bonne, U. Hurwitz, R. Gutman-Shako and Z. Stup. We are now engaged in a research project in Hakibbutz Haartzi. This project is directed with the assistance of E. Cohen and M. Rosner. The main research assistants are L. Shamgar and H. Adoni.

Our research projects dealt with new kibbutzim within the general framework of analysis but did not put special emphasis on the problems of settlement in arid regions. We have dealt with this problem by conducting additional research in the Negev. Documentary material of various sorts concerned with kibbutzim in arid regions which appeared in the last ten years was subjected to systematic analysis. We have conducted, in addition, field work on schemes of federal assistance and on projects of regional co-operation. R. Gutman-Shako and E. Breiman did most of the field work entailed in this phase of our research. Special thanks are due to R. Gutman-Shako, who participated also in the analysis of documentary material and assisted us in preparing the paper for publication. This research was partly supported by a grant from the Research Council of the Israel Federation of Labor.

moshavim in the Negev. The position of the moshavim in the Negev has radically changed since then; 75 per cent of all settlements founded in the Negev in the post-State period are moshavim. Since 1952 their relative weight has increased to about 85 per cent of all new settlements in the Negev.

Yet while losing its position as the major instrument of settlement, the collective movement has retained to a certain extent its pioneering role. Settlement of the Negev occupies a relatively more important position in its over-all settlement plan than in the over-all plans of the co-operative movement. During the period 1948-51, 27 per cent of all the new kibbutzim were settled in the arid region as against 17 per cent of new moshavim. During the period 1952-60, 59 per cent of all new kibbutzim were settled there as against 40 per cent of all new moshavim. The kibbutzim are, in addition, concentrated in the more arid districts. Comparison of the proportion of kibbutzim and moshavim in the more fertile Lachish district and in the more arid northern Negev district indicates that 68 per cent of the kibbutzim in these districts are concentrated in the most arid areas as against 48 per cent of the moshavim. Most of the field experimental stations in the far south and in the Dead Sea area which prepare the land for cultivation and conduct systematic experiments of acclimatization of crops to the Negev, are controlled by federations of kibbutzim. Furthermore, most kibbutzim are situated along the borders or on the fringes around the settlement areas, thus forming a first defence line which protects the other settlements in the district. A more detailed examination of the process of settlement in the Negev amplifies the results of the ecological analysis and makes it clear that the kibbutzim still perform three vital functions in the settlement of the Negev:

1. They serve as a spearhead in the advancement of settlement into more outlying and more arid regions. Settlement in such areas entails a longer preparatory period during which cultivation offers no, or only negligible, economic rewards. Preparation of the soil for cultivation requires protracted and arduous work. Before any crop can be planted, the soil has to be cleared of stones and rocks or desalinated. The settlers have to examine the scarce water resources and devise and try out means of utilizing them in the most economical way. The task of initial exploration and preparation of a yet unknown and extremely difficult terrain requires considerable physical stamina, dedication and perseverance.
2. A long term of experimentation and careful planning and flexibility are required before economic activity can be conducted on a more entrepreneurial basis.
3. The kibbutzim still serve to some extent as military outposts and as first defence lines which protect the borders and other more vulnerable types of settlement. The establishment of the State has considerably diminished the tasks of the kibbutzim in this respect, since the army carries out the main responsibility in this sphere. Yet the long borderline, the prevalence of infiltration and the constant threat of invasion make the task of surveillance and defence of widely dispersed settlements extremely difficult. Such a task cannot be effectively carried out by the army without the active participation of the settlers. Defence of their own settlement against sudden attack is therefore one of the main duties of the settlers, who have to keep their military training up to date and be constantly on their guard. Settlement in remote frontier areas is a semi-military undertaking calling for a flexible combination of activities directed towards economic development on the one hand, and defence on the other. As in the case of pioneering and experimentation, the kibbutzim are better able to cope with this problem than any other type of settlement.

The advantages that the kibbutzim have over other types of settlement in fulfilling these functions stem from the distinctive characteristics of their ideology and social structure. Of utmost importance in this context is the collective orientation and the subordination of economic interests to wider social and ideological considerations. The more outlying and arid an area is, the heavier is the initial investment of arduous work

and capital, and the longer is the preparatory period of experimentation during which cultivation does not offer any profit and therefore cannot be based on economic incentives.

High productivity is one of the most important goals of the kibbutz but it is a long-range, not a short-range, goal. Even when the kibbutz develops and profit-making gains in importance, the amount of profit does not become the only standard by which its achievements are measured. Moreover, eventual profit is a collective goal, not a personal motive. On the personal level the profit motive operates only in an indirect and attenuated way to the extent that productivity affects the non-differential standard of living of the kibbutz as a whole. Expectation of profit is only a secondary and, during the first phases of settlement, unimportant control mechanism. The supreme effort needed to overcome the enormous environmental obstacles is generated and inspired by a collective identification and a strong service orientation. Strenuous work which does not lead to immediate economic rewards is endowed with deep meaning and dignity. It serves as an instrument for the realization of social and national ideals as well as being an ultimate value in itself. Identification with the collective movement evokes the dynamic drive and ascetic dedication, the self-discipline and perseverance required by the initial phases of settlement in such adverse conditions.

The inherent tendency of the kibbutz to the extension of the scale of production, to rationalization, mechanization and specialization enhances its efficiency and accounts for its efficacy as an instrument of settlement. Comparatively large-scale production fosters the tendency to introduce specialized machinery and facilitates the widespread application of scientifically tested techniques. The non-family division of labour enables the kibbutz to cultivate comparatively high levels of specialized skill and calls for over-all planning and control. This type of organization allows for better co-ordination of efforts in different fields and for more flexibility in the use of manpower and resources. The management of the kibbutz can flexibly transfer workers, capital and machinery from one branch to another, constantly adapting its economy to the conditions of its environment and to the changing opportunities and demands of the market.

This combination of central control and co-ordination with flexibility is particularly important in the sphere of defence. In case of emergency the kibbutz is able to mobilize a large proportion of its members without delay and entrust the care of its work-branches to a drastically reduced number of workers. These workers are sufficient to prevent permanent harm to production branches and to provide for the indispensable needs of the members while the kibbutz temporarily concentrates on defence activities. A moshav, composed of organizationally and ecologically independent family farms, is more difficult to look after and defend in times of emergency. The organizational structure of the kibbutz facilitates the combination of military and economic functions.

The type of settlers drawn to the kibbutzim and the internal cohesion of their nuclei of settlers are of considerable importance as well. The kibbutzim are an outgrowth of the youth movements. Members of these nuclei are usually young and unattached. Members of moshavim are considerably older, and many of them already have a family with a number of children at the time they settle. The young members of the kibbutzim who are not yet burdened by small children are better able to cope with the vicissitudes and hardships of the initial phases of settlement. Members of the kibbutzim are, generally speaking, better trained and more highly educated than members of the new moshavim. Their higher level of training and education enables them to specialize and plan systematically. They are far better equipped for conducting controlled experiments and constantly improving their techniques and modes of cultivation. Nuclei of settlers in kibbutzim are more selective and more cohesive, having undergone a comparatively long period of preparatory training and consolidation together. Nuclei of settlers in moshavim are non-selective and are formed mainly by administrative decision. Most important of all in this context is the consciousness of their élite position which is more

or less prevalent among members of kibbutzim. Most members of the new moshavim are new immigrants of comparatively low status. The kibbutzim recruit most of their members from higher status groups. Most members of the majority of moshavim in the Negev have not gone to settle there of their own initiative but were directed there by the Settlement Department. In the case of members of kibbutzim, settlement in the Negev is treated as a major challenge and accepted as a self-imposed duty. They regard their special responsibilities in this sphere as a corollary of their leadership position.

THE CRISIS OF RECRUITMENT

The specific characteristics of the kibbutz have made it the major instrument of frontier and arid area settlement in the pre-State period and have helped it to maintain to some extent its special position despite the sharp decline in the proportion of kibbutzim in the settlement of the Negev. It should be stressed, however, that the severe crisis of recruitment which has been harassing the kibbutzim since the establishment of the State interferes with their proper functioning and limits their efficacy as an instrument of settlement. This crisis is a result of major changes in the structure of Israel society and of the concomitant shift in the élite position of the collective movement within it.

The establishment of the State accelerated and set in motion a series of social processes which undermined to a large extent this position of widely acknowledged leadership.¹ The achievement of independence weakened the orientation towards the future so strong in the pre-State period, and strengthened the orientation towards the present. The emphasis on long-term goals was superseded by an emphasis on short-term tasks and immediate satisfactions. The acquisition of State power lessened the dependence of the social structure on movements of a voluntary, charismatic type, oriented towards collective service. The implementation of collective values and goals has been increasingly relegated to formal organizations such as the regular army, the Settlement Department and the civil service. The establishment of the State intensified the process of institutional differentiation and led to a proliferation of new administrative agencies. All this in its turn enhanced the importance of political, bureaucratic and professional élites and undermined the predominance of the pioneering élite.

The structural and ideological changes in Israel society were precipitated by the character of post-State immigration. The centres of strong Zionist youth movements in Poland and central Europe were wiped out during the Second World War. Most immigrants who have come from Europe since the war have not been members of such movements and have not received any preparatory ideological and vocational re-training. They have usually had a general attitude of goodwill towards Israel but no strong identification with its aims and values. Most of these immigrants had undergone more or less severe hardship during the war and many of them spent long periods in concentration camps. Their experience of disaster and captivity has instilled in them a deep yearning for privacy and undisturbed personal development, and they are intent on regaining and bettering their lost status. This emphasis on personal aspirations is prevalent also among immigrants from communist countries who have undergone enforced collectivization. This experience has resulted in most cases in a reaction against the socialist ideology and a strong individualistic tendency. Very few of these immigrants evince any disposition to engage in pioneering in collective settlements.

Immigrants from Asia and Africa are usually oriented towards traditional familistic values which run counter to the essentially secular and non-familistic values prevalent in the absorbing society. They are intent on continuing their former patterns of life and have evinced hardly any disposition to change. The individualistic achievement orien-

1. On the major changes in Israel society since the establishment of the State, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954.

tation prevalent among non-traditional immigrants and the familistic orientation prevalent among traditional immigrants have attenuated the collective service orientation which predominated in the formative ideology of the absorbing society.

The proportion of professionals, managers and technical experts among the Oriental immigrants, who form a major part of the immigrants, was small. Most of the new immigrants were relatively unskilled and had moreover little capital of their own.¹ Most of them were destined to become labourers and farmers and could not supply the managerial and technical cadres required for the absorption of mass immigration. The scarcity of trained personnel coupled with an ample supply of unskilled labour enhanced the importance of recruitment of professional and managerial élites, and reduced to some extent the importance of voluntary proletarianization and settlement on the land. The ideological reformulation went further than was necessitated by the structural transformation alone, and the collective pioneering emphasis was to a large extent superseded by an individualistic achievement orientation.

These processes have had an adverse effect on the collective movement.² The continuity of values between it and society as a whole has been severed. Many of its important functions have been taken over by specialized bureaucratic bodies. The emerging alternative élite functions compete with voluntary pioneering and undermine its position as the most important élite function. The loss of this pivotal élite position has reduced the appeal of pioneering and weakened the youth movements directed towards settlement in kibbutzim.

The discrepancy between the values and mode of life of the kibbutzim and the value orientations and social patterns prevalent among the immigrants account for the fact that the kibbutzim have not been able to contribute much to the absorption of mass immigration and have received little reinforcement from it. Unlike in the pre-State period most immigrants are ready to undergo severe hardships and to suffer from prolonged unemployment rather than join a kibbutz. Even the few who joined a kibbutz on their arrival in the country have used it merely as a temporary haven and as a stepping stone.

The youth movements have always been the main source of prospective settlers in kibbutzim whose worst setbacks stem from the partial drying-up of this source.³ There is a strict ban on Zionist youth movements in all Eastern European countries, which were once the main reservoirs of pioneers. Voluntary pioneering movements in Western Europe and the United States are small and weak and have supplied the kibbutzim with only a few and fairly unstable nuclei of settlers. The only exception in this respect are the youth movements in South America which have sent out a steady stream of ardent, dedicated and persevering pioneers. In many respects the South American Zionist youth movements resemble the European youth movements which supplied the kibbutzim with their nuclei of settlers during the pre-State period. As in the case of the pre-State pioneers, identification with the collective ideology is intense and enduring. The voluntary decision to immigrate to Israel, and establish a kibbutz there, is the outcome of a kind of conversion which induces a total change in one's attitude and way of life (cf. p. 47-8).

By contrast, nuclei of Israel settlers are very unstable. Only a small proportion of the members of each movement become members of its training nuclei which actively prepare for life in the settlement. Many more drop out during the preparatory period of training and during the first phases of settlement. Only a more or less small core of the original settlers and of each nucleus of reinforcements, which joins them during later phases of development, remain in the kibbutz. The federations of kibbutzim refused to make

1. Cf. Chapter VI.

2. On the change in the position of the collective movement in Israel society, see Y. Talmon-Garber and Z. Stup, *op. cit.*

3. A sociological analysis of the role of the pre- and post-State youth movements will be found in S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Youth Culture and Social Structure in Israel', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1951, p. 105-14. Cf. also his book, *From Generation to Generation*, 1956, p. 98-107, and Y. Ben David, 'Haveruth Bithnuath Noar Vestatus Hevrathi', (Membership in youth movements and social status), *Megamoth*, Vol. V, No. 3, 1956, p. 228-47.

public their statistics on the turnover in new kibbutzim, but examination of our case studies clearly indicates that only a minority of members of Israel youth movements keep their pledge to pioneering collective settlement. An extreme example may illustrate how serious such a process of withdrawal may become.

The number of the oldest age-group in one of the youth movements which puts a strong, though not exclusive, emphasis on pioneering settlement was about 300; only 160 of them participated in the preparatory training which the group has undergone in an established kibbutz. Half of these fell off during this period and at the time they established their kibbutz in the Negev the nucleus of settlers comprised eighty members. A few years later, when we started to conduct our research there, we found that only thirty-five of the original settlers were still members of the kibbutz. After a further two years, the core of founders had dwindled to twenty members. It should be stressed that this is one of the extreme cases and that movements which put a more exclusive and more unequivocal emphasis on settlement in a kibbutz usually attain better and more lasting results. There are significant differences in this respect between the different youth movements. Yet in all of them there is quite a high incidence of withdrawal. This took place in the pre-State period as well, but the process has recently increased considerably in intensity.

Examination of our data clearly indicates that for most members of Israel youth movements, settlement in a kibbutz has become a temporary commitment rather than a life-long pledge. A term of service in a kibbutz is regarded by them as a necessary—though passing—phase in their life cycle. It has come to serve as a *rite de passage*, a segregated period of dedicated service and intensive symbolic affirmation of collective values. This period of service absolves them from their pledge and after having completed it they feel free to concentrate on furthering their personal aspirations.

In the past, members of youth movements who left a kibbutz used to be very apologetic about it and many had a deep feeling of guilt and of personal inadequacy. This is no longer the case. There are now other legitimate élite functions, and pioneering no longer enjoys an unquestioned primacy. It would now appear that being intent on a lucrative and respected bureaucratic or professional career, and on advancing in such a career, is a legitimate way of serving the community. Even members who have remained faithful to their kibbutz do not judge too harshly their friends who have withdrawn from it, and tend to condone such withdrawal.

Nuclei of Israel settlers are less stable for yet another reason. They are much more exposed to external influences because in their case settlement in a kibbutz does not entail a radical dissociation from social ties with non-members. Nuclei of settlers who come from abroad are cut off from their relatives and friends there and usually have only a few superficial ties to non-members in Israel. There is no comparable rift in the web of social relations for Israel settlers who usually maintain close ties with their family and former friends. They visit their parents often and their relatives come to visit them too. They will usually not discontinue friendships which they have made at school or in the army. Outside influences penetrate into the kibbutz through these contacts and have a corrosive effect on it. Parents are particularly important in this respect. Most of them accept the decision of their children to settle in a kibbutz with mixed feelings and many of them are openly opposed to it. They exert a continuous pressure on their children to return home and offer to help them in starting them on their careers. Since many of the young settlers come from established and fairly well-to-do families, they can always fall back on their family and get its support. A member of a South American nucleus who leaves his kibbutz is in most cases a stranger in an alien land and has to fend for himself. He may get financial support from abroad, but he does not know his way about and lacks the necessary contacts. Generally speaking, Israelis find it easier than newcomers to establish themselves after leaving their kibbutz and are therefore less firmly attached to it.

The process of withdrawal affects men and women in a different way. There are usually fewer women than men in the nuclei of settlers, and women are in addition more prone to drop off and return home. Girls are more firmly embedded in their families and are more closely supervised and controlled by their parents than boys. Girls consequently find it more difficult to dissociate themselves from their family and go out on their own. There is also, generally speaking, much more parental opposition in the case of girls, since many parents feel that girls are not fit for the extremely arduous and hazardous task of pioneering. The shortage of women stems also from the fact that women find it more difficult to adjust to the kibbutz than men. The limitation of family functions has but little effect on the husband's role. It entails, however, a radical change in the role of wife and mother. The curtailment of family duties means in the case of women an almost complete transfer to 'public' employment. Former socialization and outside influences prevent a smooth and whole-hearted acceptance of this radical change. Another important operative factor in this process is a certain disappointment at the results of the change. A fairly clear-cut sex-role differentiation has emerged in the kibbutzim in spite of the equalitarian ideology. Women are mainly concentrated in occupations closely allied to housekeeping, such as cooking, laundry service, nursing and teaching. Quite a number of women feel that if they have to stick to traditional female roles they would rather perform them within the confines of their own homes than within the framework of the specialized and comparatively large-scale communal institution. All these factors help to account for the fact that women are more prone to leave the kibbutz than men.¹

A certain shortage of women exists in many kibbutzim all over the country, but while in most established kibbutzim there is almost an equilibrium between the sexes, the percentage of women in new kibbutzim is much lower than the percentage of men. Our material on distribution of the sexes indicates that a shortage of women is more marked in new kibbutzim in arid areas than in new kibbutzim elsewhere. In many new kibbutzim in arid areas, the percentage of the women in the population is 30 to 40, and in some of the most distant and arid regions it is even lower than that. This dis-equilibrium between the sexes gives rise to serious demographic and social problems. Many members have to forgo sexual gratification and cannot find wives for a long time. The search for less limited and more varied opportunities of contact with members of the other sex draws them outside the kibbutz either temporarily or, more often, permanently. In due time, as the kibbutz develops, the percentage of women in the population usually rises and most members are eventually able to establish a family. Yet there usually remains a hard core of bachelors of long standing who cannot find a suitable spouse. Their position becomes particularly difficult when most of their comrades are already engrossed in their family affairs and leisure-time activities, and patterns of social relations become much less collectively centred. Bachelors who are past their prime become progressively more marginal and isolated.

Constant turnover gives rise to a host of additional problems. The gradual withdrawal of a majority of their members disrupts the internal cohesion of the nuclei of settlers and creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion. Sometimes the decision to leave spreads as if by contagion and produces periodic waves of desertion. Many are swept by such a periodic wave not because they themselves are so keen to leave, but primarily because their close friends have decided to go, or because widespread desertion undermines their faith in the future of their kibbutz and they see no point in continuing with a venture that seems to them doomed to failure. The group which remains in the kibbutz after such upheavals in the long process of selection consists of rather disorganized remnants of a number of nuclei of settlers which have followed each other in quick succession. Members of these nuclei often have quite different backgrounds and different outlooks. In addition, there is sometimes an age discrepancy between them as

1. For a fuller analysis of the position of women in kibbutzim see M. Spiro, *op. cit.*, p. 221-37; Y. Talmon-Garber, 'Social Structure and Family Size', *op. cit.*, p. 120-46, and 'Sex-Role Differentiation in an Equalitarian Society' (mimeographed).

well, and since solidarity in such groups has originally centred around age differentiation, this discrepancy is an important obstacle to reintegration. The first founders are often in a particularly difficult position since they are in most cases a small minority and are overshadowed by the newcomers. Needless to say, the process of reintegration of these disparate elements into a stable and responsible group of settlers is prolonged and difficult.

Most kibbutzim in the Negev suffer from a severe shortage of manpower. Only a few have developed according to schedule and are not underpopulated. The number of members in all the others is much below the standard set for them in the initial plans. The largest kibbutzim are situated in the less arid areas and comprise about 250 members. The smallest kibbutzim are situated in the most arid areas. Two of them have fewer than thirty members each. There are about a score of new kibbutzim which have fewer than sixty members. All of the underpopulated kibbutzim are not viable and are in great need of reinforcements. The federations are bombarded by constant pleas for additional settlers, but their reserves of prospective settlers have dwindled considerably. They have often shortened the period of preparatory training which the nuclei of settlers undergo in the established settlements, but in spite of it they are unable to satisfy even very urgent demands. The reinforcements that the federations manage to send to the worst danger spots are often too small and arrive too late to do much good. The depleted group of settlers who have stayed on in the new kibbutz is often much too discouraged and badly integrated to help the newcomers in the difficult task of adaptation to the new social setting. The newcomers soon lose heart and disperse.

Confronted by this vicious circle and by the danger of disintegration of their limited nuclei of reinforcement, the federations tend now to refrain from sending them to small and unstable kibbutzim. They prefer to attach them to bigger and better-integrated new settlements. The stable and dedicated members of such settlements are able to absorb the newcomers and instil into them a lasting loyalty to their kibbutz. A policy which aims at successful absorption of the limited nuclei of prospective settlers inevitably discriminates against the weaker kibbutzim. The worse off a kibbutz is from the point of view of recruitment the less chance it has of reinforcement.

Faced by the chronic manpower shortage, the kibbutzim have constantly groped for new solutions. They have tried to restrict and slow down the process of withdrawal in the nuclei supplied to them by the youth movements. The most important change in this respect is the development of better co-ordination between the army and the youth movements. Recruitment to the army had a disruptive effect on the nuclei of prospective settlers as long as their members were stationed in different units and lost touch with each other. Moreover, full and exclusive concentration on military training for a long period weakened at least to some extent their commitment to settle on the land. The army has therefore established the Nahal, a special agricultural-military unit. Members of each nucleus of prospective settlers are drafted together and stationed in a border kibbutz. After a period of intensive initial military training in an army camp, they are transferred to the kibbutz and divide their time between additional military training and guard duty on the one hand, and agricultural work on the other hand. The nuclei of settlers are thus able to undergo their agricultural and military training together and do not have to postpone the commencement of settlement till after the completion of their army service.

This pattern of recruitment has reduced the losses caused by the long period of compulsory army service. Ex-soldiers who served in the Nahal have established a number of kibbutzim of their own. Today, the Nahal supplies the new kibbutzim with a steady flow of reinforcements. But while preventing an early dissolution of the nuclei of settlers, the Nahal has not put a stop to the process of withdrawal. Many members leave immediately after the completion of their service, a certain percentage continues for another year, and only a minority stays on permanently. In a certain sense,

service in the Nahal strengthens and confirms the conception of settlement as a temporary phase in the life cycle of the individual.

The kibbutzim have also tried to devise new methods of approaching new immigrants. They have sent their representatives in the concentration centres of immigrants abroad to recruit prospective settlers from among them. They have developed with the help of the government a special housing project for new immigrants and offer them a higher standard of material comfort. They have also extended their training facilities. The results so far have been very meagre.

Another avenue of development has been the establishment of language seminars (ulpanim). Students in these seminars, lasting from six to twelve months, combine part-time work with study. The kibbutzim have set up these seminars hoping that active participation in the everyday life of the kibbutz and close contact with its members might induce some of the students to stay on and become full members. Such students relieve to some extent the severe shortage of manpower but only few of them stay on.

A more recent experiment is the recruitment of groups of adolescents in the new development towns. These towns abound in young boys and girls who have already left school but cannot get a job. They wander around aimlessly and often get into trouble. Experiments are now taking place in organizing these adolescents into groups and sending them to kibbutzim. They spend their time there working, receiving vocational and social instruction, and studying. The kibbutz assumes full responsibility for them during their stay. This scheme differs from former schemes for channelling children of new immigrants to the kibbutzim in one important respect: the families of members of these groups get a small payment for the work of their children. Offering monetary remuneration for work is against the principles of the kibbutz, but this has proved the only way in which to persuade the parents to let their children stay in a kibbutz. The payment of a regular if small wage has a stabilizing effect on the adolescents as well, since it symbolizes the importance of their work and enables them to help in the maintenance of their families. It reduces considerably their tendency to leave whenever they see a chance of making some money. Reliance is placed on the fact that intensive instruction and training and a long close association with each other and with members of the kibbutz will slowly change their outlook and will eventually bring about a transformation of some of the groups into nuclei of settlers. So far, this experiment has been carried out on a small scale only.

Another method of alleviating the acute manpower shortage is the use of hired labour. Conflicting ideological influences and economic interests operate here. While the neighbouring development towns and villages abound in under-employed and unemployed workers who are unwilling to join the kibbutzim but would welcome offers of employment, scarcity of manpower induces the kibbutzim to cut down their production considerably. The settlers are faced with a grave dilemma: they realize that employment of hired labour would enable them to make full use of their facilities and resources. However, since the prohibition of hired labour is a core element in the ideology of the collective movement, they fear that an unqualified permission to use hired labour would lead to far-reaching internal organizational changes in the kibbutzim and would have, in addition, a pernicious effect on the integrity of their members. Most new kibbutzim are against the introduction of hired labour and, unlike the better-established ones, usually refrain from employing such labour. They resort to this solution only in cases of emergency and then for short periods only.

All in all, the new sources and patterns of recruitment have not solved the problem. They have for the most part provided temporary makeshifts, thus enabling the federations to keep their kibbutzim going and prevent many imminent breakdowns.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As already mentioned, many of the new kibbutzim are situated in the more arid and remote areas of settlement in the Negev. The adverse effect of environmental factors (cf. Chapter I) is aggravated by the crisis of recruitment. Most work-branches are understaffed and the workers who have to make up for the deficiency are overworked. The situation is particularly acute in the services because of the greater scarcity of women and also because of the small size of these kibbutzim. The smaller the kibbutz is, the higher the proportion of workers required for the maintenance of a certain level of services. The most outstanding example is the children's nurseries and educational institutions.

These institutions have to be maintained no matter what the number of children is, and are therefore much more efficient and more economical in kibbutzim which have many children and well-balanced age-groups. A comparison between children's institutions in one of the federations indicated that in established kibbutzim which had a higher standard of child-care, full maintenance nursery and schooling of each required on the average 112 work days, while in new kibbutzim an average of 152 was required to maintain comparable institutions on an appreciably lower level. Age-groups are much too small and only partial use is made of the existing facilities. A bigger input of work days is therefore required to produce the same or even a lower output. A similar situation exists in other service institutions which are far less efficient than in the larger kibbutzim.

Another important factor is the scarcity of managers and experts and the frequent change of personnel in leadership positions. The recurrent turnover of branch managers and heads of committees interferes with the continuity of planning and management. It becomes exceedingly difficult to accumulate practical experience and evolve a set of clearly defined procedures and reliable techniques. Young settlers with comparatively little training or experience are entrusted with very heavy responsibilities in organizing and running fairly large-scale enterprises. The period of preparatory training in established kibbutzim is not as useful as it used to be, since in many cases there is a considerable difference in methods of cultivation and organizational structure between new and established kibbutzim. The young managers often make bad mistakes and bring their kibbutz to the brink of bankruptcy and disintegration.

The combination of unfavourable environmental conditions with internal instability has hampered and retarded the development of the new kibbutzim. Quite a number of them have discovered that in spite of persistent efforts most of their land remained barren and unfit for cultivation. Experimental cultivation of certain crops has failed, and a number of branches of production in which these kibbutzim invested a considerable amount of capital and work have proved to be a total loss and have had to be abandoned. Prolonged droughts coupled with erroneous and short-sighted planning have frequently caused very serious financial setbacks and made it necessary for them to borrow money from sources which were willing to grant them only short-term and high-interest loans.

Yet, in spite of what may seem to be insurmountable difficulties, only a small number of kibbutzim situated in areas which proved unsuitable for settlement have succumbed and had to be abandoned completely. All the others have clung tenaciously to their land and persisted in their efforts to make their kibbutz a going concern. After the initial reversals and setbacks, many have started on the road to economic recovery. The process of development is usually slow and uneven, but many of the new kibbutzim are gradually becoming economically stable and self-supporting. They have adapted many of the standard crops grown in other parts of the country to the conditions of cultivation obtaining in the Negev and have even managed to turn the differences of climate into an advantage (cf. p. 20). Quite a number have had considerable success with

stock-raising. Some of the finest and biggest herds of cattle in the country have been raised by kibbutzim in the Negev. The record for milk production was held for several years by a kibbutz in the arid area. The kibbutzim have been highly successful with the new industrial crops such as cotton, groundnuts and sugar-beet, surpassing in most cases other types of settlement in the same area and in some cases surpassing even the average production for the country as a whole, notably in the case of cotton. Experimentation with new crops and new techniques is continuing, and some of these ventures have been successful. Cultivation of certain sub-tropical fruits is gradually getting beyond the experimental phase, and some kibbutzim are now trying to cultivate them on a commercial basis.

The gradual improvement of the economic position of the kibbutzim was achieved by a reorganization of their economy. The kibbutzim reacted to the difficulties they encountered in agriculture in two different ways. First, they intensified the process of specialization and mechanization in agriculture and concentrated on a more limited number of major branches. This shift has entailed a considerable ideological reorientation. The kibbutzim have always been firm upholders of the system of mixed farming. They believed that in the long run a farming system based on diversified, well-balanced, and almost self-sufficient large-scale units was more efficient and more stable than one-crop cultivation, which, they felt, led to excessive standardization and bred monotony. For a long time they were confident that they had found the right balance between specialization and diversification. Economic pressure and shortage of manpower have, however, forced them to put greater emphasis on specialization.¹

The second way of dealing with their difficulties was to diversify their economic activity by branching out into non-agricultural spheres of production. The process of industrialization had started long before the establishment of the State; but in the pre-State period it was confined mainly to kibbutzim which were affiliated to one of the four federations of kibbutzim which objected to an exclusive emphasis on agriculture. The other three federations resisted more or less the introduction of industry, and in the large majority of kibbutzim agriculture was the sole source of income.

Since the establishment of the State the importance of diversification of economic activity has been recognized by all the federations and many kibbutzim have since set about developing local industries. This process has occurred all over the country, but the need to find additional sources of income is more acute in arid areas. Farming in such areas is, even at its best, a hazardous undertaking and remains dependent on unpredictable climatic changes. Industry is less dependent on environmental conditions and its introduction into the kibbutz stabilizes the latter's economy.

Much of this advance is due no doubt to certain tendencies inherent in the basic ideology and structure of the kibbutzim. Most important in this context is the flexible combination of specialization and diversification of economic activity and the emphasis on rationalization and mechanization of production. The economic reorganization was not, however, a wholly spontaneous internal development and was not carried out by each kibbutz in isolation. It entailed a considerable modification in the relations between the Settlement Department and the new kibbutzim.

The Department recently evolved a system which enables it to exercise a more direct and more effective control on the new kibbutzim. Before this scheme was evolved, the Department had little to say in the actual management of their economic affairs. It fixed the initial plans of settlement and supplied each kibbutz with the necessary capital to start it on its way in the form of long-term, low-interest loans, but it did not supervise closely the way in which a kibbutz made use of its capital. A kibbutz was made fully responsible and was left to its own devices. Contact between the Department and each individual kibbutz was maintained largely through the federation. This pattern

1. This change in the type of farming has been paralleled by what took place in the moshavim (cf. Chapter IV). In the kibbutzim, however, ideological resistance to the change was greater than in the moshavim.

proved highly inadequate in the case of the depleted and unstable new kibbutzim. A special guidance scheme was therefore established, which now includes sixty-one new kibbutzim controlled and trained by the experts of the Department. The Department supervises closely the financial transactions of these kibbutzim. In many cases it has converted most of their short-term and high-interest loans into long-term and low-interest ones, but it does not permit them to engage in any major financial transaction without the ratification of its experts. Plans of economic development are fixed each year by means of joint consultation between representatives of the settlers and the planners of the Department. Actual supervision of everyday economic activities in each kibbutz is performed by a special instructor who lives there for a term of office of a year or two. This instructor has over-all control and is able to offer the members of the kibbutz continuous guidance and expert advice. The instructor is a member of an established kibbutz and acts as a representative of both his federation and the Department (cf. p. 73). This scheme has been highly successful during its short existence. Many of the kibbutzim have profited greatly from it and are making steady progress.

The guidance scheme of the Department tackles only economic problems. The two major schemes initiated and evolved by the kibbutzim aim at a more comprehensive institutional reorganization and have more far-reaching and more lasting consequences. In the following sections we shall examine in some detail the new patterns of *federal assistance* and the recently developed schemes of *regional co-operation*.

PATTERNS OF FEDERAL ASSISTANCE

The kibbutzim are organized in four federations (cf. p. 50-3). From their inception they put the main emphasis on the initiation, planning and guidance of their new settlements. The federations were directly or indirectly responsible for the youth movements which supplied these settlements with nuclei of prospective settlers. They mediated between the new kibbutzim and outside bodies. Experts who served a temporary term of office in their federation's economic and social committees supplied them with expert advice. The mutual aid funds of the federations were based on the contributions according to income and economic position of more established kibbutzim and were used primarily to help new kibbutzim which were still unable to contribute anything. The kibbutzim were expected to become basically independent and even to start contributing their share to the co-operative activities of their federation as soon as possible.

This pattern of short-range and fairly restricted assistance worked well enough during the pre-State period, but it proved sadly inadequate for the unstable and underpopulated post-State kibbutzim. The crisis has induced the federations to reconsider and revise their methods of inter-collective assistance. The supplementary mechanisms involved have developed in two main directions:

1. *Centralized federal assistance*. All the federations have had to intensify and widen the scope of their activities in the new settlements. Even the Ihud, which opposed centralization more than any other federation, found that it could not cope with the new problems without centralizing, at least to some extent, its federal organization and strengthening its control over the kibbutzim affiliated with it.
2. *Decentralized assistance*. In order to counteract the growing tendency towards centralization, the federations have developed a new organizational pattern which they dub 'adoption'. While retaining over-all control, the federations delegate part of their responsibility for assistance by linking each of the new kibbutzim which are in need of assistance to an established one. The established kibbutz 'adopts' the new kibbutz and is made directly responsible for it. It pledges itself to help the underdeveloped kibbutz linked to it until it overcomes its difficulties and is no longer in need of special assistance. While in the more centralized federal assistance aid is dis-

pensed through the central organs, adoption establishes direct and comprehensive ties between pairs of kibbutzim. The centralized pattern of assistance is based on a rather vague, diffuse and unfocused feeling of solidarity between all the kibbutzim affiliated with the same federation, while the pattern of adoption limits the range of responsibility but at the same time focuses it on a set of specific duties towards a new kibbutz.

The principles underlying each of the two patterns of assistance and their interrelationship may be best illustrated by examining the major functions of Federal assistance.

The most urgent problem before the new settlements is the shortage of manpower. The crisis of recruitment from external sources has forced the movement to draw on its internal resources. The federations have decided to mobilize part of the members of the older and more established kibbutzim and to send them for periods of temporary service in the new settlements.

All federations draw primarily on the age-groups of members of the second generation who are reaching maturity in all established kibbutzim. The federations have decided to draft members of the second generation for an additional year of service either before or after the completion of their army service. During this year they live and work in the new kibbutzim or serve as instructors in youth movements which supply the federations with prospective settlers.

The decision to draft the second generation, and put it at the disposal of the federation for an additional year of service, has been reached after many discussions and in the face of strong opposition. The process of socialization and social maturation is a prolonged one in the kibbutzim, since standards of education and vocational training are comparatively high and all children are given at least a secondary school education. Though they combine some work with their study all through their school years, their work is of limited economic value and does not contribute much towards their maintenance. They start to do full-time work only after two to two-and-a-half years of army service. An additional year of service further postpones the assumption of their duties as adult members of their kibbutz. All established kibbutzim have expanded economically and suffer from a severe shortage of manpower. In many of them there is a growing number of ageing members whose productivity is on the decline and who are working only part time.¹ These kibbutzim urgently need an influx of young able-bodied workers. They await the return of their second generation from the army impatiently and find it hard to accept that the return of each age-group should be postponed for yet another year.

It is not only for economic reasons that the established kibbutzim accepted the draft with mixed feeling. The period of service in the new settlements puts to a test the loyalty of the second generation to its native villages. Many members of established kibbutzim feel that the second generation should not be put to such a test directly after completing their army service. Army life undermines, at least to some extent, their identification with their kibbutz. Their ties with their native village may be further weakened if they leave for an additional year of service instead of returning home.

The grave problems in the new settlements have induced the established kibbutzim to draft their second generation for an additional year of service in spite of their misgivings. It is appreciably easier to organize the drafting of young recruits who have not yet settled down than to uproot temporarily more settled and more established members. The kibbutzim find it less difficult to dispense with the services of young unattached and comparatively inexperienced recruits than with the services of older more experienced members. The initiators of the scheme of assistance have argued, in addition, that a transitional period of service in new kibbutzim will reorientate the recruits towards collective values and help them to readjust to collective living. It is hoped that

1. On the problem of ageing members, see M. Spiro, *Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1956, p. 217-21; also Y. Talmon, 'Aging in a Planned Society', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 284-95.

the formative personal experience of dedicated service to the movement will enhance their identification with it, and will not unduly undermine their loyalty to their native kibbutz.¹

The federations have not completely disregarded the needs of established kibbutzim. As a rule, the first, the second and sometimes even the third age-groups which come of age in each kibbutz are exempted from the duty of additional service. The federations organize the draft of those who were not exempted from the additional service in different ways. Hakibbutz Haartzi and Hakibbutz Hameuhad have decided to draft all unexempted members of the second generation and send them to their new posts either before or immediately after the completion of their army service. The established kibbutzim have been allowed in certain cases to substitute a number of unexempted members by sending other members in their stead, but it is not permissible to send less than the full quota. The Ihud decided at first against a compulsory and full draft of its second generation. It fixed a quota of 50 per cent of all unexempted members of the second generation and appealed for voluntary participation. Each of the kibbutzim affiliated with it had full rights of substitution, and tended to postpone as much as possible the drafting of its young members who has just returned from the army. This pattern was tried out for about four years. It did not work well since it entailed prolonged and very often inconclusive deliberations in each kibbutz and gave considerable leeway for evasion of duty. The Ihud has consequently changed its policy and has recently decided on a compulsory draft. We do not have precise figures on the number of members who participated in this scheme, during the five years of its existence. Approximate figures on the draft of this year in the three main federations indicate that more than 400 members of the second generation serve in the new settlements, while about a hundred of them serve as instructors in the youth movements.

It should be mentioned that younger members of the second generation who have not yet completed their secondary education participate in the scheme of assistance as well. When they reach the age of 16 or 17 they are sent for a week or two of service in the new settlements. This assistance is of limited economic value, but it is not insignificant. In 1961, for example, Hakibbutz Hameuhad managed to organize eighty groups of twenty-five participants each for a term of service of fourteen days. Coming at periods of labour shortage they were of great help. All in all, this scheme has in one year contributed about 25,000 work days to the new settlements affiliated with this federation. We could not get exact figures from the other federations where this type of help is rather more restricted but follows the same pattern.

Older age-groups participate in the scheme of assistance, too, but in their case it is a matter of voluntary participation and not a compulsory draft. Young families with small children serve in new kibbutzim for a year or two. The number of children in these kibbutzim is usually very small so that additional children of suitable ages are very welcome. Parents who volunteer to go to the new settlements set an example by forgoing the services of the comparatively big and well-organized children's houses and schools in their established kibbutz, and help the new settlements to set up their children's houses. Being older and much more experienced, they contribute to the young settlement far more than do the younger and unattached members who are transferred there immediately after the completion of their secondary school courses, or directly after their army service. Recruitment of such families is, however, much more difficult than recruitment of young, unattached and less experienced members. It is not easy to find families with children who can be fitted into the age-groups of children in the new settlements. The parents are usually at the height of their work capacity, and often occupy important positions in their kibbutzim. The established kibbutzim find it extremely

1. For a fuller analysis of the problems of the second generation, see M. Spiro, *Children of the Kibbutz*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1958, Part VI, and his article 'The Sabras and Zionism', *Social Problems*, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 100-10. Cf. also Y. Talmon-Garber, op. cit., 1957, and M. Sarell, op. cit., 1961.

difficult to do without them for a long period. The search for suitable families is usually prolonged and entails recurrent negotiations. In 1961 the federations managed to recruit about a hundred families.

Middle-aged and ageing members participate in the scheme by serving as social and agricultural instructors in the new settlements on behalf of their kibbutz and on behalf of the Settlement Department. Quite a number of these instructors go out for short terms of service of 3 to 6 months but most of them stay on for a year or two. They usually go on their own, leaving their families behind. They maintain their contacts with their kibbutz and their families by coming home regularly every week or every fortnight. It is significant that ageing members are usually eager to volunteer for these jobs in spite of the considerable inconvenience they entail. Service in these kibbutzim often compensates them for the inevitable decline in their productivity and their uncertain status in their own community. Though they cannot work hard any more, they still have much to contribute. Having weathered many storms in their time, they are not easily discouraged, and can help the young settlers to overcome their difficulties without losing faith in the future of their kibbutz. These ageing instructors often regard their period of service in the new settlements as a new lease of life and perform their duties there with unflagging zeal.¹

Old-timers are easier to recruit than members of younger age-groups, but they cannot replace them. The new kibbutzim need a reinforcement of able-bodied workers with up-to-date training. The settlers prefer young recruits who are on an equal footing with them to old-timers who often feel entitled to impose their authority. The age discrepancy between the old-timers and the young settlers is not easily bridged. The settlers have much more in common and are much more at ease with recruits who are approximately of their own age. Many of the old-timers who serve in the new settlements have been accepted by the settlers and have gained their trust and respect, but they cannot do their jobs properly without the help of a number of younger recruits.

The system of recruitment outlined here has been evolved after much experimentation and many setbacks. It now works much better than in the initial phases and supplies the young kibbutzim with valuable and much-needed reinforcement. The approximate number of members who have gone out to new kibbutzim for a term of service of one to two years during 1961 is about 650. Many more participate in the scheme of assistance by volunteering to stay and work in the new settlements for shorter terms of service.

The temporary transfer of population from established to new settlements is organized within the framework of both the centralized and decentralized patterns of assistance. The federations have organized their recruits and volunteers in groups which contain members of different kibbutzim. These groups are sent to: (a) new settlements which need considerable reinforcement to keep them going; (b) abandoned settlements (the group of recruits and volunteers takes over the abandoned kibbutz and is made fully responsible for it until their federation is able to send a new group of settlers to replace them); and (c) settlement outposts which are set up in order to do experimental cultivation and prepare the land for permanent settlement. These inter-collective groups operate under the direct supervision of the economic and social committees of the federations.

A large proportion of the recruits and volunteers are provided from within the system of adoption. Each of the established kibbutzim which has adopted a new settlement tends to send most of its recruits to that settlement, and not to the mixed inter-collective groups organized by the federation. There is a growing tendency in all federations to put the main emphasis on adoption. Each established kibbutz is made fully responsible for a young kibbutz and supplies it with both long- and short-term reinforcements.

1. Cf. Talmon, *op. cit.*, 1961.

Only in cases in which the established kibbutz cannot shoulder the full responsibility on its own does it apply to the federation to arrange for supplementary reinforcement from an other established kibbutz. Adoption limits the range of federal solidarity and narrows the field for selection of suitable experts. Yet it has considerable advantages over centralized recruitment. Mixed inter-collective groups of recruits have little internal solidarity since the recruits come from different kibbutzim. There is no connexion between the groups which serve in the same kibbutz at different times. The groups of recruits channelled to the new settlement by the system of adoption are better integrated, since most participants in each group are members of the same kibbutz. There is, in addition, more continuity of service since most groups which serve in each young kibbutz come from the same established kibbutz. Adoption entails continuous interaction between members of both kibbutzim. The face-to-face contacts and the close co-operation gradually arouse a growing concern with the difficulties of the young kibbutz. The concerned efforts of solving pressing problems often breed a sense of common purpose, and establish a lasting bond between the two communities. All in all, the number of new kibbutzim included in the scheme of adoption is forty-four. An additional ten new settlements receive more limited aid.

The scheme of recruitment makes a considerable contribution towards the economic and social recovery of the new settlements. The teams help to alleviate, to some extent, the severe shortage of manpower by providing the settlements with fairly skilled, efficient and devoted workers. Members of the team hold key positions and reorganize the main work branches. They train the settlers and help them with expert advice. The settlers often turn to them in case of internal disputes and some of them gain a considerable influence on the committees.

Active and direct participation in the life of the young kibbutz is but one aspect of the task of the team. Its main function is to serve as a link between the kibbutz and outside bodies. The head of the team often serves also as an instructor on behalf of the Settlement Department. In this capacity, he performs a double role. He co-operates with the experts of the Department and sees to it that their advice is put into practice. At the same time, he acts as a spokesman for the young kibbutz in the Settlement Department and represents it on all levels.

Instructors often act as representatives of the new settlement in their federation as well. They supply the economic and social committees of the federation with first-hand information on the difficulties of their adopted kibbutz and exert persistent pressure on them to extend their aid to it. They make constant demands for additional loans from the Federal Fund and press for speedy reinforcement. Instructors who have good connexions in the federation and know their way about there are able to get more help than the fairly inexperienced treasurer or secretary of the new kibbutz.

Last but not least, the instructor and members of the team serve as a living link between the young and the established kibbutz. The team of recruits shoulders the main responsibilities of assistance, but the scheme of adoption requires active participation of many other members of the established kibbutz and cultivation of wider contacts between the two communities. The foremost task of the team is maintaining a constant flow of communication between the settlements and initiating additional plans for further aid. Most teams report regularly to the general assembly and to various committees. They will often see to it that information about their activities appears in all publications and leaflets issued by their kibbutz. Many of the established kibbutzim involved in the scheme have set up a special committee of adoption which initiates, supervises and co-ordinates all efforts connected with it.

Both the adoption committee and the team make special efforts to impress the economic committee of their kibbutz with the urgent needs of the new settlement. They will obtain the committee's permission to lend the new kibbutz farming machinery and

equipment or building materials. They will often provide the new kibbutz with the products of the factories of the established kibbutz at cost price. Enterprising instructors have developed a pattern which establishes a direct connexion between the parallel branches and committees in both communities. This pattern has proved to be the best way of enlisting more help and ensuring the continuity of assistance. Branch managers and heads of committees of the established kibbutz visit their counterparts in the young kibbutz and advise them on matters pertaining to their common sphere of competence. They sometimes stay on for short periods and actually participate in working out plans of reorganization. The office-holders of the young kibbutz visit the established settlement frequently and stay there for short periods of re-training. By these means, a constant flow of help, advice and information between the two communities is maintained.

The ties between the established and the young kibbutz may be further strengthened by arranging for regular and direct contacts between parallel age-groups of children and between families. A family in the established kibbutz adopts either a family or an individual in the new kibbutz. Children of the new kibbutz are invited to spend part of their vacation with children of their age in the established settlement. Some of the established kibbutzim invite all members of a new kibbutz to come and celebrate the chief festivals of the year with them. Thus, members of the two communities get to know each other and cease to be strangers.

The pattern of adoption is based on a one-sided flow of services, guidance and advice. The absence of give-and-take which characterizes the relationship between the established and young kibbutzim affects both donors and recipients of aid. The lack of reciprocity weighs heavily on the young settlers who can offer very little in return for the assistance provided. It is significant that many of the young kibbutzim have developed patterns of token reciprocity. They will sometimes send a large group of their members for a day or two to help the established kibbutz during the busy season. They participate in the harvest, or lend a hand in urgent tasks of vegetable-gathering and fruit-picking. Now and then they send their 'foster parents' a present of off-season vegetables, fruit or flowers. They will often participate in the cultural activities of the established kibbutz. Members of the young kibbutz serve as instructors of folk-dancing and singing in the established kibbutz and some of them teach in adult education courses there. The amateur theatrical group of the young kibbutz will often present satirical sketches and plays in both settlements. The cultural committees of both communities co-operate in preparing the programmes for all the festivals held together. By and large, the services offered by a young kibbutz do not amount to much and have little practical significance. The main function of this limited and asymmetrical exchange is to express the gratitude of young settlers and symbolize mutual dependence. Regular periodic 'rituals' of token reciprocity ease the tension and create goodwill in both communities.

The potentialities and wider ramifications of the scheme of adoption can be best illustrated by a short description and analysis of one of the detailed case studies on which we have done more intensive and more focused research. The scheme of adoption of Carmiya by Mishmar Ha'emek is one of the most successful and most carefully worked out schemes of assistance. Mishmar Ha'emek was established in 1926 and has a population of about 570. It is one of the most important kibbutzim of Kibbutz Ha'artzi and quite a number of the leaders of the federation live there. Carmiya was founded in 1950 by a nucleus of forty members of the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement from Tunisia and France, who were joined by an additional group of twenty French-speaking members from Canada and Switzerland. A political split led to the expulsion of twenty of the more extreme leftists. In 1954 the group of founders, which was reduced to forty, was joined by a nucleus of eighty members of the Israel branch of the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement. This group dwindled to a quarter of its size in less than three years.

When the scheme of adoption was started in 1957, there were sixty-four members in Carmiya.

The exodus of more than half its original founders, the chronic instability and the precarious economic situation undermined the faith of the young settlers in the future of their kibbutz, and many seriously considered leaving it. At this critical point, the federation entrusted Mishmar Ha'emek with the task of assisting Carmiya, and Mishmar Ha'emek sent a team of seventeen recruits there. The team consisted of one old-timer, an elderly widow, two young families with one child each and eleven young unmarried recruits who had just concluded their army service.

At that time, Mishmar Ha'emek could not dispense with the services of any of its older and more experienced members to serve as instructor on behalf of the Settlement Department, and the team left without such an instructor. Fortunately, there were a number of good workers and experts in the team, and they were able to reorganize the existing branches and start new ones. It was one of the members of this team who started to develop field crops in Carmiya and taught its members how to go about it. The team took the initiative in the cultural sphere as well. The lack of homogeneity and the fact that most of the members were newcomers who had little knowledge of Hebrew or of the emergent patterns of local culture resulted in cultural passivity and even apathy. The team took over and prepared a programme for each important festival. They exerted considerable pressure for the reorganization of educational institutions too. Members of the team participated actively in all assembly meetings and had a right to vote. They were highly represented in all committees, and though none of them was the head of any of the committees, they were able to exercise considerable influence on them. Members of the first team were energetic and active, but their main contribution was boosting the morale of the members of Carmiya which was at a very low ebb when they arrived.

The first team stayed for a year. The second team replaced it and carried on with its activities. The second team was comprised of eleven recruits—five young second-generation couples without children and an older member who served as an instructor on behalf of the Department and as the head of the team. Since his children had no age-mates and there was no proper school in Carmiya, his wife and children remained at home. By the time the second team arrived, members of Carmiya were able to run their production branches more or less on their own. They still needed frequent advice and help, but they were gradually becoming more independent. Since organization of consumption and educational institutions still lagged far behind production, the team concentrated its efforts on these spheres. The main function of the team, however, during this stage was the linking of Carmiya with the Settlement Department and the federation. The presence of the instructor in the team was of utmost importance in this respect. The instructor co-operated with the Department in the task of supervising the financial transactions of Carmiya and working out its over-all development plans. He served as a go-between for Carmiya with the federation and strengthened the direct ties between it and Mishmar Ha'emek as well.

While the second team was serving in Carmiya, the federation decided to send there a nucleus of settlers who had been trained in the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement in the Argentine. Most of these prospective settlers were members of long standing in the movement and a number of them had been leaders in it for some time. The reinforcement of about sixty-five members came gradually in small groups, yet in less than a year the population of Carmiya had as much as doubled.

The third team was to be the last, since the federation felt that Carmiya was on its way to complete recovery. There are eight members in this team. The head of the team and instructor is about 40 years old, and this time he has been accompanied by his wife and three children. There is another younger family with a baby and three unmarried young members. The widow who was a member of the first team volunteered to come again. She has returned to her former place of work in the laundry and serves in addition as an

informal adviser and *confidante* to many young members. This team has set itself the task of completing the rehabilitation of Carmiya and strengthening its newly-won independence. Members of this team, like members of the other teams, sit on all important committees, yet they stress their position as mere advisers and make it a special point not to interfere too much. They participate in all assembly meetings but take part in the discussion only when it touches on their special sphere of competence, and they have given up altogether their right to vote. The instructor puts considerable pressure on the members of the team not to assert themselves and not to stick together too much.

By now, Carmiya needs little assistance in the economic sphere. With occasional advice from experts of the Department and the federation, they are able to manage on their own. There are, however, some persistent organizational problems, such as that of turnover in unpopular occupations and that of recruitment for special jobs, which have not yet been solved. The team centres its attention on these problems and makes a special effort as well to overcome chronic difficulties in the organization of consumption and education. They have reorganized the cultural committee, which is gradually being weaned from its dependence on the team. But by far the most important task of the team is to facilitate the absorption of the newcomers from the Argentine. Since the size of the group of newcomers and the group of old-timers is about the same, there is often need for an objective observer and mediator. This role is admirably filled by the team's instructor. Being an outsider and less involved in local issues, he is often able to bridge the gap separating the groups and bring about a better understanding between them. He participates in all the deliberations on the occupational placement of newcomers, and makes special efforts to persuade them to play an active part in all the committees. He organizes intensive courses for the study of Hebrew and the geography, archaeology and history of Israel. Pressure is put on the newcomers to overcome the language barrier and learn to talk and read Hebrew as soon as possible.

The teams have carried the main responsibility for assistance, yet they have been able to enlist considerable help from many other members of Mishmar Ha'emek. There are strong ties between parallel branches and committees in the two kibbutzim and periodic joint consultations. The fodder expert of Mishmar Ha'emek came to Carmiya and instructed the manager and workers in the fodder branch in Carmiya for six weeks. Experts from Mishmar Ha'emek have planned Carmiya's vegetable gardens and poultry runs. They have stayed there for a short period in order to train the workers and revisited it now and then in order to check and plan ahead. The member of the first team who started field crops in Carmiya still feels responsible for the development of this branch and helps the workers of Carmiya with his advice. Mechanics from Mishmar Ha'emek introduced the use of new agricultural machinery into Carmiya and stayed for a week in order to teach the mechanics of Carmiya how to use it. Members of Mishmar Ha'emek have helped to reorganize completely Carmiya's kitchen, laundry and children's houses. A member of Mishmar Ha'emek, who is one of the federation's foremost experts on the education of small children, has organized a special course for nurses in children's houses and came for this purpose to Carmiya for a day or two each month for about a year. Many of the managers and workers of Carmiya were sent to be trained in Mishmar Ha'emek for periods ranging from two weeks to three months. They often return there for additional short periods of training and observation, and maintain close ties with the manager and workers of their particular branch. When faced with a difficult problem, they often cable the experts at Mishmar Ha'emek, who come as soon as they can for a short visit and help them to solve it.

There is considerable cultural co-operation as well. The director of the Mishmar Ha'emek amateur theatrical company stayed in Carmiya twice for more than two months in order to prepare a programme for the festivals. A number of members of Mishmar Ha'emek have often participated and performed in the celebrations of the

main festivals in Carmiya, and vice versa. The festivals are often celebrated on consecutive days in order to enable members of the two kibbutzim to participate in each other's festivities.

Every two weeks there is an organized visit to one or other of the two kibbutzim. This visit is marked by a festive meal and by a special celebration which sometimes lasts till the morning. The guests are usually taken on a conducted tour of the kibbutz and on excursions in the vicinity. Since the guests are usually received into the homes of their hosts, the visit contributes to the development of informal relations and sometimes even gives rise to lasting friendships. There is now much reciprocal informal visiting between the two communities.

Mishmar Ha'emek has refrained from engaging in any commercial transactions with Carmiya. They felt that such transactions were inappropriate and might cause misunderstanding and strain. They have not sold Carmiya any of their products, therefore, nor lent them any money. There has been, however, an exchange of presents. Mishmar Ha'emek sent Carmiya products from their factory and apples from their orchards. Carmiya reciprocated by sending a party of workers to Mishmar Ha'emek to help with the apple-picking and by presenting them with a quantity of guavas and bananas from their plantations.

The relationship between Mishmar Ha'emek and Carmiya has been on the whole remarkably devoid of tension. Yet there are two important foci of strain. The composition of the teams was fixed by joint consultation between representatives of the two kibbutzim, and Mishmar Ha'emek tried to find suitable recruits. On the whole, the teams were fairly well balanced from the point of view of age composition and necessary skills. Yet in certain crucial instances Mishmar Ha'emek was unable to supply Carmiya with urgently needed experts. As already mentioned, the first team went out without an instructor. Although Carmiya asked repeatedly for a qualified nurse and for children's nurses, Mishmar Ha'emek was unable to forgo the services of these experts. And since the field of recruitment was circumscribed to only one kibbutz, the choice of available experts was rather limited.

Another and far more serious source of strain was the decision of certain recruits to stay in Carmiya permanently. Two girls who participated in the first team married members of Carmiya and stayed there. A boy and a girl who participated in this team married and wanted to remain in Carmiya rather than return home. Since both husband and wife had important leadership positions in the second generation, it was feared that their decision would affect many other young members who would want to follow their example. To avoid an open conflict, both kibbutzim agreed that as long as recruits of Mishmar Ha'emek were working in Carmiya, members of the second generation would not be allowed to settle there or even to volunteer for a second term of service there. Only when the last team has returned home will those who have expressed a wish to remain in Carmiya be given a free hand. It is expected that when the formal ties of adoption are terminated, a number of former members of the teams will go over and settle in Carmiya.

In a few months the third team will leave Carmiya, and the last group of reinforcements will have arrived from the Argentine. Carmiya will then number about 150 members and more than seventy children. Adoption has brought desertion to a complete stop—none of either the old-timers or the newcomers has left Carmiya since it started. The concerted efforts of experts from Mishmar Ha'emek, from the federation and from the Department have brought about a radical transformation in the economic sphere. Carmiya is now self-supporting and prosperous. They have recently achieved record crops in cotton and groundnuts, and are now specializing in growing melons and water-melons for export. They have many plans for further agricultural development and consider branching out into industry as well. There are considerable changes in the cultural and social spheres as well. The teams have initiated the development of a richer

cultural life and contributed much to the internal integration of the community. Many organizational and social problems remain unsolved, but the young kibbutz is now mature and stable enough to cope with them on its own.

The remarkable success of this scheme stems primarily from a number of its characteristic features. First, all through the development of the scheme plans for assistance have been multidimensional and flexible. All the teams have tried to cope with the economic, social and cultural aspects of their problem simultaneously, and at no stage of their activity have they neglected any of these spheres. Yet they were keenly aware of where the main foci of strain were, and concentrated their efforts upon them. No less important has been the constant emphasis on furthering the independence of Carmiya. Even during the first stages when the team had to take over in certain branches and committees, almost all key positions were left in the hands of members of Carmiya. As the scheme developed, the team engaged less in direct action and management, and tended to hand over most of its responsibilities to members of Carmiya. Gradually, the team receded from the foreground to the background, thus helping members of Carmiya to regain their self-confidence. The teams have been in addition exceedingly ingenious and resourceful in their role as connecting links between Carmiya and outside bodies. A timely and adequate reinforcement by a stable nucleus of settlers solved the main problem of Carmiya and set it on its way to full recovery.

A comparative analysis of the scope and functions of adoption in the kibbutzim in the Negev clearly indicates that there is a considerable amount of variation in this respect. Only few schemes are as well planned and as successful as that linking Mishmar Ha'emek and Carmiya. In quite a number of cases, the schemes contribute only limited and discontinuous assistance. Let us now examine the conditions which facilitate or hamper the development of these schemes.

The pattern of adoption establishes close contacts between two formerly unrelated kibbutzim. The kibbutzim are linked together by their federation mainly according to considerations of size and needs of reinforcement. Young kibbutzim which require considerable aid are linked to big established kibbutzim with considerable resources, while kibbutzim which need less assistance are linked to smaller settlements. Since established and new kibbutzim are concentrated in different regions, there is in most cases a considerable distance between the communities linked by adoption. On the whole, considerable geographical distance has an adverse effect on the relationship between the partners. Many of the devices and mechanisms which serve to strengthen the ties between the communities cannot be developed and put into practice when the kibbutzim are not situated near each other. If the new kibbutz is a long way from the established kibbutz, the latter's team carries the burden of assistance alone and cannot get much help from its fellow-members back home.

Geographical distance is a severe handicap, but its effects on adoption are not completely negative. The isolation of the assistance team often serves to increase its identification with the new kibbutz and its devotion to its task. The process of re-orientation to the new kibbutz is in many cases much quicker, since the recruits cannot visit their kibbutz frequently and are thus cut off from their relatives and friends. Isolation sometimes intensifies the inner cohesion of the team and strengthens its contacts with the new settlers. Teams with a high morale are not put off by the difficulties entailed in serving in a far-off frontier settlement. Since they are solely responsible for the scheme of assistance, they do their utmost to ensure its success. The task of assisting very distant new kibbutzim is usually entrusted to the best-integrated kibbutzim in the federation. In such cases, the dedication and cohesion of the teams sent can counter-balance the limitations imposed by distance and even turn isolation into something of an advantage.

Social compatibility between the kibbutzim joined together by the federation has a

marked influence on the proper functioning of the alliance between them. Similarity of cultural and social background of the settlers in both communities helps to bridge the gap between them and to engender common interests. Some of the most successful alliances are based on the continuation and further cultivation of ties formed during the period of preparatory training. The new kibbutz is adopted by the established kibbutz in which the founders of the former received their initial training. Adoption is firmly based in this case on the close contacts developed between the settlers during the period of apprenticeship in the established kibbutz. In some cases the established kibbutz will continue to serve as a training centre of the new kibbutz. A nucleus of prospective settlers which intends to join the new kibbutz is sent for training to the established kibbutz which has adopted it. This service further consolidates the alliance between the two communities.

Kinship ties between the two kibbutzim are of prime importance too. As in the case of Carmiya, some of the young recruits who serve in the assistance teams are usually attracted by life in the new kibbutz and decide to stay on after having completed their service. There is in addition quite a number of cases of intermarriage between members of the team and members of the new kibbutz, and most of the 'mixed' families remain in the new kibbutz. The new family ties link the two communities together and gradually reinforce the pseudo-kinship ties prevailing in adoption. Parents and relatives of members of the second generation who have gone over to the new kibbutz maintain frequent and close contacts with them, and through these contacts they get in touch with other members of the new kibbutz as well. Since the assistance scheme directly affects the well-being of their close kin, members of the established kibbutz become personally committed to it. They promote the plans of assistance and press for a strong alliance between the two communities. Kinship ties transform adoption into a comprehensive and lasting partnership.

Size, geographical proximity and social compatibility affect the schemes in many ways, but the most important factors operative are the ideology and organizational structure of the respective federations. The Ihud has its share of efficient and well-managed adoption schemes, but it has more than its share of faulty and discontinuous implementation of such schemes. It seems that the strong emphasis on local autonomy has attenuated to some extent the sense of identification with the federation as a whole. The commitment to voluntary participation and spontaneous action has led to a deep aversion to specific rules and regulations and to centralized control. As we have already noted, the Ihud tried for a long time to avoid a compulsory draft and based its recruitment primarily on voluntary participation. It still does not specify clearly the rights and duties entailed in adoption. The lack of set rules and the absence of any real supervision leads to considerable variations in the scope and effectiveness of the schemes. Kibbutzim which identify with the scheme have developed exceptionally comprehensive programmes of assistance, while others participate in the scheme only half-heartedly and do very little about it. Since there is no clearly-worked-out policy, replacement of one team by another will often lead to a sudden change in the pattern of interrelations between the two communities.

Hakibbutz Hameuhad went about the task of federal assistance in a more determined way. From the outset, this federation has put a considerable stress on the duty of the established kibbutzim to participate in its efforts to promote its pioneering border settlements and has made no objection to centralization of its organizational structure. Consequently, it did not hesitate to draft its second generation for additional service and tended to emphasize the centralized pattern of recruitment. It has no qualms about closely supervising the kibbutzim which participate in the schemes of adoption or about putting pressure on them in cases of evasion of duty.

Hakibbutz Haartzi occupies an intermediate position and tries to combine vigorous federal planning and constant guidance and control by the federation with a growing

emphasis on adoption. It has recently decided to abolish centralized recruitment in large inter-collective groups and the compulsory draft altogether. At the same time, it is taking measures to strengthen its supervision over the kibbutzim which participate in the scheme of adoption. It has defined the main rights and duties entailed in adoption and has fixed quotas of recruits. Although the new plan sets clear standards of performance, it is fairly flexible and leaves considerable scope for local initiative. The established kibbutzim affiliated with this federation are now able to fix the composition of the team they send to the young kibbutz by means of direct consultation between both kibbutzim. They are expected to send their full quota but are allowed to recruit whoever they think is most suitable for the job. As long as they conform to the basic rules and carry out the minimum plan, they can organize the scheme of assistance as they see fit.

A comparison of schemes of assistance in the different federations seems to indicate that the decentralized pattern offers too much opportunity for evasion of duty. Central recruitment is directly organized and supervised by the federation. Supervision of adoption, however, is far more difficult because it disperses the responsibility for assistance and vests it in individual kibbutzim. Kibbutzim which do not identify with the scheme can disregard their pledge with impunity. It would seem that decentralization of responsibility for assistance can function properly only if it is coupled with a tightening of central control.

The schemes of federal assistance have prevented a crisis and brought about considerable improvement in most of the kibbutzim included in it. In a number of these kibbutzim it has led to complete recovery. Like Carmiya, these kibbutzim have gained so much from it that they no longer need any special aid and guidance and are able to fend for themselves. Their economic and social rehabilitation has enabled them to absorb new settlers and to become fairly stable and self-maintaining. It should be observed, however, that in the majority of cases the scheme has alleviated the difficulties of the new kibbutzim but has not offered a full solution of their problems.

The main shortcoming of the scheme stems from an incompatibility between the interest of the new kibbutzim and the established ones. The former need permanent reinforcement, but since the established kibbutzim also suffer from an acute manpower shortage they can provide only a small part of what is needed.

Another source of strain is the draft of the second generation for service in new kibbutzim of which many of the older kibbutzim are critical. The kibbutzim are an outgrowth of a radical revolutionary movement. The founders had dissociated themselves from their former social setting and rebelled against their parents. The initial ideology of the movement had put a premium on intergenerational discontinuity. The appearance of the second generation introduced a gradual shift from disruption of intergenerational ties to continuity. Children are expected to settle in the kibbutz founded by their parents and continue their life-work there. The ideology of continuity is just beginning to take root, and the second generation has an ambivalent attitude towards it. Many of them are anxious to settle down as soon as possible and are quite content to carry on their tasks on behalf of their parents. Yet the pioneering ideology which sets a premium on breaking new ground in frontier settlements has retained a strong attraction. Many of the second generation cannot help feeling that going out to the new kibbutzim on their own is more enterprising and more worthwhile than complacently staying on in the comparatively settled and fairly prosperous kibbutzim established by their parents.

The second generation is attracted to the new settlements for yet another reason. In the established kibbutzim the second generation is, in a sense, hemmed in by its elders and has to wait for its turn. The process of taking over the important positions and coveted occupations is gradual and fairly prolonged. In the new kibbutzim there is

a shortage of office holders, branch managers, and so on. Thus members of the second generation doing their service in these settlements have a wider choice of occupation and a good chance of attaining key positions after a short time, while the constant emphasis on pioneering service and the new opportunities opened up by the schemes of assistance undermine, at least to some extent, their commitment to continuity. The established kibbutzim view this shift of emphasis with anxiety and mistrust, and regard it as a potential threat to their stability. They underline the temporary nature of the service and stress the duty of each recruit to return to his native village immediately after it has been completed.

The temporariness of the scheme is its main shortcoming from the point of view of the new kibbutzim. The recurrent replacement of teams each year brings about discontinuity and entails repeated readjustment on the part of the kibbutz, and a lengthy period of initial adjustment on the part of the team. Being newcomers and strangers in the new kibbutz, the recruits often tend to stick together and act as a separate group. By the time they have learned their way about and have started to develop closer ties with the young settlers, they have to leave.

This impermanence gives rise, in addition, to an ambiguity in the definition of the team's short-range and long-range objectives. The team's most pressing task is to ward off the imminent breakdown. Its main objective, however, is to help the young kibbutz to regain its social and economic independence. The short-term task often overshadows the long-term objective. The team comes for a temporary term of service and the recruits are anxious to do a good job and accomplish as much as possible during the short time at their disposal. Since it is easier to get tangible results in the economic sphere, they will often concentrate on that, to the detriment of social and cultural problems. Instead of training the settlers and preparing them for independence, they often take over and impose their authority. They are sometimes too impatient and high-handed, constantly pressing for sweeping reforms which are discontinued after they have left. A temporary improvement is of little value if it causes widespread resentment and leaves the new kibbutz as dependent on outside assistance and as unable to cope with its problems as before. Only teams which co-ordinate social and economic assistance and enlist the active co-operation of the settlers can make a constructive and lasting contribution to the new kibbutz.

The schemes of adoption are based on the assumption that the teams act as temporary substitutes for nuclei of permanent settlers, and their main task is to help the new kibbutz to prepare for absorbing its reinforcements. The trouble with many schemes of adoption is that reinforcements are not forthcoming. The task of supplying the kibbutzim with nuclei of prospective settlers becomes increasingly difficult, and many of the young kibbutzim have to await their turn for a long time. Adoption was originally meant to serve as an expedient for a short period of transition. In its present form it is ill suited to serve as a mechanism for long-range recruitment. The temporary transfer of population from established kibbutzim cannot in itself lead to recovery.

The realization that federal assistance has to be reorganized if it is to provide an adequate solution to the crisis of recruitment has led the Kibbutz Hameuhad to the conclusion that the established kibbutzim should provide the new kibbutzim with reinforcements of permanent settlers. The secretariat of this federation recently put before the council a resolution asking that a third of the second generation of established kibbutzim be channelled to permanent settlement in new kibbutzim. This issue caused a violent dispute in the council. The supporters of the resolution argued that the new pioneering drive would unify and strengthen the federation, and resolve the pressing problems of the new kibbutzim without unduly endangering the stability and continuity of the established settlements. Moreover, the pioneers of the second generation would establish a durable link between the old and new settlements. Ties of kinship and friendship would cut across the clear-cut division between established and young com-

munities and bridge the gap between them. The asymmetric, primarily one-sided schemes of assistance would thus become partnerships on equal terms.

The opponents of the resolution felt that a transfer of a considerable number of young members from the established to the new settlements would have adverse effects on the established settlements. They argued that an appeal to members of the second generation to volunteer for permanent settlement in new kibbutzim would fully sanction and even place a premium on intergenerational discontinuity. Since the opposition to the resolution was very strong, the secretariat did not press the issue and postponed the final discussion and decision on this matter to the next meeting of the council. In the meantime, the council has agreed to lengthen the term of service of the recruits to a period of two to three years and has called upon the second generation to volunteer for protracted service in the young kibbutzim.

The controversy concerning the new project of resettlement clearly reveals the basic dilemma and the underlying strains. In their present restricted form the schemes of federal assistance can provide the new kibbutzim with urgently needed and valuable aid but cannot in most cases offer a radical solution to their difficulties.

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION¹

The extensive schemes of regional co-operation which have been recently developed by the kibbutzim in the Negev tackle many of the problems which cannot be resolved by federal co-operation. These schemes are based on mutual aid and close co-operation between communities situated in the same settlement area or in the same district. The idea of furthering neighbourly co-operation between adjacent communities is not a new one in the federations and has in fact strongly affected their settlement policy. Two conflicting considerations operate in this connexion. On the one hand there is the interest of each federation to see that kibbutzim affiliated to it are settled in clusters near one another. Settlement in such clusters ensures organizational and ideological homogeneity and facilitates close inter-communal co-operation within a certain circumscribed area.

This tendency towards geographical concentration in homogeneous enclaves was, however, counterbalanced by the commitment to pioneering frontier settlement. Inasmuch as the federations stressed the task of pressing forward and penetrating into arid and yet unsettled regions and inasmuch as they were intent on widening their range of influence, they tended to disperse their settlements over a constantly widening area. The federations attached different weight to these conflicting considerations. The religious federation strongly favoured 'cluster settlement', and its leaders were the main advocates and spokesmen of this policy in the pre-State period. The Kibbutz Meuhad preferred to set up big kibbutzim or to branch out in isolated settlements which often served as outposts in new settlement areas. It pursued a vigorous expansionist policy and was not much concerned with planning the geographical distribution of the settlements affiliated to it, with a view to furthering co-operation on the regional level. The Kibbutz Artzi insisted on a policy which combined expansion by means of dispersion with consolidation by means of concentration. The Hever Kvutzot had no clear position on the problem, but tried to find a working compromise between the two principles.

It should be observed that all the federations were more or less aware of the advantages of settlement in clusters and took them into consideration when determining their policy in this respect. It is in such clusters, densely settled by kibbutzim affiliated with the same federation, that regional co-operation first appeared in the pre-State period. The kibbutzim in these clusters maintained close contact and developed common cul-

1. Regional co-operation between kibbutzim has to be distinguished from the regional schemes of development described in Chapter III.

tural as well as common economic institutions. Such closely-knit enclaves have often become the strongholds of their federation and served as important centres of its activities.

Regional co-operation started to develop before the establishment of the State, but it should be stressed that the pattern of regional co-operation which is being evolved now differs in many respects from the pre-State pattern. Regional co-operation before and soon after the foundation of the State was confined usually to the small clusters of kibbutzim of the same federation. Regional co-operation which is being developed now in the Negev and in other parts of the country partly cuts across lines of cleavage between the federations. In some notable cases the regional framework includes both kibbutzim and moshavim and encompasses to some extent the neighbouring development town as well. The pre-State schemes of co-operation were, generally speaking, of limited scope and were only of peripheral significance to the communities participating in them. Cultural and ideological ties were usually more important than economic co-operation. The scope of schemes of regional co-operation has widened considerably and they have a direct and far-reaching impact on the economic and social life of the communities involved.

The tendency to resort to regional planning more often and more extensively owes much, no doubt, to the growing importance of regional frameworks since the establishment of the State. Organizational ties based on geographical proximity have in many cases gained precedence over ties based on ideological and political affinity. Both the Government and the Settlement Department have come to regard the region as an indispensable organizational and administrative unit. Communities of different types and different party affiliations belong to the same geographical and administrative unit which plans and supervises all the settlement in the area. The kibbutzim kept aloof at first and did not participate much in regional activities. They maintained an independent attitude towards the regional authorities and strengthened the ties with their federations. However, the kibbutzim could not remain completely immune to the pervasive influence of the regional approach, and the new organizational ideology has gradually penetrated into the kibbutzim and helped to precipitate a major reorganization.

The urge towards regional co-operation is closely related to the change in the status of the collective movement in Israel society as well. The movement is now on the defensive, struggling hard to maintain its status as a widely accepted élite. The common struggle against outside forces has gradually increased internal awareness of a common cause and impressed upon the kibbutzim the need to co-ordinate their efforts and maintain a common front. The tendency to join forces is particularly strong among kibbutzim affiliated to the same federation but it cuts across the boundaries between the federations as well. The pressing practical problems encountered by all the kibbutzim overshadow political distinctions and ideological cleavages which often seem irrelevant to the real issues. The need to fight against similar difficulties and solve common problems blunts and checks internal differences.

Regional co-operation between kibbutzim and other types of settlements stems, in part, from a more or less conscious effort of the kibbutzim to overcome their growing social isolation. Regional schemes provide a framework for the cultivation of close contacts with neighbouring settlements. It has helped the kibbutzim to regain some of their lost élite functions in Israel society, to re-establish themselves to some extent in a leadership position in their district, and to make a contribution towards the absorption of immigrants within it.

In addition, economic and demographic factors are of the utmost importance in the growth of regional co-operation. As mentioned before, the kibbutzim have reacted to the crisis in agriculture in two different yet complementary ways: (a) specialization in a more limited number of crops; and (b) diversification of economic activity by branching out into new spheres either partly connected or completely unconnected with agricul-

ture. These shifts in economic policy necessitated far-reaching changes in production methods and organizational structure. Extensive cultivation of a limited number of field crops puts a premium on largeness of scale, on standardization and on the use of heavy machinery. The comparatively small and recently established kibbutzim could not afford to buy the new equipment on their own and could not utilize it efficiently. It soon became clear that co-ordination and reorganization of production branches and co-operative ownership of heavy machinery would increase the productivity of agriculture in the new kibbutzim and would help them to overcome the adverse conditions of settlement in arid zones.

Since heavily mechanized agriculture requires very specialized and large-scale repair services, there was a pressing need to develop co-operative garages and repair-shops. The establishment of large-scale mechanized and well-organized regional enterprises for grading, processing, and packing of industrial crops and agricultural products has proved to be equally profitable. Regional co-operation provided also a useful organizational framework for the development of local industries and crafts. The new kibbutzim could not afford to promote such enterprises and could not maintain them on their own. Consequently, they pooled their resources and resorted to regional planning. Co-operative regional organization has enabled the kibbutzim to introduce overdue changes in the methods of financing their enterprises and in their system of marketing. This development has by no means been restricted to arid regions. Similar processes are occurring all over the country; but since the crisis in arid regions is more acute and individual kibbutzim are not strong enough to solve their problems on their own, there is a growing tendency there to resort to regional co-operation.

Regional planning partly solves acute problems of manpower as well. Mechanization, rationalization, and centralization of production has enabled the kibbutzim to reduce the number of workers needed in each branch. The problem of technical experts and experienced managers is a more complicated one, but the new system of production has made it possible to deal with this problem too. Centralization of economic activities and control enables the kibbutzim to make a better and more economical use of their meagre resources of technical experts and managers. Managers of the same branch in different kibbutzim are independent of each other and manage their branches on their own as best they can. Co-ordination of these branches and their reorganization into larger units reduces the number of trained people required for their management. The best available candidates can be put in charge of the reorganized branch, and since they have over-all control, they can supervise and train their co-workers.

The most important function of regional co-operation is, however, not only the alleviation of a severe shortage of trained personnel by a more economical use of the available supply, but also the working-out of a better system of recruitment and training. When the regional schemes pass beyond the initial phase of reorganization of pre-existing branches and start to develop and branch out into new spheres of activity, they need a constantly growing number of new experts and managers. Regional enterprises and institutions serve as schools for organization and practical training-grounds. Managers of the same branch in different kibbutzim have comparatively little contact with each other and little chance of gaining from each other's experience. The regional schemes provide many opportunities for exchange of information. Most important of all, since the best-trained people have over-all control, they are able to select and train new candidates for leadership positions.

Regional planning has provided a partial solution to the problem of hired labour. It has enabled the kibbutzim to lift the ban on hired labour without actually introducing it into the settlements. Employment of hired labour is allowed only on the regional level. The prohibition remains in force on the local level. Regional institutions employ hired workers, but since hired labour is restricted mainly to these institutions, it is partly segregated and remains more or less marginal. It does not affect to any extent

the daily life of the kibbutzim which participate in the scheme. Such hired labour enables the kibbutzim to develop and expand their economic system, while at the same time it alleviates to some extent the economic difficulties of the villages and development towns situated in the same district.

Regional co-operation provides for the maintenance of fully-fledged cultural and social institutions. Many of the kibbutzim are too small to maintain even a proper primary school of their own. Only a few kibbutzim in the Negev can shoulder the burden of maintaining a secondary school, let alone an adult education centre. Regional co-operation opens up new avenues of development and provides new opportunities for cultural specialization and differentiation. It enables the kibbutzim to satisfy the highly varied needs and interests of their members and to provide a wider scope for the initiative of different groups and individuals.

Regional co-operation serves as an antidote to the social isolation of kibbutzim situated in distant regions. Members of these kibbutzim find it rather difficult to continue to cultivate and maintain external contacts. They have comparatively little opportunity to make new contacts outside their community. Most of their social ties are usually confined to the narrow circle of co-members of their kibbutz. Consequently, many of them feel hemmed in, cut off and lonely, and crave for external contacts. Regional activity extends the range of their participation and identification. It widens the scope of social contacts and provides new opportunities for the development of meaningful and durable relationships outside the local community. The settlers' external contacts are a direct extension of their internal relationships and therefore do not cut them off from their kibbutz.

It should be noted that the initiative in extending and intensifying regional co-operation in the Negev originated in new kibbutzim. Most initiators and leaders of the schemes of regional co-operation are former members of South American youth movements and are seconded by former members of Israel youth movements. They are comparatively young members of recently founded kibbutzim who are deeply concerned with maintaining the leadership position of the collective movement in Israel society and are intent on overcoming its growing isolation. They feel that their élite position can be regained and maintained only if the movement remains flexible and dynamic, constantly seeking for new solutions to its problems.

The nature, scope and potentialities of regional co-operation can be best illustrated by a description and analysis of two of the most notable schemes developed in the Negev which represent two different types of regional organization.

The co-operative scheme of Sha'ar Hanegev is the most developed and best organized of all the regional schemes in the Negev. The district of Sha'ar Hanegev includes nine kibbutzim which are all affiliated to the Ihud and a Yemenite moshav. The neighbouring development town, Shderot, used to belong to the same district but its status has been recently changed. It has now obtained municipal status.

Co-operative activities in the district of Sha'ar Hanegev are initiated, organized and controlled by the district council, on which all the settlements which participate in the scheme are equally represented. All the kibbutzim in the district participate actively in the scheme. The moshav sends its representative to the district council and to the district educational committee but has otherwise remained passive and peripheral. It does not take part in any of the economic enterprises. Since the inhabitants of this moshav are very religious, while all the kibbutzim in the district are affiliated to non-religious federations, the moshav does not participate in any of the social and cultural activities initiated by the council. It is significant that two additional kibbutzim situated in the neighbouring district have recently joined the scheme as full members and take part in all its activities. One of them belongs to the Kibbutz Artzi; the other is a religious kibbutz, which is the only one in its region and is surrounded by moshavim. Since it is

isolated and has little in common with these moshavim, it has preferred to join the non-religious kibbutzim in the adjoining Sha'ar Hanegev district. Only four of the kibbutzim which participate in the scheme are longer-established settlements; all the others were founded after the establishment of the State. The members of these kibbutzim number between 243 in the largest and fifty-three in the smallest. The total number of members in all kibbutzim which participate in this scheme is about 1,350.

The regional scheme puts the main emphasis on economic co-operation and has established a considerable number of regional enterprises. The main spheres of activity are:

Production. The starting point of the scheme was co-operative ownership and maintenance of heavy agricultural machinery such as big tractors, combines, mechanical cotton-pickers and potato-diggers. Certain phases of cultivation, such as deep ploughing, fertilizing, spraying of insecticides and in some cases harvesting of field crops, such as sugar-beet, potatoes and cotton, are carried out co-operatively.

Storage and processing. Within the framework of the scheme, several enterprises for grading, packing, and storing of products have been built up. They own a number of warehouses and cold-storage, mechanized grading and packing plants. In addition, they have developed a fairly large-scale semi-industrial plant for processing and packing frozen poultry. A more recent development is a dehydrated-clover plant. Both these plants work for the local market as well as for export. The regional organization plans to build additional large-scale plants for freezing and dehydrating fruit and vegetables, a cotton gin and a slaughter-house.

Production services. The heavily mechanized agriculture developed in the district requires very specialized and large-scale repair services. The co-operative organization has consequently built a large garage, a repair shop and a field repair unit which handle the repairs of the hundreds of machines, cars and trucks owned by the settlements in the district. They plan to set up a regional transport company as well.

General services. So far, the regional organization has not done much in this respect. The first undertaking will probably be a big and modern laundry.

Commerce. The district council of Sh'ar Hanegev was one of the initiators of inter-collective co-operation in the sphere of marketing, and has been very active in setting up a new regional co-operative which deals with all major commercial transactions of the kibbutzim in the Negev. It sells the products of these kibbutzim and buys farm equipment and household goods. Previously, most of these transactions were conducted through the big country-wide co-operatives, Tnuva and Hamashbir. The all but complete monopoly that these co-operatives had in all co-operative and communal settlements led to bureaucratization and to considerable inefficiency. The kibbutzim decided to break up the monopoly of the country-wide co-operatives and to conduct their commercial affairs more independently. The regional co-operative represents all the kibbutzim in the Negev and can therefore exert some pressure on the market. Since it is directed and managed by members of kibbutzim, it is better able to look after their interests. The regional co-operative represents the kibbutzim in their contacts with outside bodies and mediates between them and the country-wide co-operatives. Many of the transactions are still conducted with these co-operatives, but the regional co-operative does not feel obliged to deal only with them. The country-wide co-operatives have to face competition and can maintain their position only when they offer better (or at least not worse) terms than those offered in the free market. The initiators of the Sha'ar Hanegev scheme intend to widen the scope of such co-operative activities. They have established their own marketing and purchasing agency which is now gradually

taking over these functions from the individual kibbutzim and will eventually perform most of their commercial transactions for them.

Finance. The regional organization was founded and expanded with the help of central agencies. It has succeeded in getting long-term and fairly low-interest loans from other public sources. Since many of its enterprises are gradually becoming going concerns, it is now able to get financial backing from private sources as well.

Cultural and social co-operation has lagged behind, but co-operative organization in this respect is gradually catching up with economic co-operation. The most important development has been the establishment of elementary, secondary and vocational training schools. These schools are used mainly by children of the nine kibbutzim affiliated with the dominant federation and by a small number of children from the neighbouring development town. The regional organization maintains regular evening classes and an extensive and systematic programme of adult education courses of a very high level. A further cultural development has been a big regional amphitheatre, which is used for large gatherings and festivals as well as for theatrical shows and concerts. The district council plans and organizes meetings, parties and excursions, while the regional organization takes an increasingly active part in all social cultural activities in the district.

The underlying principle behind the organization of each co-operative enterprise is equal shares and equal representation for all the settlements which have consented to become full active members. The district council, on which all the settlements which participate in the scheme are equally represented, has over-all control. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority are binding on all settlements. The district council fixes the amount of capital and the number of members which each community has to contribute to every co-operative enterprise. The management of each enterprise is elected by the council. The enterprises and institutions are managed as semi-independent units under the supervision of the council. All members of the kibbutzim who work in the co-operative enterprises get the same pay irrespective of the position they occupy. Their salary goes to their kibbutz which allots them only a small sum for personal expenses. The kibbutzim provide the co-operative enterprises and institutions mainly with managers and skilled workers. In 1960 they supplied thirty managers and forty teachers. Most of the workers and some of the experts are hired in the development town of Shderot. The regional organization employs about 150 hired workers.

As previously stated, Shderot has recently become an independent centre with its own council and does not belong to the district any more. However, there is considerable contact between the two councils. The district organization has actively helped the inhabitants of Shderot, who have very little experience in local self-government, to establish their town council. The district council sent its representative to act as the secretary of the town council and wields considerable political influence there. In spite of the fact that Shderot is not included in the co-operative scheme, it benefits from it to some extent in organizational, economic and educational matters.

It should be noted that the Sha'ar Hanegev scheme is primarily based on co-operation between kibbutzim affiliated to the same federation. It cuts across the boundaries between the federations, however, by incorporating two kibbutzim affiliated to different federations which participate in all its economic and in some of its social and cultural activities. It maintains only partial and fairly peripheral relations with the moshav and the development town.

The scheme developed in the district of Shafir is much more limited and very loosely organized. Its main interest lies in the fact that it partly cuts across the cleavage between kibbutzim and moshavim. The municipal district at Shafir includes fourteen settlements: one kibbutz, another kibbutz which has changed into a moshav shitufi, and twelve

moshavim. The kibbutz and the moshav shitufi were founded in the pre-State period near Jerusalem. Their settlements were completely destroyed during the war of independence and the settlers were consequently resettled in the Negev. One of the moshavim was founded by members of the second generation of long-established moshavim. All the other moshavim were settled by new immigrants after the establishment of the State. The kibbutz, the moshav shitufi and three moshavim are settled mainly by Europeans and Israelis; the settlers in the rest of the moshavim have all recently immigrated from Middle Eastern countries. All settlements in the district, except one moshav, are religious.

Co-operative activities in the district of Shafir are initiated and organized by a special District Development Company. The actual management of the company is entrusted to a committee of representatives of five settlements: the kibbutz, the moshav shitufi and three moshavim. The district council in which all fourteen settlements are represented elects this committee and officially controls it. Actually, since most moshavim are passive or even uninterested in the scheme, the committee is almost independent. The scheme was originally started by the kibbutz and the moshav shitufi. They have managed to induce a few of the more progressive and successful moshavim to take part in the activities of the company, but most of the moshavim remain aloof. They use the services offered by the scheme but do not contribute much. Some of the moshavim view it with mistrust and confine themselves to the use of the limited services provided by the Settlement Department in the rural village centres.

Economic co-operation in Shafir is not as developed as in Sha'ar Hanegev. Conditions of settlement are better in Shafir and economic problems are not so pressing. Moreover, the considerable differences of economic and organizational structure between the communal and co-operative settlements prevents the development of a comprehensive economic co-operation between them. The subdivision of plots and the limited size of productive units in the moshavim render the use of very heavy machinery impracticable. The moshavim have, in addition, a surplus of manpower and object to the use of labour-saving devices such as mechanical cotton-pickers and potato-diggers. The development company of Shafir has consequently solved the problems of management of heavy machinery in a different way from Sha'ar Hanegev. It plans and buys the necessary farm equipment but does not own or manage it. The company usually sells it to either the kibbutz or the moshav shitufi. Each of these settlements is responsible for part of the equipment and hires it out to the other settlements. The same method is used for storage and processing. All plants were installed by the company in either of the two communal settlements. The settlements own the plants, manage them on behalf of the company and provide the necessary services to all the settlements which participate in the scheme. The company supervises the management of the plants and controls prices. The company is now considering the establishment of a big co-operative slaughter-house and canneries. These plants, which will require a considerable number of hired workers, will probably be owned and managed by the company. The company has done very little in the sphere of services and commerce. The two communal settlements maintain close economic contacts with the co-operative scheme of kibbutzim in the neighbouring district and use some of their machinery and services.

Education activities loom large in the Shafir scheme. The council has established a primary school, an agricultural secondary school, a Yeshiva and a teachers' seminary for girls. Both the primary and secondary schools lay a combined emphasis on agricultural and religious studies. The agricultural school has a team of special instructors who teach the pupils modern methods and techniques and instruct them in their practical work at home. The schools serve all the settlements excepts three moshavim. The non-religious moshav and two moshavim, which are more extremely orthodox than most of the other settlements in the district, refrain from sending their children there. Pupils who are children of new immigrants outnumber by far pupils who are children of old-

timers. The schools are planned and directed by the two communal settlements which also provide most of the teachers.

These schools maintain a high level throughout. The secondary school is considered one of the best in the Negev. Before the establishment of the district schools, only very few children of the moshavim could attend a secondary school. Children who showed exceptional talents were sent away to boarding schools. The long period of study outside their village estranged them from their family and friends. They had great difficulty in re-adapting themselves to life in the village after their return from boarding school. The system of district schools extends and diversifies educational facilities. It enables many of the children in the district to receive a good general and vocational education without severing their ties with their villages. The district schools are gradually becoming the cultural and social centres of the district. It is clear that the common denominator in Shafir is religion. The deep identification with Jewish tradition bridges the far-reaching organizational, ideological and cultural cleavages between the settlements and enables them to co-operate and educate their children together.

The Sha'ar Hanegev and Shafir schemes represent two distinct types of co-operative organization. The Sha'ar Hanegev scheme is more developed, more differentiated and more comprehensive than the Shafir scheme. The Sha'ar Hanegev scheme has set up an ecologically more distinct centre and a more independent regional organization which controls and supervises the activities of the young settlements. The Shafir scheme is much more decentralized and loosely organized. Sha'ar Hanegev puts the main emphasis on regional co-operation between kibbutzim affiliated with the same federation. It partly cuts across the boundaries between the federations, but maintains only peripheral relations with other types of settlement. The Shafir scheme represents a more radical reorganization in this respect. It cuts across the cleavages between different types of settlement and exemplifies the potentialities and limitations of such inter-settlement co-operation.

Regional co-operation initiated by kibbutzim develops mainly within the framework of district councils. Comparative analysis of the degree and scope of co-operation in the different districts in the Negev clearly shows that there is a considerable amount of variation in this respect. In some of the districts, co-operation is restricted and partial. The scope of such schemes is very limited and only some of the settlements situated in the same district participate in them. In other districts we find fully-fledged and comprehensive schemes which unite most of the settlements in the district and even attract a number of settlements from adjoining districts. Let us now examine the conditions which facilitate or hamper the development of regional co-operation.

Ecological and demographic factors have a marked effect on the nature and scope of regional co-operation. Districts in the semi-arid zones comprise eight to fourteen settlements, while districts in the arid zone contain only one to three settlements each. Settlements in the more densely populated districts are situated in the vicinity of each other and are therefore able to develop a strong co-operative regional organization. Communities in sparsely settled districts are too isolated geographically to maintain strong inter-local contacts. Size of the settlements is yet another important factor. On the whole, small settlements which suffer from shortage of manpower have stronger incentives to develop regional co-operation than big settlements which are numerically strong enough to manage on their own. However, small size ceases to be a positive factor if the number of members falls below a certain minimum. Kibbutzim which are too underpopulated and depleted to maintain their settlement as a going concern become too weak and disorganized to contribute much to a co-operative scheme.

Economic factors have a marked effect on schemes of regional co-operation as well. The degree of rationalization, standardization and mechanization in agriculture and the extent of industrialization are closely related to the extent and intensity of co-operation.

The relative economic position of the settlements which participate in the scheme is of supreme importance. The presence of a number of longer-established and fairly prosperous kibbutzim in the district is, generally speaking, conducive to the development of co-operation. However, any marked discrepancy in the economic position of the settlements participating in the scheme has a disruptive effect. The initiators of co-operation in Sha'ar Hanegev were at first the more recently established and less prosperous kibbutzim in the district. The more established kibbutzim were very reluctant to join forces with them as long as they were in a precarious social and economic position. It was only when the new kibbutzim in the district had recovered enough to be able to participate on basically equal terms that the more established kibbutzim were willing to enter into a comprehensive partnership with them. Discrepant economic interests and considerable differences in organizational structure impede the development of regional co-operation even more than do discrepancies in economic position. Economic co-operation between moshavim and kibbutzim is consequently far more limited than it is between kibbutzim or between kibbutzim and moshavim shitufim.

Ecological, demographical and economic factors have a considerable influence on the intensity, scope and comprehensiveness of co-operation, but the most important factor in this respect is the degree of social and ideological homogeneity of the settlements in the district. Districts in which kibbutzim affiliated with one federation predominate tend to develop regional co-operation much more than do districts in which there are a number of kibbutzim belonging to different federations none of which controls the majority of the kibbutzim. The project of Sha'ar Hanegev is a case in point.

The organizational structure and ideology of the respective federations have a marked effect on inter-collective co-operation as well. The Kibbutz Artzi, which is ideologically oriented and intent on keeping its distinctiveness, objects to schemes which cut across the divisions between the federations and between different types of settlement. Since it stresses the cohesiveness and unity of each kibbutz, it views with apprehension extensive schemes of regional co-operation which encroach upon the local community. This is accompanied by an intransigent attitude toward hired labour. Kibbutzim which belong to this federation usually remain aloof and do not participate much in the new regional frameworks. The Kibbutz Me'uhad, which stresses centralized organization by the federation and pursues an expansionist policy without much regard for regional planning, has not been very active from a regional standpoint either. The main initiators of the new patterns of regional planning were kibbutzim affiliated with more loosely organized, more flexible, less ideologically oriented and less separatist federations such as the Ihud and Hakibbutz Hadati.

The considerable differences in organizational, social and ideological outlook between kibbutzim and moshavim usually impede the development of close co-operation between them much more than do the differences between kibbutzim affiliated to different federations. Mixed districts which contain both kibbutzim and moshavim usually lag far behind more homogeneous districts, but the Shafir project shows that even such a deep cleavage can be bridged by a common denominator such as a similar attitude to religion. Similarity of country of origin or of former social position and cultural traditions among settlers in communities inhabiting the same district serve the same purpose, but they seem to be less potent unifying factors than ideology or religion.

This analysis seems to lead to the conclusion that although the factor of geographical proximity has considerably gained in importance, it has not superseded social and ideological factors. Regional co-operation initiated by the kibbutzim cuts to some extent across lines of cleavage based on party affiliations and type of settlement, but such cleavages are far from eliminated. Geographical proximity does not operate as a wholly independent factor. It becomes a strong unifying factor mainly in districts in which its influence coincides to a considerable extent with, and is reinforced by, the influence of ideological and social affinities.

Regional co-operation has contributed considerably to the solution of the economic, social and cultural problem of the kibbutzim. Most important of all, regional co-operation enables the kibbutzim to make a contribution towards the development of the district as a whole and to participate to some extent in the absorption of immigrants within it. The new institutional framework serves both as buffer and bridge. The regional schemes provide a semi-segregated framework in which different types of settlement are able to participate without losing their special identity and without introducing major internal changes. The kibbutzim are able to employ hired workers without introducing hired labour into the settlements. The schemes provide a mechanism which enables them to supply the district with a dedicated and public-spirited leadership and to participate at least to some extent in regional activities.

Regional co-operation has many potentialities and may make a considerable contribution to the development of the Negev. It should be noted, however, that it has inherent limitations and engenders considerable strains in the kibbutzim which participate in it. Large-scale and comprehensive co-operation leads to growing centralization and bureaucratization of management. The price of efficiency in schemes such as Sha'ar Hanegev is a far-reaching limitation of internal self-government and independence. Bureaucratization is particularly noticeable in the economic sphere. Co-operative institutions are responsible for over-all planning and development. Regional institutions direct most of the financial transactions, co-ordinate the use of machinery and control production either directly or indirectly.

Some of the important branches are cultivated co-operatively to a large extent. Many of the branches which have retained their independence and are managed separately in each kibbutz are in fact controlled by regional institutions. Since these branches often depend on co-operative institutions for deep ploughing, fertilizing and spraying, as well as for the grading, storing and processing of their products, they have to co-ordinate their production plans. Co-operative institutions make the over-all plans and fix quotas of production. The work teams in the kibbutzim carry out these plans and have comparatively little scope for independent initiative. Management of many work branches and communal institutions is in many cases subordinated to the management of regional institutions.

Work organization in the kibbutzim is based primarily on a sense of responsibility engendered by active participation and face-to-face contacts in a cohesive team. Members of the team participate in the management of their branch and carry the main responsibility for it. The process of bureaucratization and centralization robs the team of its semi-independence. The team no longer carries the main responsibility for the branch and has little to say in its management. Many of its work processes and products become completely standardized. It would seem that restricted participation, standardization and loss of basic autonomy tend to estrange the worker from his team and undermine his identification with his work.

The same processes operate in the field of community affairs. Regional co-operation widens the horizon of participation and identification and opens up new avenues of development, but it impoverishes to a certain extent the local community. It restricts local self-government and self-determination. The authority of each village is curtailed and the locus of authority is gradually transferred to the regional organization. Decisions reached by the regional council tend to be binding on the communities participating in the scheme. Many crucial matters are settled by administrative decision on the regional level and not by internal discussion and joint consultations in each kibbutz. In cases where the administrative organizational structure of regional institutions predominate, it tends to disrupt the communal cohesion of the kibbutz.

The drastic limitation of the functions of the local unit works in the same direction. A number of local institutions either cease to exist or continue to function on a much reduced scale. The local community may gradually cease to be a comprehensive and

multifunctional unit dealing with all the aspects of communal life and seeing to all the needs of its members. Many of the educational, cultural and recreational activities are organized by the regional centre and not by the local units. The kibbutzim are progressively drained of their local leaders. A growing number of members work outside their community and orient themselves towards regional institutions. Regional activities put a premium on external contacts and external activities, and weaken local loyalties. If this process is carried to an extreme, it is likely to disrupt the internal cohesion of the kibbutzim and interfere with their proper functioning.

Regional co-operation provides the kibbutzim with a partial solution to the problems of hired labour. It should, however, be stressed that an extensive and unlimited development of co-operative institutions which employ hired labour on a very large scale is bound to introduce far-reaching ideological and structural changes into the kibbutzim. Members of the kibbutzim serve in co-operative institutions mainly as managers and experts. The unskilled or semi-skilled work is usually performed by hired workers. The use of hired labour is thus accompanied by a complementary deproletarianization of the members of the kibbutzim. This development runs counter to the ideological emphasis on personal labour and voluntary proletarianization which are both regarded as essential to the system. The process of deproletarianization can be checked as long as co-operative enterprises which employ hired labour remain peripheral, and as long as only a small percentage of the members of the kibbutzim which participate in the scheme is employed in them. Extensive development of such enterprises will turn a continually growing number of the most talented and enterprising members of these kibbutzim into managers of hired workers. If this process is not controlled and checked in time it may lead to the consolidation of a strong managerial élite of executives and technical experts, primarily concerned with efficiency and economic expansion and little interested in the preservation of basic collective values or with service to the district as a whole. Thus, the principles underlying the management of profit-oriented, capitalistic enterprises may gradually take the place of those principles which guide economic activities in the kibbutz.

It should be stressed that similar and even more intensive processes of social differentiation, bureaucratization and centralization occur in many of the big and highly developed, long-established kibbutzim, but there is a significant difference in this respect between bureaucratization on the local and the regional levels. In the case of regional co-operation, power of decision is vested in an agency outside the local community. Such an external agency may easily lose touch with local problems and become out of reach to ordinary members of the kibbutz.

Until recently, regional co-operation has developed spontaneously by trial and error without much systematic planning or stock-taking. While many members and some of the leaders express doubts and apprehension, most of the initiators of co-operation feel that the advantages of the schemes outweigh by far the disadvantages. Some of the most ardent supporters of the new institutional pattern are pressing now for an even more radical reorganization. They argue that the emphasis on local autonomy has become obsolete and has detrimental effects on the development of the kibbutzim. They advocate an almost complete merger in the economic sphere, especially in the field of production and commerce. According to this, those kibbutzim which participate in the co-operative scheme should be managed as one economic unit. The organizational structure of regional institutions should become much more centralized, more large-scale and more specialized. Each kibbutz would contribute to the common enterprise by specializing and concentrating on a very limited number of branches. The income from all branches would be divided between the kibbutzim on equal terms. The local communities would retain part of their social and cultural independence, but even here the new plans advocate comprehensive and widespread co-operation. The supporters of regional co-operation also press for a change in the position of hired workers employed

in regional enterprises. They maintain that the problem can be solved by organizing all the permanent workers into co-operatives which will share in the profits made by regional enterprises. They advocate a closer integration of kibbutzim with other types of settlement in the region by establishing common educational, cultural and economic institutions.

This plan amounts to an almost complete subordination of the kibbutzim to regional institutions. It disregards the strains engendered by regional co-operation and does not weigh the pros and cons of the matter. The kibbutzim are now confronted with the task of seriously considering the potentialities and limitations of regional co-operation and of devising supplementary procedures and mechanisms which would check excessive bureaucratization.

CONCLUSION

So far we have described and analysed the main supplementary institutional mechanisms which have been evolved in order to cope with the difficulties of the new kibbutzim in arid areas. Let us now examine more closely the interrelationship between the different schemes and assess their combined effects on the kibbutzim. In many notable cases federal assistance and regional co-operation are complementary and reinforce each other. They operate in subsequent phases of the process of rehabilitation or act simultaneously. Kibbutzim which are too underpopulated and disorganized to maintain their settlement as a going concern are too weak to initiate and maintain schemes of regional co-operation. In many cases federal assistance paves the way for regional co-operation by helping the new kibbutzim to regain a certain degree of stability and self-support. Only after having recovered enough to participate on basically equal terms are they able to develop comprehensive, co-operative institutions. Some of the kibbutzim which participate in the regional schemes are not able to contribute their share if they do not continue to receive considerable federal assistance. Many of the most remarkable cases of recovery have been achieved by a well-timed combination of plans of guidance and assistance initiated by the Settlement Department and the federation, and development of co-operation on the regional level.

It should be noted, however, that though federal assistance and regional co-operation are far from incompatible and may reinforce each other, they are based on different and, in a certain sense, opposed principles. Federal aid is based primarily on a commitment to a distinctive ideology and identification with an exclusive organization. It reinforces the internal cohesion of the federation by developing the ties between the kibbutzim affiliated with it and segregating them effectively from external contacts. By contrast, regional co-operation creates an institutional framework which widens and intensifies external contacts with kibbutzim affiliated with other federations and other types of settlement. It emphasizes the ties uniting the settlements situated in the same geographical area, irrespective of ideological and organizational differences. The territorial basis of organization does not supersede and eliminate ideological and political factors but, by cutting across lines of division, it attenuates to some extent these cleavages. It reintegrates the kibbutzim with the wider social system and enables them to contribute to the development of the region as a whole.

Federal assistance and regional assistance differ in yet another way. Federal schemes are essentially defence mechanisms which protect the kibbutzim from outside pressures and enable them to conserve their ideology and institutional structure without much adaptation and modification. By contrast, regional co-operation is far more flexible and change-oriented. It constitutes an attempt to deal with the new processes and trends, not by ignoring or rigidly opposing them, but by meeting them halfway.

The threat of decline and isolation has produced, in the case of the regional schemes, a dynamic drive and a gradual reorganization.

Federal assistance and regional co-operation operate as alternative solutions which compete with each other for ascendancy: a strong emphasis on one of them is accompanied by neglect or even opposition to the other. Hakibbutz Haartzi has developed extensive plans of federal assistance but it has viewed with mistrust and opposed the new schemes of extensive regional co-operation. Hakibbutz Hame'uhad has put the main emphasis on federal aid and is not much involved in regional co-operation. There is a reversal of the predominant emphasis in the kibbutzim of the Ihud and Hakibbutz Hadati which have evinced a tendency to engage in extensive regional co-operation but are less active as far as federal assistance is concerned.

It is significant that the considerable intensification of regional co-operation and the widening of its framework beyond the narrow confines of homogeneous enclaves of kibbutzim affiliated with the same federation was initiated by individual kibbutzim and not by the federations. The attitude of the federations to this new development has ranged from outright opposition to mistrust and *post facto* acquiescence. Even federations such as the Ihud and Hakibbutz Hadati which favour regional co-operation have viewed its extension with apprehension, fearing that regional co-operation will blunt political and ideological differences and create competing foci of identification which may come before identification with the federations. Extensive regional co-operation has emerged in fact as a reaction against certain features of federal assistance. The schemes developed by the federations subject the new kibbutzim to external control by the central organs of their federation or by the representatives of the established kibbutzim linked to them through 'adoption'. These schemes make the new kibbutzim dependent on a one-way flow of services, guidance and advice. Regional co-operation is a form of self-help based on a reciprocal give-and-take. It restricts the dependence on the federation and replaces it by interdependence between adjacent kibbutzim which are faced by similar problems and co-operate on equal terms.

It should be noted that the process of institutional change described here leads to a considerable limitation of autonomy of the individual kibbutz. Planning by central agencies is becoming progressively more comprehensive and all-pervasive. Regional institutions impinge on the internal life of the kibbutzim more than any of the country-wide organizations, yet they have been developed primarily as a countervailing mechanism to protect the kibbutzim from central agencies of control and mediate between them and the country-wide organizations. Growing pressure from central agencies has given rise to closer co-ordination on the regional level. Regional institutions operate on an inter-local basis and are therefore able to represent local interests and cope effectively with local problems. They operate on a larger scale than any single kibbutz and are consequently able to exert more pressure and function more efficiently. The social structure of the kibbutzim is based largely on localized solidarity and on identification with a cohesive community. A drastic limitation of the functions of the individual kibbutz raises serious problems and may impair its effectiveness. Yet adaptation to the new economic and social conditions prevailing in the country calls for a redefinition of the position of the local community. The collective movement is now confronted with the task of strengthening the interdependence of and co-ordination between the kibbutzim and at the same time devising measures to check excessive centralization and preserve the cohesion of the local communities.

One of the most important outcomes of the process of change is the emergence of an active and dedicated new élite. Regional co-operation has led to the development of additional mechanisms for the recruitment of new leaders. The emergent élite which is composed of comparatively young members of more recently established kibbutzim is critical of the established leadership of the federations and insists on its right to pursue and press further its independent policy on the regional level. It points to the urgent

need to solve economic and organizational problems and feels that many of the ideological cleavages are irrelevant to the real issues. It calls for flexibility, for controlled change, and for integration with the wider social system.

The recent reorganization has helped the kibbutzim to overcome many of their difficulties and has enabled them to make a considerable contribution to the settlement of the Negev. It should be noted, however, that the attempt of the collective movement to regain its leadership position has a wider social significance. As we have seen, most new moshavim recruit their members from the lower status groups. Proletarianization and de-urbanization of the immigrants is in most cases induced by external conditions and is interpreted as downward social mobility. The kibbutzim recruit their settlers from higher status groups. Their members accept de-urbanization and proletarianization voluntarily as a self-imposed duty and regard settlement pioneering as a corollary of their leadership position. If frontier settlement in arid regions were to become simply the dire lot of under-privileged groups which have no better choice, it would enhance the association between settlement and down-grading of social status. A dissociation of settlement from low status and a wider social appreciation of pioneering can occur only if settlement pioneering remains connected with recognized leadership positions and is upheld by a public-spirited élite.

The moshav and the absorption of immigration

Dov Weintraub and Moshe Lissak

The absorption in moshavim of immigrants who came after the establishment of Israel was approached as a continuation of the settlement movement which had been going on long before 1948.¹ The absorbing agencies did not ignore, of course, the possibility of difficulties likely to arise due to the size and tempo of the immigration, and to the qualities of the immigrants. Nevertheless, the agencies viewed their task in a spirit of optimism. On the one hand there was a lack of knowledge of the great cultural heterogeneity of the newcomers, and on the other hand trust was placed in the attraction of the pioneering ideology. Chiefly, however, the optimism derived from the belief that most of the objective difficulties which had confronted the earlier settlers could now be eliminated.

Before the establishment of the State, the prospective settlers had to wait seven to eight years before any land could be allocated to them; and similar difficulties had attended also the provision of capital. As a result, the full development of the farm had to be deferred for a long time, and in the meantime the settlers were obliged to resort to outside work. Now, however, the greater resources of the State were considered capable of smoothing the path of the settler and of compensating for the difference in the human material and in the size of the absorption problem. The transition from the earlier stage of settlement to the new one was accordingly seen in quantitative and not in qualitative terms. The opinion which generally prevailed in the early 1950s was that although the process of absorption and socio-economic consolidation after settlement on land would now be a longer one, requiring perhaps as much as seven years, the achievements would ultimately equal those of the veteran settlers.

The experience gained during the first ten years of the mass settlement of new immigrants indicates that this optimistic view was considerably exaggerated. There were undoubted successes, but also great difficulties which were not foreseen and have still not been completely overcome.

In the following chapters we shall describe the experiment of settling immigrants in moshavim during the period 1950-60, exemplifying as fully as possible the concrete difficulties encountered by the settlers and the absorbers alike. We shall also discuss the reaction of both sides to the lessons of experience, as reflected in the reality of today and in the plans for the future.

First, however, a few words must be said on the composition of immigrant moshavim in general, and of the villages included in the study in particular. Table 19 shows the dis-

1. Cf. Chapter V.

tribution of the households in moshavim established after 1948 by area of origin and by the moshav's geographical location. This table shows that immigrants from Middle East (Islamic) countries constitute the majority (61 per cent) of the moshav population, while immigrants from Eastern, Central and Western Europe account for only 30 per cent. The villages included in this report also present approximately the same proportion. In many other respects, however, the moshavim on which this report is based are not representative. The over-all sample of our study is based on a stratified selection of villages, taking into account such categories as country of origin, geographical district, type of farm and length of settlement—all in all well over 20 per cent of all the new moshavim. This paper, however, concerns only the first stage of the study, and relates but to 5 per cent of these moshavim (cf. Table 19). The villages which have already been studied can be viewed, therefore, only as prototypes of those villages which are similar to them in geographical location, type of farm, year of establishment and country of origin.¹

TABLE 19. The moshavim analysed in the report

Code name of village	Origin	District	Year of establishment	Type of farm
Torem	Atlas Mts.	Lakhish	1955	Field crops
Savel	Yemen	Lakhish	1950	Field crops
Te'ena	Persia	Lakhish	1950	Milk-mixed
Ta'amona	Central Europe	Central	1949	Milk
Resissim	Mixed ¹	Jerusalem	1948	Milk
Levanon	Yemen	Jerusalem	1949	Mountain-mixed
Azor	Yemen	Jerusalem	1951	Hills
Oranim	Yemen	Jerusalem	1950	Mountain-mixed
Choresht	Iraq and Persia ²	Jerusalem	1950	Mountain-mixed
Biyoum	Tunisia	Central	1950	Citrus
Shalekhet	Hadramauth ³	Central	1952	Hills
Zimriya	Morocco	Central	1949	Milk-mixed
Zeviya	Central Europe	Northern	1949	Milk

1. The two largest groups being immigrants from Rumania and Persia respectively.

2. From the area populated by Kurdish tribes.

3. Yemenite cultural area.

Of the thirteen villages referred to in the paper, ten were studied by the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, and three by sociologists of the Settlement Department. The two bodies carried out their research in co-operation, so that the conceptual framework as well as the selection of the villages for study is co-ordinated. In addition to the thirteen systematically analysed villages, we have occasionally referred also to other moshavim, utilizing chiefly data collected by the Settlement Department.

The outcome of the immigrants' confrontation with the new surroundings will, in the last analysis, depend upon (a) the extent to which his social and cultural background is similar to or different from these surroundings, and (b) the extent to which he is ready and willing to change and bridge the distance where such exists. By this we do not, of course, mean that immigration cannot, or should not, lead up to mutual change and adjustment of the newcomers to the absorbing framework, instead of being just a process of one-sided acculturation. The very nature of the situation, however, obviously requires that the change expected of the immigrant should be the greater of the two.

In order to classify the various groups of immigrants according to the similarity or dissimilarity of their cultural background to that of Israel, it is convenient to adopt the

1. Since the internal problems of the moshav are the same in the whole country, the sample is not restricted to the Negev.

TABLE 20. Distribution of moshavim and households by areas of origin and geographical district

Area of origin	Total				Northern District				Central District			
	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%
Eastern and Central Europe	72	28.1	4 831	29.8	22	(40.7)	1 507	(39.6)	29	(38.6)	2 161	(38.1)
Western Europe and America	2	0.7	136	0.8	—	(—)	—	(—)	2	(2.6)	136	(2.4)
Balkans	10	3.9	739	4.5	1	(1.8)	35	(0.9)	7	(9.3)	578	(10.2)
North Africa	81	31.6	4 624	28.5	11	(20.3)	532	(14.0)	13	(17.3)	1 023	(18.0)
Other Middle Eastern countries	82	32.0	5 284	32.6	18	(33.3)	1 163	(30.6)	21	(28.0)	1 535	(27.1)
Others	9	3.5	575	—	2	(3.7)	138	(3.6)	3	(3.9)	224	(3.9)
TOTAL	256	100.0	16 189	100.0	54	[21.0]	3 375	[20.8]	75	[29.2]	5 657	[34.9]

Source : Unpublished data of the Settlement Department.

Note: Figures in parentheses () are percentages of district totals; figures in brackets [] are percentages of grand total.

method of confronting two extreme types of society and culture : the 'modern-Western' and the 'traditional-Oriental'. The two pure types do not, of course, do justice to the varied social reality ; and it would be difficult to find an immigrant not endowed with a mixture of both 'Western' and 'Oriental' traits.

By a modern type of society we mean a developed and dynamic economy of extensive markets, industrialization, and a complex financial system. The functioning of all these activities is governed primarily by rational criteria inherent in the economy itself. Such a structure obviously implies a variety of occupations, especially of occupations requiring vocational training and a certain level of general education. The standard of living is high and steadily rising, and with it also the desire for more constant improvement in the level of consumption. Here, it is economic development which symbolizes progress and one's status is largely determined by one's occupation and income. The State is national and secular. Government is oriented to wide strata of the population, activates them and brings about the politization of society. The citizen is the basic unit of the State, and his political and personal status are secured by universal equal rights.

The social relations in the modern society are characterized by the broadening of horizons and membership groups. Together with the limitation of the size and function of the family, there has been a growth in the individual's scope of activity and contacts. This phenomenon in turn results in a closer and more direct relationship with the over-all social structure through its various interlinking spheres, and in a diffusion of solidarity over and above the immediate primary groups. There is also in such a society a tendency to social stratification based upon ways of life and occupation, which on the one hand facilitates upward social mobility and on the other develops the importance of the occupational role and the motivation to achievement in it. In this stratificational system the differences between the various groups are neither rigid nor extreme ; while class and social status are obviously related, they do not necessarily overlap and both are largely independent of political power.

Education is chiefly secular, coupled, or not, with traditional religious schooling. It is primarily designed to inculcate universalistic and national values, to facilitate integration within the economy and polity, and to serve social and vocational mobility.

In the traditional-Oriental type of society the economy is based largely on agriculture, and industry is either lacking or in its infancy. The technological level and requirements

TABLE 20¹(cont.)

Jerusalem Sub-District				Galilee Sub-District				Lakhish				Negev			
Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%	Vill-ages	%	House-holds	%
4	(11.4)	202	(11.8)	7	(24.1)	339	(24.7)	6	(20.0)	414	(19.1)	4	(12.1)	208	(10.9)
—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)
2	(5.7)	117	(6.8)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)	—	(—)
12	(34.2)	502	(29.3)	17	(58.6)	763	(55.6)	14	(46.6)	1 040	(48.1)	14	(42.4)	764	(40.2)
16	(45.7)	852	(48.8)	5	(17.2)	273	(20.0)	7	(23.3)	534	(24.7)	15	(45.4)	127	(48.7)
1	(2.8)	38	(2.2)	—	(—)	—	(—)	3	(10.0)	175	(8.1)	—	(—)	—	(—)
35	[13.6]	1 171	[10.5]	29	[11.3]	1 375	[8.5]	30	[11.7]	2 163	[13.3]	33	[14.8]	1 899	[11.7]

are low, the production limited, and the money market and facilities on a small scale. Due to lack of investment capital and entrepreneurial initiative, the economy is static; occupational roles are mostly inherited and few, and there is a noticeable absence of occupations which, in the West, are filled by the middle class.

The Government is in the hands of a small group. The political consciousness is underdeveloped, and participation in political life is limited and unorganized. The State is religious, and its separation from the Church has only just begun. There is obviously little room for 'citizenship', in the Western sense, and the minorities become, of necessity, second-grade citizens.

The extended family and the local lineage group constitute the main social frameworks. Most relationships remain within them or are determined by them. Status is primarily dependent upon lineage and only limited mobility is possible by the acquisition of wealth and education; all the more so since conditions do not make for enrichment, and religious education is not a uniform criterion but particular to each group. The general level of education is low, and higher secular education is acquired only by a small élite group.

Originally the Jewish community¹ had been a traditional society, in the sense described above, in Europe as well as in the Orient. It contained however, an element characteristic of only a few traditional communities, namely, the central place occupied by learning in the life of the community. According to Jewish religion, the pursuit of (religious) learning is the most important duty of the individual. As a result, learning among Jews has never become the preserve of a privileged few, and in many a Jewish community it has been actually—besides work—the central preoccupation of a large part of the community.

Among recent immigrants to Israel from Oriental countries, however, only the Yemenite Jews came from such learned communities. Other immigrants from Oriental countries came, with few exceptions, from communities where Jewish learning had declined centuries ago. Other features of the tradition persisted, though they started disintegrating recently among some of them.

Among European Jews, on the other hand, learning has remained a central value,

1. We are grateful to Dr. Joseph Ben-David for his advice and suggestions in developing the conceptual schema which follows.

but increasingly they have lost touch with Jewish tradition. The predilection for education among these non-traditional Jews has, therefore, manifested itself in their enthusiasm for secular learning. Furthermore, since the European countries became modern societies a long while ago, even traditional Jews living there adopted the ways of thinking and many of the contents of secular modern cultures; they lived in a split world where the material and technical aspects of their life were ruled by modern concepts, while their ideas about society, politics and spiritual culture were, to a large extent, derived from religiously sanctioned tradition.

Immigrants to Israel can therefore be classified according to their cultural background from two points of view: (a) according to whether the content of their culture is traditional, modern, or contains elements of both, and (b) whether the pursuit of learning was of central or peripheral importance in their way of life. Furthest from Israel culture are those who came from traditional, not learning-oriented cultures, who include most of the immigrants from the rural areas of North Africa and the Middle East, with the exception of the Yemen; and nearest to Israel culture are the immigrants with modern or mixed-transitional learning-oriented cultures, i.e., those coming from Europe and other countries or places with a Western civilization. In between the two are the traditional, learning-oriented immigrants from the Yemen and a few local communities from other countries, and the majority of urbanized immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East.

Although, as will be seen later, Yemenites are as different culturally from Israelis as other traditional groups, their mental discipline and intellectual habits make it easier for them than for other traditionals to master abstract concepts and orient themselves in a new situation. On the other hand, the cities from which the urban Oriental immigrants hail are more or less modern communities according to our typology. But modern civilization was only recently introduced to these areas and has not yet penetrated very deeply. Furthermore, since a large part of the Jewish population in these countries has not been learning-oriented, they failed to acquire the education and knowledge necessary for the efficient mastery of the modern way of life.

Cultural similarity thus determines whether the immigrant has actual knowledge of the most important elements of Israel culture, and/or whether he has intellectual attitudes and learning habits enabling him to acquire this knowledge efficiently. As we shall see, it is a decisive factor in the acquisition of agricultural, managerial and commercial skills necessary for modern farming and for the smooth functioning of the relatively sophisticated moshav organization.

Settlement of the land, however, implies also a willingness to accept a new social and occupational role: being the member of a moshav is a new role for all the immigrants, and being a farmer is new for the large majority of them. Immigration itself always involves some psychological stress due to lack of orientation in the new society; this stress is here intensified because of being placed in a new and strange type of community, and because of the necessity of learning a new occupation. The ability to master the stress and act independently and efficiently in such a situation depends on what is called 'predisposition to change'. This concept, formulated in the course of an investigation of immigrants to Israel in general, assumes that there is a positive relationship between the integration of the immigrant in his community of origin and in his family on the one hand, and his ability to face changes of role and status resulting from immigration.¹ It is, accordingly, hypothesized that the position of the Jewish community in the countries of origin of the immigrants affects their predisposition to change.

A relatively high predisposition to change can be expected, firstly, among those coming from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and a few other places, where Jews were accepted within the general society without any discrimination, until many of them were com-

1. S. N. Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, 1954; cf. also Joseph Ben-David, 'Ethnic Differences or Social Change', in: Carl Frankenstein (ed.), *Between Past and Future*, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 33-52.

pletely assimilated;¹ secondly, among those coming from Jewish communities completely secluded from their surroundings, such as existed in the Yemen and in many of the rural areas of Africa and the Middle East; and thirdly, in a minority of urban communities in the Orient and Europe where, in spite of considerable cultural contact with the surroundings, the separateness and autonomy of the Jewish communities were maintained. Though extremely divergent in their cultures, these types had few problems about their Jewish identity. For quite different reasons the fact of being Jews had never threatened their status, either because it was considered as irrelevant or because the surrounding society was so completely religious and traditional that the possibility of improving one's status through abandoning Judaism and becoming assimilated never arose. We shall therefore call both backgrounds stable.

A negative predisposition to change is expected among immigrants coming from all the various places where there existed a so-called Jewish problem, namely where Jews were neither completely secluded from nor completely accepted by the surrounding society (non-stable background). This includes the majority of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand and of urban immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East on the other. Jews in these places faced insoluble conflicts: they were expected to be loyal to the different nations among which they lived, but on the other hand they were discriminated against by the same people who demanded their loyalty; they were encouraged to acquire education and to accept the values and the way of life of their surroundings, but were denied social acceptance and status even if they lived up to the most exacting standards in all these respects. Such immigrants come to Israel in the hope that all their problems of status and identity will be automatically resolved in the new country. Their willingness to put up with a new kind of status insecurity is, therefore, minimal.²

In principle all cultural types can go together with either a stable or non-stable social background (although there is, of course, a tendency for mixed cultural types to go together with a non-stable background, since mixed culture usually goes together with rapid change in the status of the Jewish community). As Table 21 shows, there are

TABLE 21. Theoretically possible socio-cultural types among immigrants to Israel

Background	Modern		Transitional		Traditional	
	Learning-oriented	Not learning-oriented	Learning-oriented	Not learning-oriented	Learning-oriented	Not learning-oriented
Stable	x	—	—	x	x	x
Non-stable	x ¹	—	—	x ¹	—	—

Note: 'x' = the type actually exists; '—' = the type does not actually exist in the sample investigated.

1. This type used to constitute a great part of the original moshav population, but they left the moshavim after a short stay.

twelve theoretically possible types of which, however, only six were actually found in our sample. Practically all immigrant groups, however, coming from non-stable backgrounds have left the moshavim after only a short stay. The social cores of the existing villages are usually groups from relatively stable backgrounds, with individuals from non-stable backgrounds living among them. Stability will, therefore, not feature as an explicit variable in the following descriptions, while further variables, unconnected with the immigrants' background abroad, will be introduced according to the nature of the problems to be dealt with.

1. Similar communities exist in Western Europe, America and different countries of the British Commonwealth, etc., but there has been little immigration from these places.

2. With the exception of those who manage to turn their quest for identity into a comprehensive social ideology and come to Israel as members of organized social movements. As shown in the previous chapters, however, there have been few immigrants of this kind since the establishment of the State.

Physical and material conditions in the new moshav

Dov Weintraub and Moshe Lissak

In the present chapter we shall discuss the way in which inadequate planning and insufficient resources affected the development of the individual villages, and see how the difficulties were further aggravated by an unrealistic estimate of the ability of the new settlers to adjust themselves to hardships and setbacks, and to accept, even partly, the challenge of the situation in the spirit demonstrated by the pioneering groups of earlier days.

The first area in which the inadequacy of material and physical resources of the individual settlements was reflected relates to the general settlement conditions. These include: (a) the security situation, that is the distance of the village from the border and its vulnerability to marauding activities in the area; (b) the availability and quality of agricultural land for the development of full-scale farming in keeping with local conditions; (c) an adequate water supply at reasonable cost. In order to determine to what extent these conditions affected the development of moshavim, the settlements founded in the years 1948-50 were surveyed and divided into three categories. Settlements with plenty of land and water and not exposed to the danger of frontier incidents near the armistice borders were classified as having 'very good' conditions. Those possessing enough land, but lacking either water or security, were considered as having 'medium conditions', while scarcity of land (whatever the other factors) and the absence of both water and security constituted 'bad conditions'.

It was found that nearly half the moshavim do not enjoy proper conditions for settlement, and almost a quarter of them have very 'bad conditions'. The hardships suffered by settlements in the Jerusalem and the Galilee sub-districts, among those established in the period 1948-51, are patent. The reasons for this situation have already been indicated but what interests us here, from the point of view of both the individual village and its settlers, is the fact that there are many moshavim eight or more years old which because of scarcity of physical resources, have not been able to reach even the intermediate stage of development.

Without entering here more deeply into questions of agricultural economy, it may be stated that at least 20 dunams of good arable land are needed for a successful farm of this kind (that is, the mixed mountain type), in addition to 60-80 dunams of pasture land per unit for 10 to 15 sheep, or 3 to 5 cattle. And even then, it has been calculated, the income obtained would by no means approximate to that expected under other conditions, 3,500 Israeli pounds, but only reach 2,000 Israeli pounds net (1958 prices; see Table 22).

The funds actually appropriated for each village fell short by far of the financial requirements of the ambitious programme drafted. This was the case both in basic out-

TABLE 22. Estimated income from 20 dunams of land in the mountain area

Branch	Net income in Israeli pounds
Fruit	895
Tobacco	235
Vegetables and field crops	124
Poultry	305
Sheep	191
Total agricultural income	1 750
Value of house	240
Total net income per settler	1 990

lay, such as improvement of sufficient land, and in the general development of the moshav. In the Jerusalem area, for example, as late as the end of 1958, a major part of the land improvement operations, designed to enlarge the unit of arable land, could not be completed for lack of funds. As a result, the average area of arable land allocated to each farm unit did not exceed 15 dunams, instead of the absolute minimum of 20, and the optimum of 25 dunams.

Another major economic difficulty with which the settlers had to cope was changes in the demand for agricultural products. We have seen that the planning of agriculture in the early 1950s had been based on an unrealistic appraisal of the future market conditions.¹ The dairy, poultry and vegetable farms, which had been the traditional branches of farming in moshavim prior to the establishment of the State, had been expanded in the new villages much faster than the increase in demand justified. Farmers were thus left with their produce on their hands and had to dispose of it at a loss. In fact, all the villages included in our sample and established before 1952 underwent a crisis of this kind, affecting a major branch of their economy. Sometimes, especially in the mixed farm types, several branches were hit, concurrently or consecutively.

Finally, the lack of experience and funds was also reflected in the housing given to the settlers. Housing construction in the new moshavim has included three types of units: type I, the so-called 'block house', of inferior construction and very small in size (approximately 30 square metres); type II, the improved 'block house' (of similar construction but slightly larger in size); and type III, the recently introduced standard 'Lakhish' house, by far the best of the three. The distribution of these types in the various settlements is shown in Table 23.

TABLE 23. Distribution of housing types in the new moshavim in 1959

District	Distribution of housing types by village							
	Total number of villages surveyed		Type I		Type II		Type III	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Northern	52	(99.9)	5	(9.6)	30	(57.6)	17	(32.7)
Central	69	(100.0)	—	(—)	66	(95.7)	3	(4.3)
Lakhish	25	(100.0)	—	(—)	16	(64.0)	9	(36.0)
Southern	29	(100.0)	8	(27.6)	13	(44.8)	8	(27.6)
Galilee sub-district	23	(100.0)	1	(4.3)	22	(95.7)	—	(—)
Jerusalem sub-district	33	(99.9)	17	(51.5)	8	(24.2)	8	(24.2)
TOTAL	231	(99.9)	31	(13.4)	155	(67.1)	45	(13.4)

Source: unpublished data of the Settlement Department.

1. Cf. Chapter III.

This table shows clearly the high proportion of housing now considered inadequate. Of even greater significance, however, was the slow pace at which the majority of the early housing projects were executed. Contrary to the procedure adopted later under which full housing facilities were provided for actual settlement, the previous method almost invariably involved a long preliminary period of residence in temporary dwellings. In the first, or even the second year, the settlers lived in tent camps, or in huts, themselves working as labourers on the construction of the village. This method, it is true, ensured employment for the settlers during the initial period, but its negative results were soon patent. It lowered the standard of the dwelling built largely with unskilled labour, caused much hardship due to unsuitable living conditions, and wasted valuable time which could have been devoted to employment more closely related to farming, on the pattern later adopted in Lakhish.

The inadequate resources and mistakes in planning also had far-reaching consequences for the attitude and the adjustment of the new settlers to life in a moshav. The hardships described (including market crises and irregular and piecemeal financing) occurred at a stage when many of the new settlers had just started to master farm work and were therefore especially susceptible to setbacks and reverses. Indeed, it may be said that the less the prior preparation of the farmers for the agricultural 'facts of life', the greater their sensitivity to the lack of smooth progress.

The practice whereby the settlement agencies provided the funds as they became available, which had been the accepted practice during the mandatory period, did not work here for another reason. The income derived from the partially developed farms was insufficient, and the settlers had to be provided with additional employment even after they had built their houses. In most cases, however, there were few employment opportunities in the vicinity of the new villages, and the Government initiated work-creating public works projects. The wages paid were low, no more than about 65 per cent of what could be earned in agriculture. Work of this kind was not strenuous, and was fairly regular. Many of the immigrants, accordingly, especially from those Middle Eastern countries where standards of living had always been extremely low, grew accustomed to this work, and came to prefer it to the more exacting agricultural effort, or at least to regard the small but certain income requiring little effort as their due. Prolongation of the process of development did not lead to the gradual acquisition of agricultural skill, and to an attachment to the farm. Indeed morale and initiative were destroyed by the marginal subsistence, while attitudes to farming became more and more negative. Thus, those whose ambitions were not destroyed looked forward to migrating to the cities, or to finding other lucrative employment.

Apart from its economic consequences, this shift to non-agricultural work resulted in apathy towards the moshav as a community and a political unit—a problem which was grave enough in any case. The history of moshav Te'ena provides an instructive example in this context. The settlers of this moshav came from Persia, mostly from the city of Shiraz, where they have been merchants or tradesmen and had neither the inclination nor the training to become farmers. Prior to their immigration they had little knowledge of the conditions prevailing in Israel, and no preparation for the new way of life that awaited them. Their knowledge of their new country derived chiefly from propaganda which painted a false picture of conditions in Israel in general and of life in the moshav in particular. Besides, they came as individuals and not as an organized group, and had neither the leaders nor the experience necessary for action as an organized community, especially in times of stress. On the other hand, they had some financial means of their own, were relatively well educated, and came from a culturally homogeneous and stable background.

This delicate balancing of 'positive' and 'negative' factors pointed up the importance of the absorptive process in general, and of the initial confrontation with moshav life

in particular. However, the first stages of settlement immediately proved disappointing. The settlers were accommodated in tin huts which were suffocatingly hot in the summer and cold and leaky in the rainy winter. In these structures they lived for two years (1950-52). Transportation was another source of frustration. The village was favourably located near a main road and not far from urban centres, but it took nearly two years before an approach road was constructed. During this period supplies—including bread and drinking water—had often to be borne through the fields by the settlers, sometimes a distance of three miles to the nearest point accessible to motor vehicles. There was a delay in the installation of water pipes; internal roads, electricity and telephone were not provided until even later. The houses themselves, erected subsequently, were all of type II, described above, and were unsatisfactory. The addition of a third room is certainly envisaged in the blueprint of each such house, but it is usually provided by the authorities only for large families.¹ Houses are accordingly extremely crowded, and congestion is further intensified by the frequent presence of three generations in a household—the aged parents, the settler and his wife, his unmarried brothers and sisters and his children. The sizes of the seventy-one households in moshav Te'ena were as follows: sixteen households with one to four members; thirty-seven with five to seven members; and eighteen with eight to eleven members.

At the disposal of these households there were eighteen three-room houses, occupied by families with eight or more members; forty-nine two-room houses (of which two are vacant); and six one-room houses (a special kind of house built for unmarried farm-owners and young couples). It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the factor of housing and services has been given prominence in almost all our interviews with settlers of this group.

This is the setting against which the problem of the market conditions must now be examined. It will be understood that by the time the settlers could begin farming (that is, 1952) they had already suffered severe disillusionment the results of which cannot be overestimated: on the one hand there had been the material difficulties described, and on the other the long delay in embarking on farming, caused by lack of irrigation piping and the protracted period of hard work on building, alternating with unemployment. Though financially almost all the families could well afford to weather the intermittent absence of income, the result was nevertheless severe. Five families left the village as early as this stage, while others lived in a state of constant anxiety, which could be relieved only by swift and sustained success in agriculture. When water was finally brought in sufficient volume in 1952, the settlers threw themselves and their meagre capital into farming with enthusiasm.

The economy planned for the moshav was of a mixed-dairy type. The first irrigated dunams of each family were accordingly devoted to intensive growing of vegetables, while as soon as fodder was also grown, milch cows were allocated. It has been estimated that during this initial year the settlers invested an average of 500 Israeli pounds per farm of their own money, and that they often expended as much as four standard work-days per family in a single working day. When the produce had been disposed of, however, it was found that the proceeds did not even cover expenses. The reasons for this were diverse: there was, first of all, the unskillful farming of the settlers, which the two preparatory years had done little to correct (an aspect which we shall return to later); secondly—and this should have been made clear from the outset—a small dairy herd could not be expected to be profitable.

What made the greatest impact upon the villagers, however, was the steep decline in prices which during this year affected both branches of their economy, and which was not compensated for by any subsidy. Seen in its proper perspective, this could be

1. Officially, a third room is a privilege of families with nine or more members; under pressure, however, this rule has sometimes been relaxed.

regarded as a normal development hardship. The Settlement Department in fact now energetically stepped in, explained the situation, and at once began to plan for the village a new farm-type, what was to be known as the industrial crops farm. Judging from the later success of this type, it was indeed a sound solution. The price collapse, however, coming at such a critical juncture and in a sensitive situation, served to put an effective check upon the development of the village, its agriculture, solidarity, and self-government. Twelve families cut their losses and left the village. Almost all of those who remained lost faith both in farming and in official promises, so much so that they called upon the Settlement Department to arrange for the neighbouring veteran settlements to take over the responsibility for their farms, while they, although the owners, would continue working as wage labourers. Since this suggestion was offered as a permanent solution, and not as a temporary measure, the Department (which was later to perfect the managed farm system) rejected it out of hand. The majority of the remaining settlers thereupon turned to outside employment, and every effort was made to secure for each household at least one permanent and regularly paid position. Since in several families one working individual constituted the entire full-time labour force of the household, this in practice meant neglect of the farm. But even those who had the manpower for both farming and outside work were disinclined to continue investing in their farms. This state of affairs has largely persisted in the village to the present time (1959), some six years after the original crisis, despite the fact that the farm type has been changed and funds have been offered for intensive development to make up for the delay. In effect, then, the village is as yet in the intermediate stage the chief reason being the unwillingness of the settlers to invest, or to accept development loans, and even to devote their full time to agriculture. Thus, apart from some twenty people,¹ most of the households are not primarily agricultural (cf. Table 24).

TABLE 24. Extent of farm development in moshav Te' ena (1959)

Extent of farm development	Number of farms	Number of households having outside work also
Farm cultivated and developed according to plan	13	7
Dairy farm, taken care of but awaiting liquidation	8	8
Farm cultivated partially (half to two-thirds)	26	15
Farm less than half-cultivated or neglected	24 ¹	14
TOTAL	71	44

1. In two of these farms the settler is a social case incapable of regular work.

A similar phenomenon of marking time, or even of regression, has been evident also in other spheres of moshav life. It was mentioned above that the settlers had originally come to the country and to the village individually, and without recognized leadership elements. They nevertheless fairly quickly succeeded in evolving both a stable social structure as well as an active, able and devoted élite group (which was, in fact, largely instrumental for the fact that the village weathered the initial shock of confrontation). Now, however, an apathy in respect of the public sphere has begun to creep in. The settlement is still a social entity, but the common denominator on which it is based is of a very low order indeed. The place maintains, fairly effectively, the regular moshav institutions. There is, however, little motivation for the assumption of public responsibility and leadership; the secretary is now an outside official and no active group,

1. Some of these persist in farming not from choice but because they have not yet advantageously liquidated their dairies, and are not willing to cut their losses or let the property lose its value. They have not developed the other branches now prevalent.

desirous or capable of initiating change, exists. And all this in spite of the fact that economically the situation is still below the expectations of the settlers, whether employed outside or cultivating their farms.¹

This situation has been found by us in *all* villages affected by decline in prices during the formative initial stage of their development. Since, as has been remarked, various factors are here combined, the effect of this decline has differed from place to place. Thus in some moshavim the reaction was even stronger than the one described, a considerable number of the settlers leaving the village and agriculture altogether; while in others basic faith in farming, as such, was not undermined, nor was the social and political organization of the village disrupted. We have, for example, the case of moshav Biyoun.

This village was from the beginning endowed with very good settlement conditions. Water was quickly available, investment allocations were arranged for at almost the planned rate, and housing and facilities were far above the national average.² Later we shall see that this was also true of several other factors, and that the predispositions of its members to moshav life were certainly of the best to be found in the entire settlement programme. All this notwithstanding, however, the crisis which affected the vegetable crops and the dairy produce of the settlement brought about far-reaching changes in the agricultural performance and attitude of the settlers. The majority slowed down the development of their farms and reduced almost to nil their own investments. At the same time, many households sought and secured outside employment. Since many of them had acquired a secondary education as well as agricultural skills, the work they found in the neighbouring rural or urban enterprises was often regular, full-time and lucrative.

The Settlement Department acted in this case even more radically than in the preceding one, since it at once added to the village economy a mature citrus grove instead of the young grove just planted. This addition was calculated to compensate the settlers for the losses incurred, create a more favourable attitude to farming, and provide a branch of known stability and profitability. This step, however, did not reverse the previous trend. The outside occupations were not abandoned, but the grove, which had been meant as an auxiliary branch calculated to encourage the settlers to continue developing the major branches of farming as planned, became instead the principal and often the only agricultural occupation. Some households cultivated this crop exclusively, leaving the remaining area and equipment allotted to them unutilized; others continued to develop additional plots (but not on the mixed-dairy lines planned for them and fitting in with the regional and national planning) and further increased the citrus area. Now the situation is as follows: the rent obtained from the citrus grove is the major source of income; the next in importance is salaried work (in the village or elsewhere); while the other branches account for the smallest part only.

The distribution of income by size and source in moshav Biyoun in 1958/59 may be summarized as follows. The total income of all the families was 276,583 Israeli pounds; of this the lowest quartile received 2,000-2,994 Israeli pounds, the second quartile received 2,994-3,479 Israeli pounds, the third quartile 3,479-4,281 Israeli pounds, and the upper quartile 4,281-5,500 Israeli pounds. Agriculture accounted for 65,050 Israeli pounds (23.7 per cent of the total income), outside employment for 99,033 Israeli

1. As we shall have to point out very often in the sections that follow, none of the complex situations of the kind described are the sole or even the predominant result of one single factor. Here, too, responsibility cannot be attributed solely to the causes mentioned; it may be traced also to demographic structure, the admitted preference for lighter work, the new social conditions introduced with the coming of the second group of settlers and the resulting challenge to leadership, and other factors already alluded to. This, however, in no way invalidates the analysis made, and the facet discussed has been of major and distinct importance.

2. In 1949 a plane flying a group of Youth Aliya children from Tunisia crashed in Norway with total loss of life. As a memorial to the victims the Norwegian Federation of Labour donated a complete prefabricated village (including communal buildings) to the Tunisian settlers, the standard of which was superior to that generally erected here. The Federation continues to take care of the upkeep of the gift, and as recently as the spring of 1960 a Norwegian master-craftsman came over to give the houses a new coat of paint.

pounds (35.7 per cent), and rent¹ from the citrus grove for 112,500 Israeli pounds (40.6 per cent).

This situation is of course again the result of a combination of factors. The specific aspect mentioned, however, coming as it did at a particular period, was the mechanism which triggered off the entire reaction. And it is in this light that it should indeed be primarily considered. Generally, we have found that this 'trigger-effect' increases, other conditions being equal, the greater the susceptibility of the settler to crisis, and the greater his ability to earn and live outside the village.

The moshav structure implied certain manpower expectations, and it thus required of the villagers suitable demographic characteristics. The immigrant groups, however, not having been selected by age, health and size of family unit, present a great variety of demographic structures, most of which depart from that envisaged in the original planning. It will be our purpose to examine here in what way different demographic types present a different manpower potential and thus determine the fulfilment of the settler role, and to consider the conditions under which change in the nature and implications of these types may occur.

We have already stated that it is the purpose of the moshav economy to provide, once it has attained the stage of advanced investment and production, for the needs of the agricultural family on a level deemed sufficient by the standards of society, and without recourse to either additional employment or to hired help from outside the household. To achieve this aim, each farm-type (or, more precisely, the detailed crop-rotation scheme of each farm-type), has a planned work schedule. The planned totals of work days in three types of farm, for example, are as follows: dairy, 405; industrial crops, 367; citrus, 361. These calculations exclude poultry.

For our detailed analysis we shall, as before, refer primarily to the industrial crops farm. This example will have general validity, since (a) as may be seen, the requirements of the various types in similar stages of development are of the same general order, and (b) while there are many differences in the detailed internal division of the work days of each type over the months and seasons of the year, the broad characteristics are similar.

The type chosen, then, requires the annual investment of a total of 367 work days. We have arrived at this figure by allowing for the two correcting factors, namely, a below-norm actual work expenditure per dunam, and time invested in agricultural instruction.

It is clear from these details that the farm requires approximately one-and-one-third work years (on the basis of 280 days per work year), though this over-all calculation is subject to an uneven work curve. In fact, during six peak months the household will have to provide between $36\frac{1}{2}$ and $46\frac{1}{2}$ work days per month; during the three average months (April, November, December), between 24 and 28; while during the 'dead' winter period between $6\frac{1}{2}$ and $11\frac{1}{2}$. All in all, and varying according to seasons, a minimum of less than one worker and a maximum of two. This total can be divided among the members of the household. Work which physically does not require adults constitutes in this type of farm over a third of the total output (though the vocational qualifications required might in practice somewhat reduce the real possibilities of employing children). In effect, then, a relatively small manpower demand—on the whole not requiring or affording work to more than one 'standard' agricultural adult, with *ad hoc* seasonal reinforcements easily obtainable from a normal household.

No less definite, and of similar significance, are the implications of such a farm with respect to the number of consumers it can support. We have mentioned above that the

1. We say 'rent' because the grove (i.e., the original one, planted in one piece) is not divided between the individual households and separately cultivated, but farmed as a whole. As such it provides work for approximately twenty settlers (apart from seasonal additions) who take care of it on a salaried basis (and are accordingly considered as being in 'outside' occupations), while each household receives an income from the profits.

yearly income planned for the smallholding agricultural household in the final stage was approximately 3,500 Israeli pounds (after deduction of payments for loans, based on 1958/59 prices), that is, the income obtainable at that time from a veteran farm of similar characteristics. Judging by national consumption averages for this period, the expenditure made possible by such an income in 1956 was as follows : out of a total average expenditure per person of 963 Israeli pounds, an average of 412 Israeli pounds, or 42.8 per cent of the total expenditure, was spent on food, tobacco and drink; 154 Israeli pounds (16.0 per cent) on clothing, shoes and similar articles ; and 397 Israeli pounds (41.2 per cent) on other items.¹

Considering the relatively low cost of living in rural areas, and on the basis of an average household unit of slightly less than four persons (as it has been in the old-established moshavim), 3,500 Israeli pounds was a reasonable income. This, however, clearly implies that only a small family of the type which existed in the original moshavim would actually realize the standard of living envisaged in the planning. Assuming that the agricultural standard of living is supposed to be generally similar and bearing in mind the fact that the economy in question sets a definite limitation on investment and mechanization, we may now adopt the expectations of the above-mentioned farm type as a general point of reference 'O', and express the balance between the manpower and consumption of any given household. Considering the actual manpower of the family as 'A' (with the age curve of the unit and the number of its members determining the size of the labour force, and the physical constitution and the state of health of each individual in this force defining its quality), and its consumption needs as 'B' (measured by the number of consumers in it and the consumption level of each of them), there are five basic types of demographic balance which are of importance.

Type 1 is a fully productive, but childless, family. In this structure B falls short of O, and a relationship of $A > B$ is created. On established and veteran farms this is clearly a marginal or transitional case. It is, however, perhaps the ideal form for the period of development and capital formation. Since the settlement of such a household is usually the product of previous selection and preparation, it is found mostly among young farmers establishing a new family (which is rare among immigrant settlers).

Type 2 is the 'balanced Western' demographic structure, in which $A = B$, both aspects corresponding to the implications of the farm plan. As pointed out, this is the type implied by the blueprint of the moshav, which, historically, was founded by relatively young people with small planned families. They could, therefore, fully utilize the factors of production and achieve an adequate income per head, without either overwork or under-employment. This type is, in fact, the common pattern of the Western farmer; and, though as such it frequently appears also in some of the new settlements under discussion in this paper, it is too well known to require further explanation. It should only be remembered that in practice its range is fairly wide, that is, the equilibrium between consumption and production may be achieved through several variations, in which limited changes in respect of the owners of the farm themselves, or as regards the number of children and their spacing, do not affect the fundamental balance described.

Type 3 may be termed the 'war survivors' or 'unbalanced' Western family, with manpower so small that it is often incapable of providing a living through agriculture. This is so, even though the number of consumers in it is also restricted, often even falling short of that envisaged in the norm O. As, however, the productive capacity is less than the requirements of profitable commercial farming, the relationship of $A < B$ is established in the majority of the households, whether transitionally or for an entire genera-

1. Cf. R. Weitz, *Darkeinu BeHakla'uth UvHithyashvuth* (Our way in agriculture and settlement), Tel Aviv, 1958, p. 63.

tion.¹ The destruction of Jewish families in Europe by the Nazis led to late marriages and children born late in life, producing an age distribution characterized by a relatively large number of small children and elderly people, and a scarcity of age-groups in between. Among settlers of this kind are many who are in their fifties, with no children at all or with children of kindergarten or elementary school age. In one typical moshav, namely Ta'amon, this demographic fact constitutes the most important single factor in the shaping of the economic activity of that part of the population (immigrants from Yugoslavia and Rumania) both of which had suffered so much during the war.

TABLE 25. 'War families' in moshav Ta'amon by country of origin, size of families and age of children, 1958

Origin	Total	Number of children in family				Age of children	
		Nil	1	2	3	13 and below	14-18
Yugoslav families	20	10 (50%)	4 (20%)	5 (25%)	1 (5%)	8 (40%)	2 (10%)
Rumanian families	15	8 (53%)	3 (20%)	4 (27%)	—	6 (40%)	1 (7%)
TOTAL	35	18 (51%)	7 (20%)	9 (26%)	1 (3%)	14 (40%)	3 (9%)

TABLE 26. Farms by demographic structure and agricultural activity (auxiliary or regular farming) in 1958

	Agricultural activity		Total
	Regular	Auxiliary	
Balanced demographic (European structure and other)	127	4	131
War survivors	2	33	35
TOTAL	129	37	166

This situation is no doubt fluid, and some of the families with children who engaged in farming only as an auxiliary source of income may become full-time farmers when their children grow up; or, conversely, agricultural families without children may, as they grow older, stop their production entirely (especially as the lack of heirs weakens the motivation to develop the farm fully). At any juncture, however, at which this demographic structure appears, it has a detrimental effect on the moshav economy.

Type 4. In contrast to European families, Oriental families are practically always larger than can be maintained at a reasonable level of living by a farm unit in the moshav. Thus they are always unbalanced. The most difficult kind of imbalance is represented by Type 4. Here the consumption needs are more than ordinarily large, while manpower barely meets agricultural requirements. Formally—though obviously for different structural reasons—here, too, $A < B$; and here, too, the basic suitability to small-holding agriculture as such may be called in question.

The following example illustrates the problems of this type of demographic structure. The village in question is moshav Shalekheth (growing chiefly vegetables and industrial crops), and it is characterized by the fact that though the majority of its families have manpower sufficient to cultivate the farm—the cultivation being done by a large number of workers of limited and impaired physical capacity—the farm is not sufficient for the large consumption needs. The demographic composition of moshav Shalekheth in 1958 was as follows: there were 193 adults, including 85 males of working age (up to 55), 83 females of working age (up to 55), and 30 old people (over 55). In addition, there

1. Some families, of course, overcome this handicap by longer working hours, but this does not change the basic imbalance, since overwork cannot be continued indefinitely.

were 258 children and young people (both sexes), of whom 33 were between the ages of 13 and 24.

The average number of children per family in this population is four (although the proportion of youth is small), and at first glance it seems similar to the second, balanced type, or at least as being only midway between it and the extremely large families often found among immigrants from the Mediterranean countries. In fact, however, the average family in the village is still young, and the average given above may rise. The main problem, however, is the quality of the manpower.

True, the settlers have entered upon the production cycle energetically, and the crops planted and sown in the spring of 1957 (the year when the moshav entered its intermediate stage of development) were very successful in size and quality. But this initial impetus (the year given was the first full productive one in the village) was by no means based on a balanced and reasonable working effort, as measured by the standard man-hour day. The settlers, including the women, the children (7 to 13 age-group) and the old people, worked long, hard hours in the fields over and above the hours of work usually required by this type of farm even in peak production periods. The special effort was needed because the people were physically weak and in poor health. Besides malnutrition, tuberculosis, anaemia, and other types of chronic illness, the children also suffered from diarrhoea and boils. The women, exhausted with frequent childbirth, in addition to being in poor health, worked side by side with the men in the fields. All this created a vicious circle where weakness induced by malady led to the necessity of greater effort in work which in its turn further increased exhaustion and malady. Conditions were aggravated by poor nutrition.¹ Children were more adequately fed by the School Nutrition Scheme, but the school lunch (which usually provides half of the children's food intake) was not given during the summer vacations, when the youngsters' meals were exactly the same as those of the adults. This situation persists and therefore, though the settlers work willingly, even the younger people sometimes return home at noon exhausted. The filling of the production norm is only made possible by the large number of workers, each of whom produces only part of the standard output. The income per worker from the farm is therefore very low, poverty producing malnutrition and the resulting low potential.

Some of the agricultural families of the village have no hope whatever of improving their lot. As a result of their demographic structure they are predestined to become social cases in the moshav. For instance, in moshav Shalekheth there is one case of a 52-year-old man maintaining a wife, nine small children and an old mother; in another case a man of 42 has two wives and eight small children; and in a third case a 40-year-old man maintains two wives and eight small children, and suffers from tuberculosis.

The excessive stretching of all available manpower in farming in this demographic type adversely influences the possibility of establishing new units of production by the natural process of fission within the family. In a village similar to the one we are describing both in the origin of the settlers and in demographic structure, several farms became vacant owing to their owners leaving the settlement (there have been no such cases in Shalekheth). The allocation of these units to the young people of the moshav seemed the most obvious solution. However, in the majority of cases this intention could not be carried out, because the parent farm would have been undermined by the withdrawal of just one working son; thus the establishment of a new household would have endangered the very existence of the old.

The prevalence of demographic structures of types 3 and 4 has serious implications for the economy of the moshav as a whole. First of all, it is clear that withdrawal of

1. The usual nutrition pattern is: breakfast (eaten in the field in summer), half a loaf of bread, an egg or yoghurt, hot peppers, two tomatoes, or other vegetables; lunch (during the summer eaten by only about 10 per cent of the population which does not work in the field), half a loaf of bread, hot peppers, olives, yoghurt and coffee; dinner (main meal), bean or potato soup, half a loaf of bread, tea.

families from participating in the common economic organization and duties (either because of non-membership of the auxiliary farm in the co-operative, or because of inability to stretch further the minimal income) affects the financial situation of the collective and its ability to provide public services. As regards type 3 (or at least in respect of the specific example given), this withdrawal may only diminish the profitability of the agricultural co-operative, since the non-members make a good living from other sources and will usually be willing to pay at least the municipal rates. Even in these cases, however, the moshav will have to depend largely on the willingness of the person to pay his taxes. Moshavim do not have elaborate mechanisms for the collection of taxes, since they can collect tax arrears from the shares of the farmers in the profits of the co-operative. This sanction can, of course, not be used against people whose main income does not derive from agriculture. In the village settled by type 4, however, both the agricultural and other services are affected by the very large number of families who are unable to share the financial burden of any assessment. Since most of the services needed by the population are contracted by the moshav as a whole, default of payment by some families may deprive all the moshav of essential services.

In Shalekheth, for example, the medical services provided by the Sick Fund were suspended for four months because some families did not pay their dues. The dues, therefore, had to be redistributed, increasing thereby the burden of most of the settlers who in any case could barely make ends meet. In 1958, the inclusive dues per household (all families included) were set at 16.750 Israeli pounds monthly; the share of the nine non-paying units should have thus amounted to 150.750 Israeli pounds approximately. The non-payment of this sum increased the assessment of each of the other seventy-seven families by 1.957 Israeli pounds monthly (i.e., 12 per cent). In addition the village commitments and individual taxes had to be increased because of the need to establish a local welfare fund to cope with the situation. Although social cases in new immigrant villages are officially the responsibility of the State and regional authorities, the allocation they receive from them is so small that the moshav feels constrained, morally and socially, if not legally, to contribute its share.

Of course, change can and does occur within this extreme example, chiefly following the return of the adolescents studying in educational institutions outside the moshav; but an agriculturally suitable demographic structure should be able to afford the absence of school-age children. More important, if no modifications occur in the family pattern itself, the structure will be repeated in the next generation. The moshav has, it is true, a potential reserve of additional farming hands—namely, the incumbents of public and technical positions, recruited from among the local settlers. These jobs, especially the technical ones, are not filled in the veteran moshavim by members of the agricultural families and certainly not to the detriment of production. In the moshav we are describing, however, the removal of work-age persons from the farms to fill other positions clearly stems from the specific demographic structure, even though other social and cultural factors (such as striving for power and prestige) are also likely to be present. Since the aspects of health and endurance mentioned above are not as yet understood by the population concerned, and since the farm is not sufficient to provide for the large number of mouths to be fed (especially during the period of development and accumulation of the owner's capital), the economic rewards offered by salaried jobs are indispensable and considered well worth the additional labour falling to the lot of those members of the household who till the land (see Table 27).

Type 5 is the opposite of the second demographic structure described. The household of this kind, like that of the foregoing one, includes many children and extended family connexions; but owing to better health and stronger constitution (especially among the older people), its manpower is much larger. Potentially (that is, under different production possibilities), therefore, it could with its labour force meet consumption require-

TABLE 27. Salaried non-agricultural occupations in moshav Shalekheth in 1958

Function	Number of incumbents	Monthly salary (in Israeli pounds)	Function	Number of incumbents	Monthly salary (in Israeli pounds)
Secretary	1	85	Worker at Mekoroth Water Co.	1	45
Rabbi	1	70	Person responsible for recreation activities	1	20
Treasurer	1	20	Youth club instructor	1	30
Storekeeper	1	40	Cook	1	32
Security officer	1	150	Teacher	2	Not known
Border policeman	2	140			

Note: In addition, there are also several people employed outside the moshav: a tractor driver in a neighbourhood settlement, two messengers in Tel Aviv, and 20 teenage girls working as domestic servants in a nearby town.

ments, thus establishing an $A = B$, or even $A > B$ relationship. Given requirement O, however, this excess and non-utilizable productive capacity also results, paradoxically enough, in the $A < B$ imbalance; and unless this imbalance is redressed by the population itself, several of the problems attendant upon all such relationships (already described in the case of types 3 and 4) will also appear here.

To illustrate this type we shall briefly analyse the structure of eight families of a North African village, namely moshav Zimriya which has a mixed dairy-economy.¹

TABLE 28. Examples of the type 5 household in moshav Zimriya

Number in household	Age					
	55 and over	55-46	45-35	34-25	24-13	Below 13
10	1 ¹	1 ¹	2 ²	1 ³	3 ⁴	2 ⁴
7	—	1 ²	1 ²	—	3 ⁴	2 ⁴
10	—	1 ¹	2 ²	—	2 ⁴	5 ⁴
7	3 ¹	1 ¹	—	—	1 ² 2 ³	1 ⁴
8	1 ¹	1 ¹	—	2 ²	—	3 ⁴
10	—	2 ²	—	—	5 ⁴	3 ⁴
8	1 ¹	—	1 ²	1 ³	3 ³	2 ⁴
8	—	1 ²	1 ²	1 ⁴	4 ⁴	1 ⁴

1. Parents of owners.
2. Owner of farm.

3. Brothers and sisters of owners.
4. Children of owners.

Every one of these families has at least twice the manpower required by the farm and by other activities in the village. As a result all the farms are fully developed, and in addition some of the members of each household have outside employment.² In fact, because of the advantageous labour market situation, the twenty-six 'balanced' Oriental type 5 households in the village were able not only to expand their productive activity more than all the other families in the moshav, but also to attain a *per capita* income comparable to that of the 'balanced' European type 2, and far exceeding that of the 'unbalanced' Oriental type 4 (see Table 29).

The average monthly *per capita* income was, in fact, as follows: in type 5 families 47.6 Israeli pounds; in type 2 families, 50.6 Israeli pounds; in type 4 families, 20.95 Israeli pounds.

1. All in all, there are twenty-six families of this type in the village.

2. Of these, four are permanent and full-time jobs (teaching, baking, orange-grove management, cultivation of an additional farm) and the other four are seasonal full-time employments.

TABLE 29. Relationship between demographic structure and monthly income per household in moshav Zimriya in 1958

Demographic structure	Income (in Israeli pounds)				Total number of households
	Over 350	250-349	150-249	0-149	
Type 5	13	13	—	—	26
Type 4	—	6	23	11	40
TOTAL	13	19	23	11	66

This situation, however, derived from the fact that the families concerned were able, on their own initiative and because of special conditions, to utilize their excess manpower potential and thus to balance the 'excess' consumption needs. Were it not for these factors, their demographic structure would have meant an unemployed surplus on the one hand and a relatively low *per capita* income on the other. The first of these would be most felt, of course, in the dead agricultural season; but all in all, the sharp contrast between the family needs and income and between the manpower potential and realization would lead not only to dissatisfaction with agriculture, but also to feelings of forced inactivity and the undermining of working habits. Such has indeed been the case with many families of this demographic type which have not been able to secure additional employment. This is especially marked in the mountain area, which is relatively undeveloped and does not provide work opportunities.

To sum up, it is evident that the standardization of the agricultural unit and the disregard for differences in household structure have given rise to grave problems in respect of both agricultural production and subsistence from the farm. Some of these discrepancies will no doubt resolve themselves in time. Thus the special case of the 'war survivors' is not likely to repeat itself; cultural changes raising the age of marriage and reducing fertility may affect the 'Oriental' structure and bring it closer to the 'Western' one; while different standards of nutrition and better medical care should eliminate the especially problematic Oriental pattern (type 4). At the same time, the need for differential planning, taking into account the diverse predispositions of the settlers, seems to have been clearly shown. In this way, greater mechanization and the incorporation of hired labour might solve the problem of type 3.¹ On the other hand, more land or else assured additional employment might significantly regularize the situation of type 5.² However, there does not seem to be any solution within the moshav for the type 4 families. Although this type of family would have difficulty in any community, the varied educational, employment and welfare services of a city may be more successful in coping with such families than the tightly-knit homogeneous moshav.

Besides material and manpower resources, the success of the settlements described above clearly depends also on the extent to which they command the necessary skills required in modern farming communities. The acquisition of such skills in a comparatively short time has encountered serious difficulties. In order to appreciate the magnitude of these obstacles a brief outline of the knowledge and ability expected by the moshav pattern is necessary.

Agricultural skill. This category includes all the different kinds of skills necessary for successful farming. A distinction must be made here between two types of knowledge.

1. Manual and mechanical skills, such as ploughing, weeding and raking, general care of livestock and the use and maintenance of mechanical equipment.

1. This has indeed been the case in moshav Zeviya, in which the families of 'war survivors' have compensated for the lack of manpower by employing outside workers and by using mechanical reapers and milking machines far in excess of official planning.

2. One of the possibilities now being studied is, in fact, the so-called 'combined farm', including agriculture and outside employment in regional or cottage industries, specially established for this purpose. This form has been proposed chiefly for the mountain area, to meet its special problems of scarcity of land on the one hand, and lack of employment openings on the other.

2. A grasp of the scientific basis of agriculture: soil mechanics and chemistry, biological development of plants and livestock, and their diseases. This theoretical knowledge is necessary for the understanding and application of the various principles which determine proper decision-making in farm work, and which underlie some of its main activities, e.g., use of fertilizers and manuring, preparation of feeding formulae, pest control, and irrigation. The ability to be guided intelligently by norms defining quantity, quality and timing is especially important, in the situation of constant research and experimentation existing in Israel, as a result of which changes and innovations in various farm practices are frequently introduced.

Economic and commercial skill. This category means chiefly the ability to calculate the profitability of a given crop in terms of the specific market conditions prevailing at the time, and in reference to possible price fluctuations in the future. This capacity, and the resolve and the flexibility to act in a changing situation, are of special value in raising industrial crops, poultry and beef cattle, in which not infrequently it is necessary to take a decision on expansion, reduction, or even liquidation of the branch. These and other branches obviously also require considerable knowledge and experience in the marketing of produce and the purchase of various production goods such as manure, fertilizers, tools, feed for livestock, etc. This is so, since notwithstanding the fact that the economy of the country as a whole and that of the village itself are planned, successful manipulation can secure more advantageous terms. Most of these calculations and activities must be undertaken on the level of the village as a unit, but a considerable share of personal responsibility is inevitable. Indeed, the individual settler must not only generally understand and evaluate the steps taken by the corporate body; he must also be able to apply them to his own specific situation, if only in order to calculate the extent and variety of his farming activities in keeping with the manpower at his disposal, his personal predilections, and his agricultural and other skills.

Financial and managerial skill. This category of knowledge is required primarily for the shaping of the settlement's fiscal and financial policy, and for the undertaking of specific deals and commitments. Applied both to the village as a whole and to the individual farm, it embraces all problems of capital formation and distribution, in relation to resources, conditions and effective utilization. Within this over-all framework the general as well as the household budget is prepared, the appropriate taxation scheme decided upon and implemented, and arrangements for credit and for repayment and prolongation of loans made. The administrative skill of the village is applied also to the management of various local services, and to the execution or supervision of the building and development programmes. While specialized personnel is often partly enlisted from outside the moshav (even in the case of more developed settlements), every village must co-ordinate the use of such personnel, and ensure the smooth, regular and orderly functioning of the services concerned.

As has been pointed out, most of the settlers came to the new moshavim without any previous training or experience in agriculture. The precise nature of this lack of knowledge and inexperience within the different settler groups, and the extent to which it has been made good, is the subject of the discussion which follows.

A clear dividing line may be drawn between the agro-technical performance on both private and public levels, and the other areas. In fact, the acquisition of the various manual and mechanical skills has almost invariably proved the least difficult. These skills have been learned within a few years by people with different vocational and cultural backgrounds, often with little or no farming experience.

Not so in respect of the other types of knowledge. In contrast to the agro-technical skills, based on average manual dexterity and repetitive action, here the emphasis is on a fund of theory and the application of non-mechanical norms, that is to say, on the ability

to analyse new situations, and to employ generalized criteria, precise calculation, and reasoned appraisal. For this reason, significant differences deriving from the settlers' background and basic predispositions should be expected here.

The 'Western' type of immigrant is well ahead of the others in this respect. He is followed by the 'transitionals', and the especially flexible 'traditionals' (the Yemenites in particular); while the hard 'Oriental' core shows the greatest lag. Thus the settlers of twenty-three of the twenty-four villages which had reached 'consolidation' status¹ by the end of 1958 were of European origin. That is to say, practically none of the settlers who belonged to Oriental Jewish communities have been able to take over the full management of their villages after seven or more years, as compared with the success of more than a third of the moshavim settled by immigrants from Europe (cf. Table 30).

TABLE 30. Moshavim settled between 1 January 1948 and 31 December 1951, by area of origin of the settlers and the achievement of consolidation status (1958)

Country of origin of majority of settlers	Number of settlements	Consolidated settlements	
		Number	Percentage
Asia and North Africa	120	1 ¹	(0.8)
Europe ²	59	23	(39.0)
Others	1	—	(—)
TOTAL	180	24	(13.0)

1. Advanced transitionals from the city of Tunis.

2. Includes one village settled by Jews from western Turkey, since socially and culturally this group is akin to the communities of south-east Europe.

Similar differences have been consistently found in specific areas of activity. Research carried out in the Jerusalem region, for example, shows that there is a correlation between the efficiency of the chicken farms and the country of origin of the settlers. (In our analysis and presentation of this material we have tried to hold other possible factors constant: thus we have included only villages established about the same time, we have employed an index of profitability which is independent of size of farm, and we have disregarded the smallest, barely commercial, units.) Since the egg farm requires a cross section of almost all the complex skills mentioned, this finding seems of special interest (see Table 31).

The relatively low productivity of this branch in some of the villages can be explained in terms of inadequate knowledge. More specifically, there have been three problems.

1. Lack of scientific grasp of poultry-raising, such as giving to the chicken feed concentrate unsuitable for its age; buying poor stock; improper classification of layers, and insufficient protection of concentrate against wild birds.
2. Lack of commercial skill among the individual farmers; insufficient flexibility in alternating the production of eggs and table poultry.
3. Lack of commercial skill among the managers of the village co-operatives, e.g., buying food concentrate at expensive prices, and poor marketing.

The difficulties resulting from lack of proper education, even after a long period of farming and instructing, are reflected in an analysis carried out by us in 1959 in three villages settled by immigrants from Asia and Africa. In none of these villages (all 8 to 9 years old) had even 50 per cent of the active farmers reached a satisfactory level of performance. Within this group itself, however, the differences are striking and show

1. Consolidation status means that the settlement has reached the stage of full production, completed its basic investment programme, and established a fully autonomous municipal government. This is signified, *inter alia*, by the withdrawal of all resident instructors. All this constitutes an excellent indicator of the availability in the village of all the skills mentioned. Of course there are considerable differences within the consolidated and the non-consolidated groups of villages as well. Many of the latter type would be described as fairly successful villages in spite of the fact that in one respect or another they still fall short of the norm of 'consolidation'.

TABLE 31. Egg production of villages in the Jerusalem area

Origin of settlers	Number of layers	Eggs per layer	Mean per layer per village
Central European	20 000	100	95
Central European	10 000	80	
Central European	8 200	92	
Central European	6 000	100	
Central European ¹	2 500	100	
Central European	800	100	
Yemen	5 500	82	88
Yemen	4 500	89	
Yemen	4 000	100	
Yemen	4 000	80	
Yemen	4 000	100	
Yemen	3 300	100	
Yemen	2 000	40	
Yemen ¹	1 500	100	
Yemen ¹	1 200	100	78
Morocco (semi-urban)	1 300	80	
Morocco (semi-urban)	900	50	
Morocco (semi-urban)	800	80	
Morocco (semi-urban)	500	100	
Morocco (rural)	3 500	68	74
Morocco (rural)	500	80	
Kurdish	1 000	80	67
Kurdish	700	71	
Kurdish	500	50	

1. In these settlements there is a minority of settlers originating in Morocco (semi-urban).

the value of even a minimal general education. The inhabitants of moshav Te'ena had come from the same town in the country of origin and settled together on the land. While among those who had had even a little Western schooling the percentage of good, mediocre and poor farmers was 63, 31 and 6 per cent respectively, among those with no formal modern education at all the same categories constituted 31, 38 and 31 per cent respectively. A similar picture obtains in moshav Zimriya, in which the distinction lies between the 'transitionals' (from Fez, Rabat, Marrakech) and the traditional element (mostly from the Atlas Mountains). Finally in moshav Levanon the comparison is between the 'learning-oriented' Yemenite group and the 'non-learning-oriented', 'traditional' Cochin immigrants, constituting a minority in the settlement.

A similar picture is obtained from a comparison of the milk production in moshav Ta'amon, which has European settlers, with that of a neighbouring village settled by immigrants from Morocco ('transitional' type). Both villages are of the same farm type, of similar age, and possess equally good physical conditions. The comparison is based on a sample of twenty and forty-three dairy farms respectively, in 1958/59, and the results are independent of the size of the dairy.

In the 'Western' village the average milk yield per cow is 4,560 litres (representing 0.91 kg. of fodder per litre of milk); in the 'transitional' village the corresponding figures are 1,850 litres and 1.4 kg.

The kind of neglect which occurs in Oriental villages is illustrated in some detail by a survey of the field crops of seven farms in the settlement of Moroccan immigrants just referred to. Table 32 shows the disregard for quantitative norms in the essential processes of fertilizing and irrigation.

TABLE 32. Fertilization and irrigation in a sample of seven farms

Farm code number	Type of fertilizer						Irrigation		
	Nitrates			Phosphates			Norm (m. ³)	Actual quantity supplied (m. ³)	Percentage of norm
	Norm (kg.)	Actual quantity supplied (kg.)	Percentage of norm	Norm (kg.)	Actual quantity supplied (kg.)	Percentage of norm			
1	1 500	1 200	80	1 700	950	56	17 000	14 000	82
2	950	1 400	147	850	200	24	11 500	14 800	129
3	1 400	700	50	1 555	850	55	15 135	15 000	99
4	1 305	1 400	107	1 385	550	40	13 730	12 250	89
5	1 400	1 400	100	1 300	950	73	14 200	18 767	132
6	1 500	1 400	93	1 440	1 100	76	13 500	12 000	89
7	1 150	1 050	91	1 430	900	63	12 900	11 000	85

Source: *Moshav Maslul: An Economic and Agricultural Analysis*, Ministry of Agriculture and Jewish Agency Land Settlement Department, 1958.

A similar situation exists also in regard to timing. In the period under discussion sixty-nine settlers prepared a total of 225 dunams of beet. Of this area 143 dunams only (that is, 65 per cent) were sown according to the crop rotation schedule and the instructions of the team, while the balance followed at a much later date, after the ground-nuts crop. Quantitatively, the yield obtained was uniformly high, and both areas produced an average of 5.75 tons per dunam (comparable to the ideal norm of 6 tons, and the national average for that year of 5.0 tons). The percentage of sugar content, however, differed significantly. While the properly sowed plots achieved as much as 17 per cent, the others in no case exceeded 15 per cent and in sixteen farms amounted only to 13 per cent. The cases of the low sugar content can be traced to a combination of factors: a cold rainy winter, in which the late crops had to be cultivated; insufficient use of phosphates; and over-fertilizing with nitrates. Unsuitable cultivation affected also other crops and branches. The consequent loss of produce suffered by the village has been estimated as follows: autumn potatoes, a loss of 120 tons (at 1.3 tons per dunam); cotton, a loss of 9 tons (at 250 kg. per dunam); ground-nuts, a loss of 35 tons (at 300 kg. per dunam); onions, a loss of 80 tons (at 1.5 tons per dunam); dairy, a loss of 130,000 litres (at 3,600 litres per cow).

At the prices which the settlers actually obtained for their products (and which were often, as we shall see later, below par), the loss to the village because of poor yields amounted to 70,000 Israeli pounds net—that is, an average of 900 Israeli pounds per farm. In addition to this factor, and apart from the loss of income because of the sugar deficiency in beet, other problems were created by improper market calculations, poor storage, late reaping, and inefficient marketing. Much of the onion crop, for example, did not reach the market at all, in spite of the fixed prices (40 per cent of the fifty-seven farmers who grew this crop sold less than a ton per dunam; 21 per cent sold 1.5 tons per dunam; 37 per cent sold between 1.5 and 2 tons per dunam; and only 2 per cent sold more than 2 tons per dunam). This was the result of unwarranted speculation, and also apathy, as a result of which a large part of the yield was held back until it rotted. The differences in the efficiency of different farmers in marketing are illustrated in Table 33.

TABLE 33. Production and marketing of onions in a sample of seven farms

Production and marketing of onions	Farm code number						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Amount marketed (in tons)	1.30	2.00	1.90	0.60	3.10	14.90	1.80
Amount spoilt (in tons)	1.30	0.50	3.00	—	1.00	—	—
Home use (in tons)	0.05	0.03	—	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.05
Total production (in tons)	2.65	2.53	4.90	0.62	4.13	14.96	1.85
Area (in dunams)	1.50	2.00	2.00	0.50	3.00	4.00	4.50
Yield per dunam (in tons)	1.63	1.26	2.45	1.60	1.38	3.74	0.41
Income (in Israeli pounds)	145	172	164	51	285	1 010	168
Average price obtained per ton marketed (in Israeli pounds)	111	86	86	85	92	68	93

This inefficiency was repeated in the handling of the crop of autumn potatoes. Regional agreement had assured a fixed price for this item, provided it reached the market not later than 15 February. This price would have grossed an average of 200 Israeli pounds per ton, or approximately 170 Israeli pounds net. The actual price real-

ized, however, was about 155 Israeli pounds per ton. The reasons for the differences were that 52.5 tons were sold at 100 Israeli pounds, since they reached the market long after 15 February; and that 33.5 tons, which had been poorly stored and packed and given a low grade, fetched only an average of 65 Israeli pounds per ton. The moshav as a whole lost approximately 8,000 Israeli pounds of possible income on the 507 tons of potatoes it marketed.

Space does not allow us to continue this analysis to cover all crops and farm branches of the village in question. It was, however, possible to estimate that the average loss of potential income incurred by each household because of insufficient farming skill amounted to over 1,000 Israeli pounds in the year reviewed. Under proper cultivation the farms could easily have averaged our scheduled income of 2,000 Israeli pounds¹ or more. In fact, however only twenty-two out of sixty-nine² households obtained this income from their farms. Success was due to some extent to the size of the plot under cultivation (the majority of the villagers did not yet cultivate the whole plot of land allocated to them). But the differences in the size of the farms can account for only a small part of the differences in income, since only five out of the eight farms of the maximum size (30-35 dunams) had an income of 2,000 Israeli pounds or more, while eleven out of the forty-eight smallest farms had the same income. The main source of the difference was in the quality of farming and marketing.

Isolation and analysis of the financial and managerial skills is much more difficult. This is because management of the economic affairs of the villages is closely intertwined with political functions. Economic inefficiency may, therefore, be the result of social and political difficulties, rather than of the lack of financial and managerial skills. In those villages, however, in which a local bureaucracy did operate over a period of time, and where we were able to study the situation systematically, we found that managerial efficiency was related to the same factors as efficiency in agriculture and marketing. Taking into account present as well as past holders of administrative positions,³ the villages in our sample may be ranked as follows in respect of the availability of managerial skills.⁴

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| 1. Moshav Ta'amon | 5. Moshav Choreshev |
| 2. Moshav Zeviya, Moshav Biyoum | 6. Moshav Shalekheth |
| 3. Moshav Te'ena | 7. Moshav Torem |
| 4. Moshavim Levanon, Zimriya, and Oranim | |

This is the same order which obtains in respect of agricultural skills.

The team of instructors. In view of the inexperience and lack of skills prevailing among the settlers, a number of instructors were attached to each new village from the outset. Their task was to teach the newcomers the rudiments of successful farming and responsible membership in the moshav, and to assume responsibility for the management of village affairs until the settlers were capable of undertaking it themselves. The standard team, whose salaries are paid by the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, consists of three members: a social instructor responsible for economic, administrative, social and cultural matters; an agricultural instructor; and a woman home economics and child-care instructor. In addition, teachers, nurses, social workers, doctors and other personnel work in their various fields in the moshavim; in the present report, however, their work is of no direct concern to us.

1. This calculation includes the vineyard, but not added capital from stock increase.

2. The settlement comprises eighty farm units, but eleven are inactive.

3. Our criteria for evaluation of the work of the local administrations are as follows: ability to understand the principles of financing the activities of the village; familiarity with the institutions through which this financing is done, and capacity to utilize their facilities properly; knowledge of budgeting and taxation; understanding of the village balance sheet and book-keeping system, and of the principles governing the debiting and crediting of individual accounts; understanding of the principles on which the municipal services of the village function; acquaintance with the institutions which provide these services, and the capacity to utilize them and to supervise their schedules and their accounts.

4. Only those villages which are analysed in one or more sections of this report are included here.

The process of instruction has been carried out in a number of ways.

In agriculture, the methods have been: (a) direct contact with the individual farmers in the course of their regular work; (b) group instruction by way of lectures, experimental plots and demonstration farms; (c) special courses and 'instruction days' (arranged chiefly in winter, the off-season on the farm); (d) training of the younger people. In the beginning each instructor used rough and ready rule-of-thumb methods; now, however, a detailed training programme has been developed.

There have been no established methods of instruction in commercial and administrative-financial skills. In order to teach such skills to the settlers, the social instructor has usually worked through the moshav committee, carefully going over all the organizational problems of the village with the committee and gradually training its members to take over all the necessary outside contacts. Quite early in the development of a village the Settlement Department encouraged, upon the recommendation of the instructors, the appointment of one of the villagers as moshav secretary. This secretary, while training to take over the managerial functions of the instructor was also able to relieve him of some of his multiple tasks in the interim period. A certain amount of generalized instruction has also been given by the female social instructor (a kind of home economist) in addition to her more specialized tasks. Frequently, as a result of local conditions, she has become a kind of technical secretary to the social instructor, in addition or to the exclusion of her other duties. Needless to say, this has limited the time devoted by her to the improvement of household and family practices.

Before embarking upon a description of the duties of the instructors and some of the difficulties they have encountered, a brief examination of the development of their function may be useful.

When the mass immigration to Israel began in 1948, there were no professional instructors to undertake the duties in question. The original instructors were therefore 'drafted', chiefly from among members of established moshavim, who undertook the task as a public service to which they were willing to devote a few years. They were often young men and women who had grown up in a village and were competent farmers as well as able leaders. By the time the material reported on in this book was gathered, practically none of the instructors of this type were left in the villages. Their work was highly praised by the settlers. It was appreciated that they did their job voluntarily, out of a genuine desire to help. Invariably they lived in the village itself, sharing with the newcomers all the difficulties and hardships of early settlement. Some of them were regarded by the settlers as model men and farmers, worthy of emulation. On the other hand, however, these instructors were recruited from party-oriented movements, which had a strong interest in attaching the new village to their respective networks of moshavim. Their loyalty was therefore primarily to the party, and their actions were often motivated and determined by political commitments. The settlers thus frequently regarded their instructor as the direct representative of an outside body, and not unnaturally came to take up an ambivalent, and even suspicious, attitude towards him. Later, when they became more familiar with the Israel political system, they learned, as voters, to use this factor in order to secure various benefits.

In later years, a different type of instructor has emerged, recruited chiefly from among the new settlers themselves. Recently most of the social instructors have come from the more advanced immigrant moshavim; in some cases, they are appointed to their own villages. Obviously, their experience and self-confidence are not of the same standard as that possessed by their predecessors; sometimes they are not much above that of the farmers they are supposed to guide, and their position as instructors and experts suffers in consequence.

In spite of the differences between the two types, the basic problems of instruction have remained the same throughout the years. The first of these problems has been the scarcity of qualified candidates to fill vacant positions and an underestimation of the mag-

nitude of their duties. The teams accordingly were too small for their tasks. They had to tackle the settlements, which were mostly isolated and maintained their own services, and the burden thus fell squarely on the local group alone. This affected primarily the work of the two chief instructors (the social and the agricultural). We have seen earlier that the responsibilities placed upon the first of these were many and various and included instruction, acculturation and actual management in various spheres of the moshav life. In reality, however, proper performance of any one of these duties left hardly any time for the others. Inefficient organization of the instructor's work schedule, or the settlers' wish that he enter into a large number of minor and major matters, served to aggravate the situation. Basically, however, the problems stemmed from the objective scope of the work.

The majority of instructors—especially those who actually live in the village under their care—work long hours, right into the night and over the weekend. At the same time, their duties also take them away from the village for days, reducing the time available for actual instruction. Thus they find it impossible to cope with all their commitments, which, in turn, gives rise to tension and feelings of resentment. On top of this, these commitments tend to increase with the time spent on them. The instructor's resources are obviously most stretched precisely at the critical initial period, when he has to manage the village affairs almost entirely by himself, as well as to implement a comprehensive training programme. Small wonder, then, that both facets of his activity have often left much to be desired. The results of this situation are still felt today in areas of communal or fiscal activities which lag behind the general development of the village.

Nor is the picture essentially different when we come to the agricultural instructor. Although his work is more defined and restricted in scope, he nevertheless not only has to carry out an extended and intensive instruction programme, but also to supervise the cultivation of all individual and co-operative crops. Thus it is not surprising that he does not pay adequate attention to each of the farm holdings.

Rather paradoxically the situation is sometimes worse in those villages in which the instructor is a local settler. While it has generally been considered desirable to train a member of the moshav to fill the post, he is almost by definition the owner of a farm, and a more successful farmer than his neighbours. The time and attention he must devote to his own holding, therefore, often adversely affect his public duties.

The second problem is one of insufficient training. This factor affected even the experienced veteran farmer-instructor. He had, certainly, a very good general knowledge of moshav structure, activities and agriculture, but not always on a level sufficient for his more general duties. The agricultural instructor, in particular, has often been transferred from a village with a different farm type and has had to reorientate himself. The regional and other specialists have, of course, been at his disposal; their work, however, has been restricted to special activities, planning and periodic consultations, and has not extended to the everyday problems and decisions arising on each farm. In consequence such an instructor, however devoted and experienced, has sometimes shown himself inadequate in the performance of his professional duties. This, fortunately, has not been frequent; but there have been instances of mistaken judgements and bad advice, of which competent men would not have been guilty. What is worse is that these few instances have been magnified. They have passed from ear to ear and from village to village and have had an abiding effect, often undermining confidence and causing damage far in excess of their material incidence.

Not being qualified agronomists, these instructors have on occasion found themselves at a loss in the more sophisticated villages although in a different sense. In such villages there might be several farmers who had already acquired a broad experience and proficiency, were certainly past the stage of basic instruction, and were eager to progress to more scientific cultivation, new methods, and wider horizons. These men would

almost have reached the level of the instructor himself, who could no longer help them very much. Supplementary courses for both instructors and advanced farmers have been organized for many years, as has also a specialized field service employing qualified experts in various agricultural branches. The scope of both has, however, been far too limited.

Few of the instructors, moreover, had the pedagogical experience to enable them to carry out their duties successfully. Even those who did possess actual teaching experience were unfamiliar with the approach, methods and means suitable for the heterogeneous immigrant population. Previous contacts with many of the groups concerned had been few, and the procedures applied were consequently almost invariably taken over from the existing Israel scene. Language difficulties were in most cases overcome, since Israel contains a large number of people proficient in many of the languages of the immigrant groups; other skills, however, were conspicuously lacking. How to address a person and to make oneself understood, to prove or demonstrate a point; what means to use in maintaining discipline among grown-ups—these and many other problems could not be anticipated by the average instructor, let alone solved quickly. In time these difficulties were overcome, but the setbacks caused by such seemingly trivial factors as failure to use the proper visual aids, inability to understand the necessity for gradual progress and frequent repetition, and insufficient reliance upon concrete demonstrations, cannot be overestimated. This is perhaps too heavy a responsibility to be placed upon small and often inexperienced groups of people, with none of the specialized vocational, personal, pedagogical and sociological qualifications so obviously required by the situation.¹ But this again has been an inevitable result of rapid and continuous settlement.

The third problem relates to the right time when the farm should be handed over to the settler. Obviously the proper procedure would be to strike a balance between too protracted a period of preparation, which might undermine the farmer's ability to undertake responsibility, and too swift a transition, which might find him unprepared. Earlier we mentioned the principle of the managed farm, as practised in Lakhish, which offers such a solution. During the first years of mass settlement, however, this method was not generally used. On the contrary, many villages experienced one or the other of the extremes of bad timing. Thus we saw, in the case of moshav Te'ena, that the preliminary agricultural training had been insufficient. The settlers, who had been employed chiefly in building and public works, were plunged suddenly into agricultural production and financial responsibility. Their lack of psychological preparation as well as of vocational training was certainly largely responsible for the crisis we described. Premature switch-over in the supply of know-how and training also occurred in the public sphere—co-operative, financial and administrative. In almost all the villages in which this happened (and there were many) disorders followed. In moshav Biyoun, for example, a settlement with excellent basic conditions (as proved by its subsequent success), the premature transfer of responsibility during the second year of existence caused a crisis.

Conversely, too long a process of transition, or too long a pause between the acquisition of knowledge and responsible application, likewise, in several cases, obstructed later development. This was equally the case in the individual and public spheres. Since this particular drawback, however, is most noticeable among the moshav youth, we shall take it up again when we come to discuss the vocational training of the second generation.

A further problem arises out of the fact that the social instructor's role is oriented to different institutional frameworks. Actually, he serves three masters, and his success

1. There were, of course, several significant exceptions. Moshav Torem, for example, was for a long time in the care of a team which had spent a long time in the Atlas mountains, organized the immigration from there, and accompanied the future settlers of the village to Israel. The results were extremely beneficial.

depends on his ability to meet at least the main demands of all three, though they are not always fully compatible and may even be directly contradictory. In the first place, the instructor is the representative of the settling authority, namely the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, which pays his salary and finances the establishment of the village. He is held responsible by the Department for adherence to the settlement budget, implementation of its instructions and development programme, and for other aspects of the moshav organization.

Secondly, he is the representative of the political movement sponsoring the village. In this capacity he is required to secure the settlers' political loyalty, instruct them in the movement's ideology and values, and lead them to act according to these orientations. Although the aims of the two frameworks mentioned largely overlap, there still exists a definite area of potential disagreement between them, which must inevitably be reflected in the role of the instructor: For instance, the movement might wish the team consistently to support a rapid acculturation process, thereby implementing its pioneering, co-operative and egalitarian ideology; the settling agency, on the other hand, might be prepared, for reasons of expediency and because of its primarily economic-national functions, to allow adjustments in the basic pattern.

Thirdly, the instructor obviously serves the settlers themselves. They expect him to answer those of their needs which seem primary and important to them, but are not necessarily congruent with those of the other factors mentioned. During the first years, for example, a settler's main and immediate preoccupation is to ensure an adequate standard of living for himself and his family. The Settlement Department, in contrast, thinks in terms of long-range consolidation and its over-all development plans. Thus there might be fundamental differences of opinion concerning the scope of agricultural production. Some settlers may wish to cultivate the farm only partially, and to supplement their income from outside employment. The moshav movements oppose this for ideological reasons, and the Settlement Department, acting as custodian of national planning interests, does so for economic ones.

There are many such areas of potential conflict built into the situation, and the instructor is pulled in three different directions. Accordingly, in the performance of his tasks, he will have to be selective, yielding, as the case may be, to one or other of the pressures to which he is subjected. The net result therefore will not be effective and orderly training and absorption.

The settlers tend to look upon the teams chiefly as outside factors, not properly belonging to the village. To a certain extent this is the case even when the instructor has actually been a member of the moshav in which he works; he still is, primarily, a representative and an employee of the Settlement Department, to which he owes his first loyalty and whose directives he is bound to follow even when they run counter to the demands of the village. The attitude toward him is thus tinged by a degree of circumspection. The settlers are aware of their dependence on the team, but also of their inability to influence, let alone control, its activities.

In older villages, however, a slightly modified conception of the instructor's role can be discerned. The more experienced settlers have come to realize the potential powers residing in the moshav committee; they have seen that if this committee knows its own mind and has the ability to act it can, within the broad institutional limitations, make the instructor responsible to it for his actions. Since the importance of his work is recognized, full co-operation is extended to him. At the same time, it is co-operation given from a position of conscious strength: the team's functions are defined in a much narrower and more specific way, and chiefly confined to teaching and to various ancillary tasks. The social instructor sometimes becomes a sort of executive officer, if not an 'errand boy', to the settlement's institutions.¹

1. The village may be capable of self-government, but still have recourse to this instructor's more specific services, in administration, liaison with outside bodies, etc.

To sum up: the role of the social instructor is split and differentiated according to the outside and inside factors he serves. More important, it is not clearly defined, both as regards its concrete activities and its hierarchy of aims. Even a minimum implementation of these commitments to multiple goals and to distinct tasks requires not a little agility, and is almost inevitable that such commitments should sometimes come into collision.

Some of the difficulties referred to were characteristic principally of the early period of settlement. No panacea has been discovered to cure these or other ills, and most solutions recently attempted have been partial and have not yet been tested by time. Nevertheless, it seems worth while to draw attention to some of the improvements introduced:

1. The 'managed farm' system, designed to cope with the difficulties experienced by the settler in learning his new occupation. Under this system, it will be remembered, the farm in its early stages is worked and administered under the direct control and responsibility of an outside factor. This is particularly advantageous in cases in which the settler has had no previous experience of farming.
2. A thorough reorganization in the structure and methods of instruction, as well as in the recruitment and preparation of the absorptive teams. On the one hand, all the instructors are now, as far as possible, required to receive a basic sociological and educational grounding. This grounding is first of all given in regular preliminary courses, and subsequently in lectures and refresher courses.

The same applies also to the level of vocational qualifications of the various instructors. The processes of selection for employment have, within the budgetary and manpower limitations, become more severe and are rigorously applied.

Teaching techniques have also been streamlined and improved, and are designed to utilize the settlers' group as a whole and secure their active co-operation and participation. Brief mention must be made of the 'observation plot'. This is in fact a mechanism of instruction involving the use of model units chosen in conjunction with the settlers themselves, on which the agricultural problems of the village are carefully worked out, the production norms exactly followed and noted, and the results consequently clearly demonstrated. These observation plots usually serve a number of neighbouring villages and have by now become a regular part of the teaching process. In fact, all the training is now differentiated and made to suit the agricultural and other conditions of specific areas, or even individual villages.

3. The setting-up of rural centres to improve instruction: (a) the special facilities for meetings and for demonstrations of heavy agricultural equipment available in a rural centre make for lower costs and higher standards; (b) the rural centre ensures better living conditions for the professional and absorption teams, as well as some provision for their cultural and social needs (the previous arrangement—living in the village—repelled qualified personnel because of the lack of basic material comforts and recreation; the centre thus contributes towards the provision of better service for the villages).

To what extent these innovations have been successful cannot, as yet, be estimated. It is hoped that a comparative research project now undertaken at Lakhish will provide some of the answers to this, as well as to other questions raised here.

Another means of transmitting skills to the settlers consists of training the youth of the villages. The most common form this training assumes is that of evening courses held in the settlement itself. The programme of such courses is specially adapted to the educational level of the pupils and to local agricultural needs. The studies are entirely voluntary and do not come within any formal educational framework. The staff is recruited from among the agricultural instructors, local schoolteachers, etc. The nature, scope and level of these activities are extremely diverse, and vary from moshav to

moshav. No study has yet been undertaken of the full extent and success of the scheme, and there is, therefore, no way of evaluating its results.

In addition to the local efforts, vocational instruction to moshav youth is also given in more institutionalized settings:

1. The agricultural secondary schools. These serve primarily the veteran agricultural population of the country, and the number of new immigrant children in them is negligible.
2. The more recently established regional agricultural schools. A few years ago a number of regional rural councils established two-year post-primary schools. Their curriculum consists of basic agricultural theory and practical training, as well as of some general education. The students do not live in (contrary to the ordinary agricultural schools), but commute daily in organized transport. They are thus able to help on their parents' farms, while they do not grow up in an environment entirely different from that of the group of origin. These seem highly important factors, because otherwise many parents would not send their children to such schools at all, even if scholarships and other grants were available. Thus supplementary vocational schooling is, as has been said, of comparatively recent standing and no analysis of its functioning can be made at present.
3. The pre-secondary vocational boarding classes. In 1950 the Department for Youth Immigration of the Jewish Agency decided to give young boys and girls of the new settlements systematic agricultural training, especially designed to meet their needs and level of formal education. Special classes were established, and the vocational training was focused on the preparation of the youngsters for taking an active part in the farming and the management of their villages. Of all the formal educational settings mentioned, this scheme has in fact drawn the largest number of children from new immigrant moshavim.¹ It is also the most studied and documented, having been the subject of a special research project carried out in 1958 by the Henrietta Szold Foundation for Child and Youth Welfare. Because of the pertinence of this project to our topic, the relevant sections of this report are here extensively quoted.²

The population investigated in the research included the youngsters who had studied in the classes described during the period 1953-56, and who completed at least two full years. In the course of the survey 115³ boys and 44 girls who returned to their villages at the end of their schooling were studied, constituting 47.6 per cent of the entire group and 85.7 per cent of the returnees (some youths having left the village in the meantime, and others being absent, chiefly in the Army, during the field work).

These 115 boys can be classified on the basis of their status on the farms, as follows: (a) seventy-four (65 per cent) are responsible for the management of the farm or are instituting changes and improvements while actively engaged in cultivation; (b) nineteen (15.5 per cent) assist in the cultivation of the farm without evincing any initiative for improvement or changes; (c) twenty-two (19.5 per cent) are not employed on the farm.

Analysis of data on the degree of responsibility undertaken by the youngsters in the management of the farms shows that of the seventy-four actively engaged in cultivation thirty-three are acknowledged as the farm managers (seventeen of them have lost their fathers), twenty-three are full partners in the conduct of their parents' farms (here, too, the boys have assumed full responsibility and take the final decisions in all matters of cultivation, though the father is formally recognized as the owner and man-

1. Of the villages included in our research moshav Ta'amoni has availed itself of the first possibility only; moshav Zimriya of the first and the third; three Yemenite moshavim (Levanon, Oranim and Qavva) and moshav Te'ena, chiefly of the second but also of the third; and the others almost exclusively of the third (except for moshav Zeviya, which has sent no children at all to agricultural schools).

2. T. Honig Parnass, *Village Youths who Received Training in Agricultural Schools*, Jerusalem, 1959.

3. Because of limitations of space we confine ourselves to the problems and data of the boys' group.

ager of the farm), and eighteen are actively employed on the farms, introducing changes and improvements.

Of the twenty-two boys not employed on the farm, twelve came from families not engaged in farming. A few more were serving in the Army, or had received scholarships to study in more advanced agricultural schools at the time the survey was made. Thus practically all the graduates who came from farming families went back from school to the farms.

The graduates returning from agricultural institutions show considerable initiative in the introduction of new branches of farming; expansion and improvement of the farm, especially of the dairy; introduction of crop rotation, to ensure that crops are grown in the right seasons, and replacement of manual labour by more use of animals.

All this tends to show that the graduates of the agricultural schools were well equipped for developing the family farm. Analysing, however, the work schedule of each boy it turned out that in the majority of cases the parental farm could not provide sufficient scope for these young workers. Of the 103 boys whose parents owned farms, twenty-seven were fully or mainly employed outside their parents' farm. Another forty-two worked on the parental farm, but regularly undertook outside employment. Only thirty-four youngsters found full-time jobs on their parents' farms on their return from the agricultural schools.

Of those having outside employment, nearly half work in the branches collectively cultivated by the moshav, and slightly fewer do agricultural work on private farms (both in their own and in other moshavim), or work as agricultural instructors in neighbouring moshavim, or on various public projects—the JNF nurseries, orange groves owned by the Jewish Agency, Jewish Agency farming estates, the Mekoroth Water Corporation, etc. Finally, a minority (seventeen boys out of 115) work in non-agricultural employment.

A number of factors induce these boys to seek outside employment. For instance, some have no farms of their own. In certain villages no final parcelling of private holdings has yet been made and the settlers must support themselves by outside employment. In some cases the parental holding is being wound up as the family is planning to leave the moshav. Most of the others who work elsewhere do so because of strained relations with their parents.

Furthermore, in the majority of cases the family holding cannot provide full employment for the youngster. Often where the father is not physically disabled or where there is an older brother or brother-in-law in the house, the youngster is compelled to seek outside employment. Most of the youngsters who divide their time between their own holdings and outside jobs belong to this category. They devote from ten to twenty days every month to outside labour and the rest to the family farm. Sometimes even when they work full-time elsewhere they devote a number of hours a day to their own farm, their working day often extending to as many as twelve to fourteen hours.

The attitude of the young people towards outside employment varies considerably, depending on their status on the farm. It is noteworthy that those having positions of responsibility are keen on outside employment as a means of balancing the family budget. On the other hand, many of those who are given little responsibility at home engage in outside employment only very reluctantly. Their feelings of resentment stem from the fact that their hard work—both outside and on the farm—is not compensated by any consciousness of responsibility for the management of the farm.

In the course of our interviews with people holding key positions in the moshavim, opinions were sought on the agricultural training of the graduates. Members of the moshav councils and secretariats were frequently active in the despatch of the young people to the institutions and continued their interest in their adjustment to conditions on the farms and in the moshavim, after their return. The proficiency of the graduate

was singled out for special praise, and it was obvious that they were regarded with a new respect by the settlers, whose attitude towards agricultural schools changed as a result. When settlers in the moshav combine to form a partnership for cultivation of the land, they now often endeavour to include a settler whose son has graduated from an agricultural institution. In many cases the advice of the youngsters (particularly those who had completed the full three-year course) was sought and whatever instructions they gave were followed, sometimes even more readily than those of the local agricultural instructor.

Many moshavim tend to entrust to these youngsters who have completed their full agricultural course important duties such as the management of the collectively cultivated vineyard, organization of irrigation in the orange groves, management of cotton-growing, overseeing workers, responsibility for tractors and the like. Despite their comparative youth, some of them have already been asked to participate in the agricultural councils of the villages.

Social integration and change

Dov Weintraub and Moshe Lissak

It has been seen that originally the moshav was created by people who believed in the values of agricultural pioneering, equality and co-operation. The settlers in the moshavim were tightly knit groups with common ideals and a strong desire to evolve a new way of life, and were rigorously selected¹.

Among subsequent immigrants there were few if any groups of settlers similarly motivated. The moshav was for them an alien form of village community to which they tried to adjust as well as they could, preserving as many as possible of the social forms they had brought with them from abroad. Thus the new moshavim comprises a variety of community types which can be classified according to two criteria:

1. Whether the immigrants' socio-cultural background is modern, transitional or traditional (cf. above p. 97).
2. Whether the population of the village is composed of a culturally and socially homogeneous group or of several heterogeneous groups. Homogeneity of the group has been, as will be shown later, a very important condition for the success of moshavim, especially if the villagers came from a traditionalistic background. We shall concentrate here mainly on the modern and traditional types, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, dwelling only briefly on the transitional types. Our four main types are, therefore, as follows: modern homogeneous (type 1); modern heterogeneous (type 2); traditional homogeneous (type 3); traditional heterogeneous (type 4). Furthermore, some of the villages are composed of partly modern and partly traditional groups, and we shall present one case of such a mixed village.

Transitional and mixed types are a broad and diversified category, since they include villages with populations on different levels of the modern-traditional continuum, and various compositions of such groups. To give an adequate picture of the entire range of these variations would involve the description of a great many individual villages. It seems, however, that an analysis of the four pure types is sufficient to indicate the basic problems and processes which characterize the adjustment of the immigrants to the moshav structure.

The question to be clarified through the study of these types is: What are the conditions for the emergence in the new moshavim of a stable social structure, reflecting a sense of belonging to the community and a willingness to support the institutions of the village? The general hypothesis of this study is that both the *modern* and *traditional types of villages* are capable of achieving stability given certain conditions, of which

1. Cf. Chapter V.

homogeneity and suitable leadership are among the most important. In this chapter we shall be examining first the initial stages of adjustment, and then the conditions of the continued maintenance of stability once achieved.

Moshavim Ta'amon and Zeviya in our sample belong to the homogeneous Western type; here we shall describe the former.

The moshav is situated in the southern part of the country, on fertile soil, and is relatively far from the frontier. It is connected to a central water pipeline, a main electricity line, and a first-class road. In addition, the adjacent area is dotted with old-established villages and towns, and the regional authority is very active and experienced. The settlement thus enjoys favourable conditions as regards agriculture, security and services.

The founding groups of some forty Yugoslav families settled on the land in 1949, after a period of waiting in temporary quarters in an abandoned Arab village. Shortly afterwards the settlers were joined by additional groups of the same origin. In 1950, with the consent of both the moshav and the Settlement Department, it was decided to add new farm units. Since previous experience had shown that Yugoslavs and Rumanians could be successfully integrated in the framework of one village, a Rumanian group was settled on an area somewhat removed from the original centre of the village. In the course of time other families were settled, partly to occupy farmsteads abandoned by some of the original settlers, and partly to cultivate new ones. These were also mainly Yugoslavs and Rumanians, with an admixture of other Central European, Oriental and local families. Today the Yugoslav group represents some 48 per cent of the population and the Rumanians 22 per cent, the rest being made up of individuals from different, mainly European, countries.

The Yugoslavs are themselves divided into two distinct sub-groups—'Ashkenazi' (the larger of the two) and 'Sephardi';¹ the differences between the two communities are not great, and though the former seem to be somewhat more 'westernized' than the latter, the characteristics ascribed to the Yugoslav section as a whole in the main apply to both. All these immigrants have a middle-class urban or semi-urban background, and a predominantly secular outlook. They consist mainly of former businessmen, civil servants and members of the liberal professions. Among the original founders of the settlement were a lawyer, an agronomist, a banker, a member of the diplomatic service, a musicologist and a few senior civil servants. This élite constituted some 20 per cent of all the family heads in the original nucleus of the village. The rest were also predominantly composed of men and women with a secondary education and good social standing. Many of them had some experience of active participation in the public life of their communities of origin. Religious tradition and practice had already become somewhat alien to them; before the Second World War there had, in fact, been little Jewish consciousness among them at all. Activity in Jewish religious and community organizations and frameworks had been largely marginal to roles performed in society in general.

The holocaust of the war, however, had affected the group as it had most other Jewish communities in Europe. They had suffered both as Jews and as Yugoslavs who had taken an active part in the war and in the resistance. After the cessation of hostilities they attempted to reconstruct their lives along previously established lines, including renewed participation in local and national activities on the one hand, continued cultural assimilation on the other. They were bitterly disappointed to find that in spite of their intention to carry on in their native country and adapt themselves to the new régime, they were farther from complete integration than even before the war. Not only was

1. *Ashkenazi* ('German') are the descendants of Yiddish-speaking Jewish groups whose forebears had lived in Central and Eastern Europe until the eighteenth century and have dispersed since then over most parts of the world; the *Sephardi* ('Spanish') Jews are descendants of Jewish communities expelled from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century who have since lived mainly in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Netherlands and, from the seventeenth century, also in England. There are certain cultural differences between the two groups.

their Jewishness remembered and taken into account (at least that was how they felt it), but they also found it impossible to erase the trauma caused by the catastrophe that had overwhelmed their community and to go on living in places saturated with tragic memories and painful associations. The result was a strengthening of Jewish consciousness and Zionist feelings and the subsequent emigration to Israel. Zionism and emigration to Israel did not, however, involve in their case a change of outlook and aspirations and the substitution of a more pioneering ideology of their basically urban middle-class expectations. They wanted to carry on with the old occupational, economic and social patterns within a more acceptable and congenial social and political framework, and in no sense did it originally include any intention to settle in a moshav.

What, then, made them choose this way? We say 'choose', because this group embarked upon its course deliberately, after due consideration, and on the basis of a rational decision. The organization of the village nucleus in 1949 was a free association of people, mostly strangers to each other before, but of like background and with a similar approach to the situation. It was an association with a clearly enunciated goal and programme—a phenomenon extremely rare at that time. The group decided that settlement in a moshav was the way to achieve the quickest possible economic and social absorption in their novel surroundings: the protracted and difficult process of integration on the anonymous urban society was recognized; and so was the difficulty of maintaining the social and professional status achieved in the country of origin. This created the basic willingness to choose the moshav and to prepare for it properly.

Before actual settlement in the village, a communal camp was set up, designed to provide adequate vocational training as well as (what was considered even more important) to enable the settlers to get to know one another, to foster mutual help and a feeling of security in the initial, preparatory and formative stages of absorption. In addition, from the very first days of the existence of the nucleus a deliberate effort was made to establish links between themselves and the absorbing society. For this purpose they persuaded a number of Yugoslav farmer families, long settled in Israel, to join the moshav. This, then, was the foundation on which the moshav later developed. And though part of the élite left the place as soon as opportunities to resume their urban way of life arose, and the Yugoslavs no longer command an absolute majority in the village, its specific character is nevertheless still largely the product of the work of the original founders.

The second largest group in the village, namely the Rumanians, comprised somewhat different elements. Some of the families came from the relatively developed parts of Transylvania and had an urban middle-class background and education similar to those of the Yugoslav settlers. The major part of this group, however, came from more backward small towns and villages. Accordingly they were of a lower socio-economic status—small merchants, artisans and quite a few farmers. Few of them had had a secondary education; and most of them had gone to traditional Jewish religious schools. They had more children than the Yugoslav settlers, and they formerly belonged to traditional religious communities. On the whole, therefore, they had been a transitional group, cognizant of modern ways of life but still living in a relatively stagnant, traditional environment prior to their emigration.

This group had had a more prolonged preparation for emigration to Israel as well as for settlement on the land than the Yugoslav group. They came from a country which used to be one of the centres of Zionism and from which there has been a constant flow of emigrants to Palestine since the end of the last century. Besides, immigration and settlement in the moshav did not involve for most of these families a drastic lowering of social status and standards of living. These two patterns, though both European, thus represent an urban type beside a village type, and their confrontation in one small unit makes the social fabric of this moshav of special interest.

It seems that the most conspicuous social characteristic of this village is the multi-

plicity and variety of social groups. We can distinguish eight main lines of association over and above the nuclear family: friendship begun abroad; friendship from the period of common training, friendship based on a common mother tongue; blood and family relationship; ethnic origin; age; religious observance; similar education. Of course, these lines intersect and act in conjunction; yet it would seem that the factors of education and language are at present the most decisive. Thus, for instance, the ethnic factor by itself scarcely acts as a barrier between the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi Yugoslavs, while Hungarian-speaking Yugoslavs and Rumanians associate closely and their circle includes also the few Hungarian immigrants in the village. Similarly, individuals with academic and secondary education tend to draw together, in clear preference to all other considerations except that previously mentioned. All in all, it may be said that these two criteria constitute the basic elements of the network of social relationships in the moshav, yet with significant secondary differentiation deriving from the other factors. We have a community formed of a plurality of distinct social crystallizations; and this plurality even constitutes an explicitly stated principle in the organization of the settlement.

At the foundation of the village, the plots were assigned according to the following scheme: (a) the various self-defined social groups were each given a number of adjoining plots, equal to the number of their members; and (b) the drawing of the plots was then carried out by each group separately, and determined only the internal distribution within each such geographical-social cluster. In this way, the frameworks of friendship and affinity were the cause rather than the effect of the ecological formation of neighbourhoods.

This arrangement was, in the course of time, impaired by some families leaving, and by the introduction of new ones; but the filling of empty farms was carried out to a considerable degree according to the principle of co-optation by neighbours. Of course, the very separation of the moshav into two areas, at some distance from one another, as well as the size of the built-up area (seven kilometres from end to end) also influenced the situation.

Yet this social plurality has by no means prevented the emergence of a common, unifying solidarity. As stated above, there is not one single predominant factor among the principles which determine the nature of the various associations; these associations, moreover, are of a social character and do not reflect cultural separation; and they do not, therefore, preclude more extensive social activities, celebrations, fêtes, or meetings. On the contrary, the attempt of the élite to promote also over-all frameworks of contact has gained consistent support from the 'associational' groups. In fact, social standing and prestige in these groups themselves is largely derived from and determined by a member's success in the over-all society of the village, as measured by his contribution to its economic development, political and social organization. The village society as a whole is in this way the decisive frame of reference, and can accordingly promote common identification and co-operation. This factor has indeed prevented a social cleavage along political and economic lines, in spite of the differences existing in both spheres of activity. Politically, many settlers are most active, some of them working on a country-wide scale in several different parties; these parties, moreover, ranging from extreme left to moderate right, are traditionally at loggerheads on many issues. This activity, however, is not allowed to penetrate into and disrupt the fabric of the moshav society, and it does not, therefore, bring about ideological divisions (as has happened in some old-established settlements) or sharpen already existing tensions (as has been the case in several new villages). As a matter of fact, only once in the course of the elections of the moshav council was a list submitted consisting entirely of members of one political party. Even then, as all the sides concerned have stated this composition was purely accidental; and in any case, after the list was successful, the new council neither showed discrimination against members of the other lists, nor stressed the party basis of their power.

Other types of social difference have not led to conflicts or deep cleavages either. It was pointed out earlier that there was a clear-cut demographic division in the village. This created different manpower patterns. These patterns, in conjunction with the settlers' different socio-economic backgrounds, their aspirations and their ability to support themselves outside agriculture, have created in the moshav distinct occupational strata—agricultural and non-agricultural—as well as different economic interests and various ways of life. Besides, some Yugoslav immigrants brought with them substantial supplies of household furniture and utensils, and have since supplemented these with further acquisitions. Other groups, on the other hand, not only arrived almost completely impoverished, but have also put their income primarily into farm development. As a result, the village for a long time contained families with entirely dissimilar material standards, but these differences never crystallized into permanent status division and social distance.

The pattern of interaction in the village has incorporated the social inclinations and backgrounds of the various groups, and at the same time has evolved also a common framework of membership and identification. That this somewhat loose and permissive structure has been able to support common goals, policies and institutions in the other areas of moshav life seems to be due largely to their definition at the hands of the settlement élite. This definition has been minimal; it attempted to eliminate from the collective sphere points of actual and potential tension, explicit or implicit in the different orientations characterizing the diverse population. Economically, emphasis has been put on development of the individual holding, and on the owner's right to cultivate it as he thinks fit. The moshav provides expert advice in agricultural matters, but each farmer is fairly free to decide what crops he will raise, on how large an area, and there is considerable variation from farm to farm in this respect. At the same time, great care is taken to ensure the efficient organization and the fullest possible utilization of those common agricultural and financial services which are considered essential to and compatible with even an individualistic outlook. Here co-operation is expected and given, and a full burden in taxes, support and actual help is obtained also from those households in which farming is only an auxiliary source of income.

The same pattern is also expressed in the sphere of mutual aid, regarding such basic areas as help on the farm in case of sickness or military service in the reserves, assistance in running the household in emergencies, provision of small loans, etc. Many aspects of mutual aid are, however, left outside the scope of the organized community. There is rather the feeling that to entrust this problem to the organized community and its executive organs is tantamount to an infringement of individual dignity, and that it is far better solved within the more intimate and familiar frameworks of neighbourhood and friendship. This solution is by no means perfect. Some individuals indeed complained that they were given no help by these sub-groups and that, therefore, no help was available to them at all (except in the most severe cases in which the moshav did take a hand). Such a state of affairs can easily be understood in the light of the ecological structure of the village: those who were not settled in the 'area' occupied by their sub-groups, or who are new to the place, or for some reason or other have few contacts and are personally unpopular, are indeed isolated, and therefore also suffer some economic hardship. Most persons interviewed, however, expressed their full satisfaction not only with the system itself as a matter of principle, and as a reinforcement of the primary groups, but also with its success in their own particular case.

Another sphere where great differences exist is that of religion. We have already mentioned the differences of outlook existing in this respect: indeed, the conspicuous absence of Jewish ritual and folklore in the Yugoslav group originally constituted a source of friction and conflict in the relations of this group with the Rumanians; in time, however, both groups have undergone a process of mutual adjustment in the course of which the orthodox have become more secular and the secular more religious.

At the beginning of the moshav's history, in 1950, a suggestion to celebrate the Seder (Passover Eve Feast) together was received favourably and even enthusiastically, and this both because of the élite's desire to strengthen village solidarity by celebrating the holiday together, and also because of the opportunity to be present at a ritual which many Yugoslav families had never celebrated according to tradition. For various reasons the plan could not be carried out, and the holiday was celebrated separately (some families, which were not familiar with the ritual, had to give it up altogether); however, it was the first sign of religious interest on the part of a community hitherto so secular. This interest grew and was strengthened through attendance at lectures on the history of the ritual and songs of the various religious festivals. Apparently this phenomenon was partly due to the influence of the more orthodox sector of the population, as well as of the children who learnt about the holidays and celebrated them in the kindergarten and the elementary school. In part it was brought about by the blend of national and religious elements inherent in the Israel form of holiday celebrations, a blend which endows religious holidays with a national tinge and the secular Independence Day with a religious sanction. No less, however, has it been motivated by the desire of the majority group to meet half-way and recognize a value system characterizing a large segment of the village. All in all, the general aspect of the village is still primarily secular, and that with a considerable measure of common approval. Religious dicta, to the extent that they are observed, are confined to the private domain, and do not affect the freedom of action of the non-observant individual. Religious rituals, however, have become a part and parcel of the activity and the tradition of the community as a whole.

To recapitulate: Type 1, as represented by Ta'amon may be designated as the stable association of loose groups. It is a structure based chiefly on interaction within a variety of sub-groups incorporating different social backgrounds and inclinations. Over and above these sub-groups, however, there has also evolved social identification and participation on the village level, and the two kinds of framework together have been capable of supporting the common goals, policies and institutions of the community. A necessary condition for the adequacy of this support has been the nature of the collective values, which are so defined as to require a relatively low social consensus and to accommodate population of various origins.

Type 2, namely the heterogeneous modern structure, is exemplified in our sample by Moshav Resissim. This moshav is situated in the central area of the country, and its general settlement conditions, like those of the previously described village, are of the best in Israel. The composition of the population, as regards country of origin, is however more varied, the main groups here being composed of twenty-seven Rumanian families and thirteen Persian families.

Israelis, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are represented by six, eight and seven families respectively; the remaining eighteen families come from thirteen different countries and four continents. The socio-economic background of the vast majority of the population (the two main segments included) is very similar to that of the Rumanian group of Ta'amon. The same may be said of the pattern of interaction adopted, which is likewise based on association by friendship, origin, age, kinship, ritual, language and education, with the two last criteria again the most significant. Here, however, no over-all solidarity, above and beyond the several sub-groups, has emerged.¹ These sub-groups constitute almost the entire social universe of the population of the village. But, unlike the situation in moshav Ta'amon, the informal groups of this village do not promote inter-group activities designed for the community as a whole. They only satisfy the social needs of the individuals who belong to them.

1. The main sub-groups are : (a) the bulk of the Rumanians, characterized by a common language as well as by a combined traditional and elementary general education ; (b) the Persians, Moroccans and Turks with similar characteristics ; (c) a group composed of Israelis, Western and Central Europeans, Argentinians and a few Rumanians distinguished by a higher general education and by using Hebrew as their everyday language. Each of these groups has also attached to itself some of the remaining families, culturally closest to them.

As a result the village institutions do not function properly. Most of the buying of goods and the marketing of produce is done individually or through informal groups rather than through the village co-operative. This results in higher costs and reduced efficiency. The inability, or unwillingness, of the different groups to co-operate has also prevented the development of local self-government. As a matter of fact the village at one point established a system of self-government with elected officers and a council, but decided to abandon it (which is a very rare occurrence). At the present time, most of the municipal functions are performed by a paid secretary who is not a member of the moshav. He is practically the local government and takes most of the decisions usually taken by the elected representatives of the community. As will be seen later, this type of government by paid officials is quite customary in villages populated by traditional groups who lack the experience in modern political and administrative procedures. Here, however, we encounter the same pattern in a village whose population and whose background would ordinarily make it capable of establishing local self-government.

The reason for this relative lack of success in establishing a viable and autonomous community lies in the experiences of the first stage of the settlement in this village. In those anxious days the different groups crystallized into self-contained units which have subsequently been unable to merge themselves into a united community. Why they were unable to do so becomes apparent from a comparison with moshav Ta'amon. In moshav Resissim there was (a) lack of any previous social selection and preparation, such as characterized the majority group of Ta'amon and enabled that village to develop with less anxiety, a feeling of greater mastery over the situation, and consequently a larger measure of social flexibility, and (b) an absence of any élite to set the proper tone and provide the leadership to initiate and promote the process of integration. In the type 1 village both these conditions were fulfilled by the Yugoslav segment of the population. Here, however, there was no dominant group, but two relatively large groups greatly differing from each other and a medley of smaller groups and individual families from all over the world. This was, therefore, a much more heterogeneous village, and this heterogeneity could not be overcome and made to merge into a sense of common belonging.

Homogeneity and heterogeneity are of course not necessarily lasting phenomena. Efficient leadership and prolonged common experience can gradually overcome the disadvantages of cultural heterogeneity, while homogeneity alone without effective leadership and/or suitable conditions for settlement will not produce a stable moshav structure. It should be pointed out, however, that homogeneity and leadership are not unrelated phenomena. A relatively homogeneous population provides a suitable background for the emergence of leadership, while even very able leaders may not be able to find the necessary social backing in a heterogeneous population.

The types to which we turn now are both based on the 'traditional' pattern of interaction. This pattern is characterized by a very strong attachment to kinship and territorial groups, limitation of social interaction chiefly to these groups, and lack of confidence in, and capacity to work together with, people from outside the group. The basic framework of this type is the 'hamula' and we shall meet it in each of the types that follow. Properly speaking, the origin of what is known in Israel villages today as hamula lies in the Mediterranean patrilineage, territorially defined (although the term itself is in use chiefly in Iraq, Israel and Jordan). In Israel, however, these criteria of membership have sometimes been blurred, and groups combining several families—not necessarily of common patrilineal descent and common former residence—have emerged still calling themselves hamulas. This has been due not only to changes in the original structure, begun already in some countries of origin, but also and chiefly to the fact of their having often been split in the process of migration and settlement. In this context, therefore, the term 'hamula' denotes the groups or 'cliques' actually functioning in the

moshav, rather than the historical hamulas.¹ In spite of these changes, however, the new organization has often—at least in the initial years—been no less important a unit than it was originally. This is so as the process of migration has caused the individual to fall back even more upon familiar groups and accepted forms of social interaction. Indeed, the moshav has frequently not only strengthened some links of the traditional structure which had been weakened in the country of origin, but also broadened the scope of activity of this structure, and even caused it to assume functions hitherto outside its competence. This is especially the case as regards economic and political activity: in the first of these, the hamula has immensely gained in importance, while in the latter it has even entered the new fields of local government and party politics.

In the countries of origin the members of the hamula usually formed a neighbourhood group, and membership implied an obligation to give economic help, hospitality and protection to other members whenever required. There was also a strong sense of belonging to the kin-group, and loyalty to it was considered more important than loyalty to any other group. The economic co-operation within the hamula did not, however, imply arrangements of communal or even co-operative production. The unit of production was the individual household comprising an extended or a nuclear family, but not the kinship group. Nor was the kinship group an effective political unit. Members were mobilized in case of trouble, but permanent functions of local government were not arranged by the hamula.

In the Israel moshav the hamula assumed these two latter functions. The moshav imposed on the new immigrants a co-operative framework of production and processes of political decision-making through elected representatives and committees. The Oriental immigrants, unaccustomed to co-operate as individuals, assimilated the moshav institutions to the framework of the hamula. Thus the hamula took upon itself the organization of production and co-operative marketing prescribed by the moshav constitution. Even more important, it has become the main political unit in the village, both internally, that is *vis-à-vis* the other groups, and externally, as the representative and champion of its members in their relations with the absorbing society and its various organs. This, in turn, has necessitated a tightening-up of the hamula organization, lent it new strength, and also endowed it with the power to take sanctions. Long 'lost' members of the original groups have therefore been sought out all over the country and 'drafted' to settle in the villages concerned; and there have been cases of wholesale 'exchanges' of populations between various moshavim, causing ties previously loosened to be tightened up again. This process of social reconstruction and absorption by way of internal selection and on the basis of kinship or quasi-kinship criteria has thus infused the traditional orientations, divisions and strifes with new vigour.

Type 3, the homogeneous traditional structure, is based on the hamula pattern just described. This type appears in two fundamental variations, and we shall describe each in turn.

The first variation occurs when, because of a common background and place of origin, the population is socially homogeneous in spite of a plurality of hamulas. Moshav Shalek-heth and moshav Torem, as well as a Yemenite village studied by O. Shapira in the Jerusalem area,² belong to this kind. We shall illustrate it by an analysis of the first of the settlements mentioned.

1. While we have as yet no sufficient comparative data in this respect, it may be stated that the Yemenite hamula is of all the most 'pure' and continuous. Although, like the others, it has also sometimes been splintered in the process of settlement, so that the present-day group is often only a segment of the original one, it has nevertheless usually kept the original bases of membership. The reasons for this seem to be threefold.

1. Unlike the Kurdish and the North African hamulas, the Yemenite hamula had not been significantly affected by social changes, and has accordingly constituted the same viable and functioning unit up to its very migration to Israel.

2. The great majority of the Yemenite community had been living in very small towns and villages, mostly comprising a few families and one to three hamulas. Due to a very high mortality rate within this group the hamula itself had, indeed, usually been very small. In consequence it was often possible to transplant all the hamulas of a given Yemenite locality to the same moshav.

3. This hamula has been based on a richer common value content.

2. O. Shapira, *Moshav Gadish* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, Settlement Department, 1959 (stencilled).

As has been said, the entire population of this moshav is from one place of origin, namely the desert Sultanate of Haban in Hadramauth, in the Aden Protectorate. Before immigration to Israel this community numbered 345 (this is actually less than in the moshav under discussion, which has 451 inhabitants), all of whom came to Israel and the majority of whom settled in their present village. In spite of the fact that they had mostly lived in the capital town of the principality, they had very little experience or need of social relations, co-operation and organization above the level of the extended family. This was so chiefly because of their occupational structure; they were almost exclusively silversmiths. Since they were highly concentrated in one small place, they had to depend on a large hinterland for their work, and consequently lived a life of itinerant hawkers. Males of working age (usually from 13 to 50) constantly moved from place to place, leaving the women, the small children and the aged in the regular place of residence. The families were thus reunited only on Saturdays and religious holidays, and the hamulas met regularly only during Sabbath prayers or other religious ceremonies. Roles and relationships transcending the hamula and pertaining to the community as a whole were even less regular, and were usually undertaken only in times of trouble, payment of head tax, and other similar occasions. Though restricted in scope, the hamulas were thus the basic social and religious framework, with little interaction and contact between them. Local legend or tradition has it that a long time ago relations between the hamulas had been closer and better, but that they deteriorated by the middle of the last century. Since this social cleavage is a characteristic phenomenon, persisting to this very day, it merits a brief description. It seems that in addition to the cumulative effects of the itinerant way of life, two specific causes significantly deepened the dividing lines between the groups.

1. The evolution of two different prayer rituals. It is interesting to note that none of the variations was theologically important or extensive; indeed, they related only to four repetitive points in the entire prayer book. The subjective symbolic value of the different rituals was nevertheless enormous. And from that date the upholders of the opposing versions not only ceased to mix in worship on those occasions in respect of which actual disagreement obtained, but also gradually withdrew from common attendance in general. Since 'ascending to the Torah' during prayers is an important matter of religion and social honour for the orthodox Jew, a multiplicity of synagogues for extending this honour to as many people as possible had in any case been characteristic of the traditional Jewish community. Here, however, this trend was not only reaffirmed; it also overlapped and emphasized an already deep social division based on kinship.
2. The 'affair' of the ritual bath. Originally the various groups had utilized a common ritual bath, attached to the synagogue of the 'Hillel' hamula. As differences deepened, however, members of the competing 'Maatuf' group proclaimed the bath ritually impure, and began sending their women to a water-pool outside the walls of the town. This was considered an insufferable religious as well as social insult, and revenge was taken by 'peeping Toms' disturbing the bathing, and by polluting the pool with the carcass of a dead camel. Stinking fish were in turn deposited in the Hillel bath. Such acts of retribution continued until both sides finally agreed to differ, and a second bath, adjoining the 'Maatuf' synagogue, was built.

These and similar points of disagreement finally helped to estrange the local kinship groups almost completely one from another. They aligned themselves in two camps, each composed of one of the big hamulas mentioned and of one of the two smaller ones (which, being incapable of maintaining an autonomous position, joined forces with the more numerous body). This is the situation now in the moshav. There are in the village the same four hamulas which existed in the place of origin, and they are still organized in what may be called two systems of 'a sun and a satellite':

System A

Group I	Maatuf hamula	38 families
Group IV	Mifi hamula	8 families
Total		46 families

System B

Group II	Hillel hamula	30 families
Group III	Shamuch humula	10 families
Total		40 families

These systems cut across all the spheres of activity of the moshav. Religiously, they do not intermix. Since the Settlement Department has erected only one synagogue building, additional temporary quarters have been provided in the village club, and the two groups alternate weekly in each of them. Similarly, the authority of the Maatuf rabbi, set up properly by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to serve the whole community, is not generally accepted. Members of the opposing group have not only often refused to allow him to officiate at weddings or other ceremonies, but have protested against the appointment in writing.

The area of economic co-operation has also been reduced to a minimum. The villagers support and utilize the necessary marketing and other facilities available, but will not go a single step beyond that. The following are good examples of this attitude. Traction animals (usually mules) are often given in joint ownership to two or three families, and this was done in this moshav too. In this case, however, great and unexpected difficulties arose, even though two of the co-owners were members of the same hamula. A real crisis followed where a mule was given to neighbouring families from different hamulas. The tensions which arose between these neighbours affected the relationship between the hamulas as a whole, and led to a refusal to co-operate with the Settlement Department. The villagers refused for several months to accept equipment and other means of production issued to them, thereby delaying considerably the beginning of efficient cultivation of the farms.

There is a similar refusal to co-operate between the hamulas in other spheres of social interaction. With the exception of the school and the youth club (the activities of this latter have, however, been severely curtailed by the traditional leadership), there is virtually no social intercourse between members of different hamulas. It has been mentioned that there are separate synagogues for each of the two factions of hamulas. Social separation extends even to the younger generation, including youth returning from the Army or from outside schools. Although they come back more highly trained as well as broadened socially and culturally—and in fact occupy most of the specialized positions in the village—they nevertheless gravitate back into the orbits of their respective hamulas. As we shall see later, this is not necessarily done wholeheartedly. But since the attraction of the group of origin is for them as yet the strongest force, and since they would not be accepted in it on any but the traditional terms, they forgo all attempts at swift 'modernization', or—more precisely—at modernization on levels other than the technical-instrumental ones.

The same principle determines also the acceptance by the community of the instructors and of the other agents of the absorbing society. The transmission of skills as such is accorded the settlement's full co-operation, and attendance at formal lectures and general demonstrations will more often than not be satisfactory. However, when contact with the absorptive team is likely, in the eyes of the settlers, to affect the traditional social structure, sanctions to redress the balance are immediately applied.

We have found, for instance, that the best method of communicating is through the framework of the hamula, either through its gathering on Saturdays, or by approaching its approved opinion leaders. Any other procedure is liable to be, and in fact has been,

construed as improper or even as undermining the existing order of things. Thus informal visits to individual households have assumed (when concentrated among the young, or among the rank and file, or among one given segment) the appearance of subverting the old traditional pattern. Instructors (in this and similar villages) found that even a normal preference for the company of their age-mates became regarded as a deliberate attempt to put the young before the old.

Another important aspect of the traditional type of village is the importance attached to proper forms of behaviour. Thus while it is perfectly permissible to bring up for discussion secular affairs of the community at the social gathering after the Sabbath morning prayer, the religious character of the meeting has to be carefully observed and respected. First of all only matters of great importance for the community can be discussed. The mentioning of trivial matters is resented and this kind of communication will not be accepted in this situation, even if urgency or expediency should justify the communication. Even important matters of the community must not be presented in a way to suggest that they are of the same importance as the rabbinical sermon, the examination of boys' progress in their religious studies, or the chanting of religious songs.

The traditional patterns of social interaction also affect the political organization and the administration of the village. Support of the political institutions is only given on the condition that this is in the interests of the hamula. Furthermore, formal office in the village government is either regarded as inferior to, or as an integral part of, the status of the office-holder in his own hamula. This, while preventing the creation of a too independent, strong and distinct power élite, also precludes the separation of the spheres, and the creation of autonomous status scales.

The following is, in fact, the relationship between the ascribed social structure and the political system in the village in question. The council is staffed by each faction every alternate year; the secretariat is always in the hands of the majority hamula (Maatuf), but the second largest one (Hillel) is entitled, in those years in which it sits on the council, to choose the secretary from among its protagonists. The arrangement also applies to the less important functions. The list below gives the distribution of these jobs by hamula in Shalekhet; it shows the attempt to maintain the delicate intergroup balance.

Secretary, Hamula I
 Rabbi, Hamula I
 Treasurer, Hamula II
 Store keeper, Hamula II
 Security officer, Hamula IV
 Border policemen, Hamula I, II

Worker at Mekoroth Water Co., Hamula I
 Recreation organizer, Hamula II
 Youth club instructor, Hamula I
 Cook, Hamula III
 Teachers, Hamula I, II

To sum up: the type of social integration described here is based upon a minimal over-all solidarity of ascribed groups. This solidarity is derived not from a positive social preference and satisfaction, but rather from lack of choice. That is to say, each of the groups described would certainly opt for living in a homogeneous village all its own, and regards the present arrangement as at best a not entirely unsatisfactory substitute. Nevertheless, the stability of this structure is greater than these words might imply. Here, there not only exists a common cultural consensus, but the social situation is actually a familiar and a reassuring one. The antagonism and mutual suspicion of the various groups is as a matter of fact sanctioned as well as regulated by long tradition, which has given them the nature of accepted rules of the game, not lightly broken, and certainly preferable to the unknown conditions obtaining outside. This is confirmed by the fact that not a single family has left the village since its establishment—certainly a unique record in the history of the new villages.

The village in question has also been one of the most 'static', its social structure having changed but little in the eight years of the settlement's existence. But there will

certainly be changes in the future. On the one hand, its particular social adjustment makes it especially susceptible to internal and external crises, any of which is liable to tip the balance. On the other hand, it will of necessity be affected by processes of internal change in the hamula itself. Whether the moshav will in fact evolve a looser social orientation, meeting the interactive patterns of the general society, or whether it will rather disintegrate into type 4 described below, depends upon the sequence of events and upon the quality of the leadership it develops in the course of time.

The first process of developing into a less tradition-bound community actually took place in a very similar village—Gadish. The population of this village consists of three hamulas, which also came from one Yemenite locality, the town of Gedes.¹ The moshav has retained the basic characteristics of the type described, but has limited the exclusiveness of its kinship groups. This development may undoubtedly be attributed chiefly to the existence of an active and progressive leadership, and in particular to the relatively large number of young families in it.

Another variation of the homogeneous traditional village is that based on one hamula. We have met only one case of this kind in our sample, in moshav Levanon. This settlement is situated in the Jerusalem Corridor, on the main road to the capital. Its mountainous terrain limited the possibilities of agricultural development, and the vicinity of the frontier placed heavy demands on the local manpower, since much effort and time had to be spent on guard duties and training for self-defence. On the other hand, when the villagers came to settle, terraces and some fruit-bearing trees had already been prepared for them. In this respect, at least, the moshav was more fortunate than many others in the same area which had to start from scratch. The security situation, however, was much worse; not only is the village very near to the frontier, but it was also for a long time the only settlement in the vicinity. The isolation, otherwise perhaps acceptable, thus became tinged with feelings of insecurity. This and the actual military duties were a drain on the physical as well as moral resources of this far from militant group, especially as the original nucleus of the place comprised only twenty-five families.

These first twenty-five families to come to the place were a haphazardly selected 'advance party' representing several larger groups,² at a time when the groups as a whole had not yet been prepared and organized for settlement in the moshav. In the earliest period this heterogeneity was of little importance. The village and its population were small; there was as yet no agricultural organization or work (the villagers were engaged in various tasks of ground-breaking and house-building; nor was there any communal or co-operative structure. In fact, the village constituted a sort of rural workers' camp, and in no way resembled, or was meant to resemble, a moshav. This should have indeed afforded the new settlers a chance of easier transition and training in a less definitive and exacting social and economic structure, as well as a 'breathing spell' to gather confidence and strength before the assumption of new duties and responsibilities. We shall see, however, that when the situation later changed this preparation proved insufficient.

Before two years had passed the settlement became a proper moshav (in so far as the agricultural resources of the hilly Jerusalem area allowed), and its population was brought up to 130 families. Each 'section' of the 'advance group' having in this process drawn upon its members in other parts of the country or in various transitional work settlements, the village now consisted of three almost entire hamulas, all from different places of origin. These three hamulas crystallized into autonomous and exclusive social groups, which first practised almost total isolation but soon entered into a fierce struggle for political and economic power. Since the village had more families than usual, the Settlement Department was not interested in retaining all three of the units engaged in the struggle. As a result, the conflict came to a head very soon, and a population upheaval

1. For a detailed description of the locality of origin cf. S. D. Goitein, *A Yemenite Weavers' Village*, New York, 1955.

2. The groups themselves were waiting in transitional work settlements.

left the place in the entire 'possession' of the biggest group, numbering fifty households. This change constituted a transition from a heterogeneous social structure to a homogeneous one. The hamula has continued, true enough, to constitute the villagers' frame of reference and it has even increased its power and strengthened its principles. However, the general cohesiveness and relative freedom from conflict now obtaining have, irrespective of any moshav values, created much better conditions for social stability.

The main guiding line of this one-lineage community seems to be the preservation of the group as a unit, and the cohesiveness of its members. The solidarity it is capable of generating is, indeed, intense; for example, the hamula has taken good care of its social cases. There are in the village ten such families, either entirely or partly incapable of agricultural or other work. Their continued presence in the village constitutes a constant drain upon its resources: then farms are tied down to people not cultivating them (a fact of special concern also to the Settlement Department); these settlers are exempt from various local taxes and dues, impoverishing the communal fund; their meagre competence, provided by various welfare agencies, has to be supplemented by the hamula; they are frequent recipients of loans for which the moshav stands surety and which it almost invariably has to repay itself; and they are more often than not also incapable of performing other communal roles, not least among these being the heavy guard duties already mentioned. The problems of these social cases could be solved in various ways without leaving them a burden on the moshav. As a matter of fact offers of resettlement have been made by the authorities involved. But the families are reluctant to go, and the village is reluctant to let them go. This is probably the same type of solidarity which holds the sceptical, the weak and the vacillating in the village so long as the group as such exists and remains there.

In other respects the hamula has been able even to change and to adapt, particularly so in the sphere of economy. As we have seen, economic production in the Yemen almost never transcended the household;¹ the hamula had no duties in this respect, and therefore no experience either of large combined enterprises. The new circumstance prevailing in Israel have accordingly required the hamula leaders to be conversant with, and to supervise, the various marketing and accounting activities. What is still more significant, however, is that they have largely also adopted a form of co-operative production—as far as we know a unique development in this type of village. While auxiliary and livestock farming has remained strictly in the hands of the individual households, in the orchards and field crops it is the hamula which is the unit of production. These crops are by no means in communal ownership, as often happens in smallholders' villages; this idea has not been congenial to this property-conscious group, and the settlers have insisted upon the legal assignation of all the plots to heads of households. Since, however, the greater efficiency of large-scale production is recognized, the cultivation is supervised by the group and entrusted to it, as is the apportioning of the produce. There is a clear division of labour and specialization—technical as well as managerial. The hamula leaders organize such work as irrigation, spraying, and protection of crops, and they also encourage children to participate in the easier and less specialized jobs. This obviously signifies a public approval of achievement, and creates a legitimate scope of activity for the abilities of the agriculturally trained youths. Indeed, as long as the traditional leaders see no danger to their values and position, and to the social solidarity of the group, they seem to be willing to adopt new forms of interaction and co-operation, and to accept responsibility for new tasks and problems. And this is certainly a process in which a traditional structure assumes new roles and functions and redefines its ways of common action.

The general principles which shape the social structure of the hamula are reflected in the status system of the village. There are in the village two distinct scales on which

1. Usually comprising the extended family, composed of several nuclear units.

social prestige is based. The first expresses the old standards of the traditionally ascribed place of each family in the group. The second represents the level of adjustment to Israel in general and to the moshav in particular. At present, the traditional scale is the more important of the two: high position on it, due to age, lineage and religious learning, confers greater power as well as status than does agricultural or administrative achievement. The second scale is indeed complementary rather than conflicting, and subordinate rather than competing. Whether, and for how long, this will remain so, it is as yet impossible to predict.

In sharp distinction to the homogeneous traditional type is the heterogeneous traditional type (type 4). We find a clear example of this in a Yemenite village in the Lakhish area, not analysed elsewhere in this report, namely moshav Savel.

The settlement in question has been blessed with excellent settlement conditions and regular financing, and its settlers, with the help of good instructors, have reached a high standard of agricultural proficiency and development. In fact, for two years after having reached intermediate stage, they had excellent crops and an above-average income. In the ten years of the moshav's existence, however, they have not succeeded in evolving even a minimal social integration of the community, and the segments comprising the population have in fact grown more hostile to each other with the passage of time. The general characteristics of these groups are similar to those of the groups already analysed.

The emergence of a community-wide feeling of solidarity was prevented in this village by the relationship between the hamulas. There are two hamulas in the moshav like the two factions in moshav Shalekheth. But in moshav Shalekheth all the hamulas came from the same locality, bringing with them the tradition of social cleavage as well as traditions of containing the conflict within limits and maintaining a measure of co-operation. In the present moshav, however, the hamulas came from different localities, though both came from central Yemen, and shut themselves off from each other from the very beginning. Each group has its own synagogue and assembly hall, and these are so exclusive that members of opposing factions are not invited even to such traditionally hospitable ceremonies as weddings and births. Moreover, there has not been in the entire history of the village a single case of intergroup exogamous marriage, although this is a very common practice among the Yemenites, and in fact serves as a mechanism for resolving interkinship differences. Even mixed youth activities have been disallowed, and the functioning of the village youth club suspended. This factionalism has reached also the elementary school, in which friction between children of the two groups has been a common occurrence.

However, as long as the administration and government of the village was vested in the absorptive team, the division between the hamulas was one of withdrawal rather than of open conflict. The social secretary and his clerical staff performed all the tasks for which interaction with and acceptance by all the settlers were necessary. They concentrated in their hands all the economic power and allocated the various resources and rewards in a strictly impartial way. And all this, while not actually approved and legitimized by the population, nevertheless commanded compliance and prevented a fight for a division of spoils.

The situation changed radically when the establishment of the moshav council was encouraged and some of the public functions handed over to it. In no case has it been possible to bring the council to adopt a common point of view. The various members and officials put forward by the two hamulas have invariably shown preferential treatment to their groups. And, conversely, they have never received minimal co-operation from any one other than their own allies. This has not only prevented efficient administration, but has also created acute tensions hitherto kept within limits by mutual avoidance. At present, no action representing the village as a whole can be undertaken; the different groups are no longer prepared even to tolerate each other's presence on the same

premises, and there is reason to believe that before the year is out the moshav will dissolve.¹

This type of conflict occurs among other traditional groups as well, if hamulas from different places of origin are brought together. But the Yemenites seem to be particularly prone to such conflict, probably because their hamula has more religious value content and is more tightly integrated than the hamulas of other groups. That is why more than 50 per cent of the Yemenite settlers have left their villages. Although they are usually people who are otherwise willing to work, are well disposed to country life, and capable of mastering the skills necessary for farming, they find it usually impossible to organize, between hamulas coming from different places, the kind of co-operation required by the moshav structure.

Not in every case, however, has social heterogeneity led to the disintegration of moshavim populated by people from traditional backgrounds. Exceptionally capable leadership in moshav Kavoa and moshav Choreshe, both populated by hamulas from different places of origin, managed to create some kind of social cohesion in these moshavim. This, though, did not take place without the emergence of a less traditional social orientation. Before these villages developed a sense of loyalty to the community as a whole, there had occurred a loosening of the hold of tradition and a broader form of approach among the people. These moshavim thus became transitional rather than traditional types of villages.

Other moshavim composed of heterogeneous hamulas who succeeded in developing their self-governing institutions have been those composed of two hamulas of greatly different sizes. As far as religious and social life is concerned the minority hamula is in these villages considerably isolated, while politically it is likely to constitute a kind of subject group with practically no say in the affairs of the community. They do, however, receive their proper share of material resources and services, and are not exploited or taken advantage of economically. Majority status involves, in the tradition of these groups, an obligation to paternalistic behaviour towards the minority which is not a potential competitor. The situation of the minority may be conceived as parallel to that of the Jews in Moslem countries—a second-class but ‘protected’ group.

Turning to the *transitional type of group*, it has to be pointed out again that there may be a very great variety of transitional communities, depending on the exact place of the group on the modern traditional continuum. Here follows a brief description of a transitional moshav—Zimriya—whose population came from a background about halfway along the above continuum.

The village is in the central part of the country, in a populous and prosperous district, and its conditions leave little to be desired. Its population is mostly from the cities of Morocco—Marrakech, Fez, Rabat and Meknes—with a small segment from rural surroundings.

TABLE 34. Composition of Zimriya by place of origin

Place of origin	Number of households	Percentage
Large cities (Casablanca and Marrakech)	17	24.3
Medium cities (Meknes, Rabat, Fez, Oudjda, Safi)	36	51.4
Atlas mountains	13	18.6
Other places (Tangier, Algiers and Iran)	4	5.7
TOTAL	70	100.0

1. As the manuscript was completed, one of the two hamulas indeed left the village. It is as yet too early to tell how those who have come in their place will become integrated.

When the moshav was originally settled, divisions along kinship and residence lines constituted the main basis of social identification and interaction in the village. Even in the beginning, however, this pattern never approximated the definite, exclusive and all-embracing nature of the hamula, which among this kind of population had lost most of its vitality and scope long before migration. True, dependence upon the in-group grew briefly flared up might be a better expression—during the initial period of settlement and absorption. This phenomenon, however, resulted chiefly from unfamiliarity with the situation and the people; it has not assumed a protracted or a general character; and has since given ground again to the resumed process of ‘Westernization’. Indeed, in this process the transition to the new pattern has kept pace with the passing of the old, without causing any social void or break in continuity. At present in the village there are still groupings based on kinship and place of origin, in a way much more prominent than in the ‘Western’ type described. Their position, however, is not paramount; that is to say, interaction based on kin or residence group membership is often cut across by other relationships (such as age, friendship and education) and comes to be more and more limited to family festivities, domestic help and small loans. Together with the development of the ‘associational’ type of social relations, the over-all co-operation and solidarity of the village community as a whole has also grown, and its political structure has become based upon the universalistic criteria noted in moshav Ta’amon.

During the early period, true enough, political power and position derived primarily from ties based on family and common origin; the village council reflected indeed the kinship and the ethnic composition, and the office holders owned their power as well as loyalty to their particular membership groups. However, with the growth of general acquaintance and interaction, and the decrease in the social prominence of the groups of origin, the authority structure has come to be based on ‘free-floating’ rather than traditional interests; and the administrative personnel has consistently been drawn from professionally qualified people, irrespective of their group membership. It may thus be seen that the transitional moshav was originally characterized by a potential ability to move in either social direction, namely, to ‘regress’ to a more ‘traditional’ type of relationship, or to continue the ‘Westernizing’ trend. In the village we have described, the first tendency was predominant during the initial stage of settlement, while the second gained the upper hand later on.

Moshav Biyoun is our example of the *mixed village*. Though all the inhabitants of this village come from Tunisia, the social usages of the two segments have been consistently different, providing a good illustration of the type as a whole. The majority group came from an urban background (chiefly from the capital itself), and was ‘Westernized’ and secularized to a considerable extent. It was also composed largely of younger people, many of whom had received a partial or complete secondary education.¹ The second group, on the other hand, comprised people from small towns and villages, characterized by a more traditional social and religious background, strong kinship ties, as well as by a higher average age.

TABLE 35. Composition of moshav Biyoun by place of origin

Place of origin	Number of households	Percentage
Tunis and vicinity	47	60.3
Small towns and villages	31	39.7
TOTAL	78	100.0

1. This village was the only non-European one to achieve consolidation status by the end of 1958 (cf. Table 30).

The different social orientations and cultural backgrounds of the two population segments promoted significant social segregation and distance between them. Though the Westernized majority did encourage a general associational pattern of interaction, in reality few actual links, based on criteria cutting across the two groups, could be forged. And this was further emphasized by the sharply differing attitudes to religion. The traditional element was strongly in favour of a general and compulsory religious way of life, at home as well as in the public sphere, and this 'missionary' point of view was resisted by the more secular sector. In time, processes which we described in the case of moshav Ta'amom helped to achieve a mutual adjustment. Here, however, the consensus arrived at has been more religiously defined; while the private and the public spheres have been separated so that in the first each household may now legitimately decide for itself, in the second no offence to religious propriety and ritual must be given, and the external face of the community is thus an orthodox one.¹ In this way, the existence of a religious segment, crystallized around the synagogue and constituting a distinct group, has been perpetuated and legitimated.

Nevertheless, the flexibility of the majority group has enabled it to pursue also other general policies relative to the village as a whole, and calculated to develop it as one functioning community. Social support of the traditional group has thus been given to the co-operative and administrative institutions (manned almost exclusively by members of the younger secular element), to vocational and general education of their children (above the elementary level), to intensified youth activities, and so on. To sum up: a pluralistic but viable social system has been evolved, in which the contradictions in social orientation and cultural background have been compensated for by an extremely devoted, able and flexible leadership.

In the preceding pages we have examined the extent and the ways in which different villages achieved a stable social structure. We have shown that both the 'modern' and the 'traditional' types of moshav are capable of attaining social integration, given the condition of a culturally homogeneous background. And we have seen how an initial cultural variety and distance may be mediated and bridged over by a determined and suitable leadership.

Differences between individual villages notwithstanding, there can be discerned three main types of social integration in the new moshavim: the autonomous-associational type, such as developed in Ta'amom and Zeviya; the managed-associational type exemplified in the case of Resissim; and the type of traditional communities based on the hamula, all of them to some extent managed by the team. All these types are a far cry from the original pattern of the moshav ovdim. The inhabitants regard the moshav as a framework provided for them by the absorbing society, within which they pursue a variety of material, religious and social goals. They have little ideological commitment to the moshav as a social form, or to agricultural work, equality and co-operation as values in themselves. They may or may not be followers of the political party to which their moshav organization belongs, but unlike the early settlers in the moshvei ovdim, they do not regard political commitment as a necessary element of the moshav community. With the exception of some hamula-based moshavim where different hamulas became identified with different parties, the introduction of party politics into moshav organization is either resisted or accepted as something imposed on them from the outside by the Israel political system.

The autonomous-associational type of moshav does not as a matter of fact differ from the private moshavim established in the 1930s (cf. Chapter II). The managed-associational type is new, but has become quite accepted and fits in fairly well with the prevailing trend towards regional organization which diminishes moshav autonomy anyway. The hamula-based traditional type of moshav is, however, an only temporarily balanced

1. This is so chiefly as regards the observance of the Sabbath and the High Holidays, and the religious character of the village primary school.

structure, since its organizing principles are in the long run inimical to efficiency, and its culture and social relations are incompatible with those prevailing in the country. Processes of change are, therefore, occurring in all these traditional villages, which we will now proceed to describe.

The allocation of roles and resources along the ascribed lines of kinship, sex and age has been the first to be affected by *processes of change*. Let us first take a look at the main aspects of *change within the family*. In the Yemenite Jewish community,¹ marriage—especially for the woman—usually began with puberty, that is at the age of 10 to 12. As a result, it was often consummated before the girl was sexually mature, and births frequently took place before she was sufficiently developed physically. In the present context we are not concerned with the effect of such customs on the mortality rate and on the health of mothers and infants. The important point here is that the woman thus passed from one male authority to another without being grown-up, capable of understanding fully the various roles connected with maturity and family life, and able to express an opinion of her own. Not that possessing such an independent opinion was legitimate in any case, for marriage was invariably an arranged affair, in which the father gave his daughter to a man of his choice. This man was often already married, and frequently as much as fifty years older than the bride, but there was nothing she could do to reverse the paternal decision.² Cases of resistance did happen, but they were considered deviant and shameful behaviour. What was more important still, there was nothing a rebellious daughter could do on her own, economically or socially.

The bridegroom, especially if he was young, was also very much subject to paternal authority. Nevertheless he usually had more chance of expressing his wishes concerning the marriage. Besides, unlike the girl, he could move out from his parent's home and migrate to another locality, a circumstance which considerably reduced the parent's power to force him into a marriage against his wishes. The marriage contract was usually arranged on the basis of barter between the two fathers, with the help of a marriage broker, invoked by the interested party. The arrangements included such points as the sum of the bride-price (paid usually in money), the amount to be paid after the proper consummation of marriage, and the extent of the gifts to be bought for the bride (dowry). Not infrequently it also happened that the father of the bride became dissatisfied with the bargain struck, and took pains to discover a more suitable match for his daughter. In such cases he usually offered compensation to the deprived groom (mostly equivalent to the sum paid by the new groom for the girl), or else gave her away clandestinely thus creating a *fait accompli*.

These arrangements have changed considerably in Israel. The traditional values underlying marriage and family life are still regarded as valid in principle, but the conditions within which the family lives here make it impossible to enforce these values. For example, in Israel the minimum legal age of marriage (except for special cases in which the District Court may give dispensation) is 18 years. At this age the Yemenite girl is already mature, and knows her own mind as well as her way around. She has been outside the home and has mixed in general society on the one hand, and in the society of boys, on the other. While in the Yemen she saw her bridegroom for the first time usually shortly before the marriage ceremony, here both sexes meet much more freely. In

1. The institutions of courtship, marriage and family differed, of course, from place to place, especially as regards customs and rituals. We obviously cannot do justice to this variety in the present context, and we shall accordingly refer to one specific pattern, that of the Yemenite Jewry, by far the most numerous traditional community in the country in general, and in the new moshavim in particular. This pattern is nevertheless broadly similar to that of other major traditional Jewish communities in the Mediterranean area, notably those of the Atlas Mountains in Morocco and the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Persia. This is especially so as regards the basic characteristics of the traditional Jewish family in the East, such as the fusion of nuclear units within the extended patrilineal and patrilocal family; a strong paternal authority structure; a high ritual content; early marriage and the subjection of the wife to her husband and his family. There are, however, small traditional communities, as for instance those of Cochin (India), of whose family background our knowledge is as yet limited. We cannot therefore say to what extent the forthcoming analysis applies to these smaller groups as well.

2. Polygamy was practised chiefly among the richer and more important families, and constituted a status symbol. At the same time, it was also designed to compensate for the very quick ageing process of women in this society.

consequence, the prospective pair know each other and are able to estimate their mutual compatibility, and it is usually they themselves who make the choice. Since both the boy and the girl can find employment and leave the house, the parents usually comply with their children's choice.

The services of the traditional marriage broker are, however, not dispensed with, and he will still be employed by the father of the groom to help in the complicated matter of the bride-price. In fact, in this aspect the two generations, (chiefly the fathers and the daughters) still see almost completely eye-to-eye. Girls consider marriage without bride-money an indication of their small value and an invitation to be poorly treated by the future husband, while the father is, of course, only too glad to be able to demand a high price, made possible by his daughter's beauty and the suitor's love for her. In fact, a wife for whom a relatively small bride-price has been paid is even in Israel regarded lightly by her husband. He will, more often than not, treat her harshly and exploit her; while in the opposite case her situation will be decidedly easier and more comfortable.

The most recent tendency, then, is to emphasize the symbolical rather than the economic aspect of the bride-price. This change, of course, affects primarily the establishment of new families in Israel, and not so much the families which emigrated there. The influence of the freedom of the young girls, however, is fed back to the traditional family structure in general, creating therein more equality between the sexes.

Other processes also operate to change the traditional role-structure described. We have already mentioned that the nuclear families in the Yemen were not independent, but were part of a patrilocal and patrilineal extended family. Thus a household included the older parents, their married sons and their children, and their single children of both sexes. Each young couple received one room in the dwelling, and this room later served the whole nuclear unit as it grew. The males were usually individually employed, mostly as itinerant artisans, but their earnings were pooled together under the exclusive direction of the head of the household. Control extended also to the internal economy of the families, namely as regards the work and the position of the women in it. No young wife disposed of her time during the working day, or could devote herself to her (nuclear) family exclusively. She participated in the general work of the entire household, which was divided between all its women. All tasks were communal, whether marketing the household produce (chiefly that of the various handicrafts existing in Yemen), buying provisions, or cleaning the house. The authority over all the women was invariably vested in the eldest wife of the head of the family, who allocated the various tasks and supervised them. In addition to this, the position of the woman in the household was insecure by virtue of religious law. The husband had the right to unilateral divorce. By simply making his wishes known in the presence of a rabbi, and handing over the sum of money agreed upon in the marriage contract ('*Betubba*'), he could send his wife away to her parents without any responsibility for her future support, at the same time keeping all the children from the marriage. The converse, on the other hand, was impossible. The husband had no obligation to grant his wife a divorce, and he would, moreover, usually refuse to do so, since by agreeing to such a request he would commit himself to pay the marriage contract. The only redress which the unhappily married woman thus had was to run away to her parents, remaining for the rest of her life separated from her husband, but unable to marry again, except if she converted to Islam, in which case her former marriage was annulled. She then could marry again, but her status as a Moslem woman was by no means more secure than as a Jewess.

All this has again been affected by the Israel scene. To take the legal status of the woman first, a significant change has primarily resulted from the fact that polygyny—which had been practised among the Yemenite and other Eastern Jewish communities abroad—is in Israel illegal. There has also been a far-reaching change in the application of the divorce laws. Although in Israel, too, marriage and divorce are governed by the same strict religious laws, and administered by rabbinical courts, the practice of these

courts is here much more equitable, offering the wife what amounts to actual equality. In matters of maintenance there is also recourse to the civil courts. True enough, in all our samples we have not come across a case in which such a redress was actually sought. In fact, the Yemenites have almost invariably preferred to seek the adjudication of their own spiritual leaders. However, the very existence of another possibility has served to make membership of a household much more stable.

These changes have been considerably accelerated by the moshav smallholding system, in which the structure of the farm as well as the living conditions tend to eliminate the extended family altogether. This was a most important factor influencing the allocation of roles and the relations within the Yemenite household. The position of the woman in Yemen was not only normatively defined as subordinate but was in fact made and kept that way by the structure of the overriding group, namely the extended family. The power of the husband to advance or prefer his wife was very limited; he could under no conditions (except by migrating) change her position and her tasks as defined by the family matron. As we mentioned earlier, the 'traditional' woman had no standing of her own as a breadwinner. She was, of course, responsible for home-making. In addition, she worked at weaving and embroidery, and sold the products not intended for home consumption. However, these tasks were almost never the main economic activities of the household, not did they constitute its chief source of income. That was derived from the work of the male members of the family working separately and practising different crafts from the women. In consequence, the division of labour on the basis of sex was complete. Even among the very few agricultural households which existed among Yemenite Jews, women were not allowed to work outside the house. The numerous males of the extended family, with the addition of hired labour, made possible the efficient cultivation of a relatively large plot with fewer hands. The intensive moshav farm, on the other hand, requires the participation of the wife in the productive process proper, especially during the peak agricultural seasons.

This encroachment by the woman upon the male preserves is further strengthened by other economic aspects of the village. On the one hand, part of the village marketing is done not through the moshav co-operative, but 'on the side' in a nearby town or city. This is so chiefly as regards such produce as eggs, especially when the poultry runs are still very small, or when cash is urgently needed. This activity is almost exclusively the province of the woman, as in fact it was also in the country of origin. In the Yemen, however, the market was closer to home, and the transactions were invariably controlled by the authoritative elders of the extended family. In Israel, each household acts independently, sending its own representative to the market. As a result almost every wife or grown-up daughter has a direct contact with the outside economy and has to exercise her own judgement. On the other hand, the status of women is enhanced by new patterns of consumption. The variety of household goods is much greater in Israel and is not produced by the household itself. The women take most of the initiative in these purchases, and it is often they who also make the final decisions about buying a certain type of kitchen equipment. Some of these purchases have to be obtained outside the village, and involve considerable expense (e.g., gas ranges, refrigerators, etc.). Furthermore, some of the household items are recognized status symbols of the family. One can see moshav housewives who are the proud possessors of polished gas ranges, but who actually cook on the more familiar oil stoves. All this broadens the scope of social contacts of the wives and enhances their authority in the family.

These processes initially caused considerable stress within the family unit. The great solidarity and cohesion of this unit has, however, been able to withstand the friction and evolve a workable adjustment. Thus the husband is still the undisputed head of the household and the family; but the decision-making process is shared, the wife's opinion being now asked for and carrying considerable weight.

The last point to be mentioned in the present context, as regards tensions and changes in the family, is the problem of the younger generation. In the Yemen, the family itself was an important agent of formal education.¹ There existed specialized institutions of religious learning, but most of them were only subsidiary to the family. Thus the courses given in the 'elementary' schools (the so-called *muallamas* or *caneeses*, roughly the equivalent of the orthodox European Jews' *heder*) which averaged six years, were regularly supplemented at home, in the evenings and on the Sabbath. It was chiefly the father who expanded the meagre curriculum, and explained the difficult points on which the teacher could not linger.² It was before the males of the family, gathered together at home or in the synagogue, that the pupil had to prove his knowledge. And it was their approval which in fact constituted the criterion of progress and the 'certificate of proficiency'—the teacher's as well as the pupil's. These local schools taught only reading, some writing, and the recitation by heart of basic religious texts. The explanation of these texts, the teaching of more advanced texts and such religious practices as the ritual slaughter of animals were almost entirely left to the parents. Only in the capital city of San'aa and a few other larger towns did there exist more advanced rabbinical schools. As regards vocational studies the family's monopoly was absolute. The son not only inherited his father's occupation, tools, and usually clientele, but received all his training from him. There were no trade schools whatsoever, and no youngster (unless an orphan, or a son of an incapacitated father) was ever apprenticed to anyone but his parent. In fact, as soon as the boy finished his elementary schooling, and often before, he joined his father in his work. If the father was an educated man, the son received much of his religious instruction while reciting and discussing with his father religious texts in the workshop or in the course of journeys to the market. The same was, of course, true of the girl. She received no formal education at all, but was most carefully instructed by her mother in her domestic and religious duties, including all the various skills which the family utilized in its home industries.

In this education system childhood was conceived as a state of imperfection, which should be left behind as early as possible, and whose special nature and status should be minimized as much as possible. This does not mean that love, care, devotion and tenderness were not lavished on the infant, but rather that the child ought not to have a long 'moratorium' period but should assume mature roles at the earliest possible moment.³ Thus the boy began his formal studies, unrelieved at school by any play or games, usually at the age of 3 or 4. At the same time he also began to take part in the religious life of the family and the community, visiting the synagogue twice daily and spending most of the Sabbath there, together with the adults. Around the age of 10, and sometimes earlier, he started working. The girl grew up, in the social sense, at an even younger age. She was introduced to the various house chores at the age of 3 or 4, was taught weaving and embroidery as soon as she could handle the necessary tools, and was given away in marriage when 10 or 12 years old. Symptomatic of this situation was the fact that in the Yemen there were no initiation ceremonies or rites to mark the transition from childhood to adolescence, or from adolescence to maturity: in most Jewish communities, on the other hand, there is such a confirmation ceremony, signifying adulthood and the assumption of full religious obligations (at the age of 13 for boys and 12 for girls). As said, in the Yemen, this custom has not been practised. Nor were there any age-groups to speak of, the only exception being the school, itself ungraded and existing only for the very young.

The situation in Israel is entirely different. As a result of compulsory schooling there

1. For details cf. S. D. Goitein, 'Jewish Education in the Yemen as an Archetype of Traditional Jewish Education', in: Carl Frankenstein (ed.), *Between Past and Future*, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 109-46.

2. Not only was the curriculum restricted, but the teaching was poor, because of very inadequate physical conditions, large groups, and lack of grading. Teachers were not regarded as professional people, but as persons doing a partly custodial, partly low-grade service job. Their pay was very low.

3. For a discussion of the moratorium, cf. E. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, New York, 1950.

has been a decline in the educational role of the family, which relates to both sexes of all ages and to all types of studies. Thus vocational training is here completely transferred to specialized agencies (even the instruction given on the farm itself being as yet mainly entrusted to the absorptive team); and the same applies, of course, to general education, which in the Yemen scarcely existed. Only as regards religious education has the family retained some of its functions; but even in religious education the school has taken over much of what used to be done by the parents. Thus while a father may still teach his son some religious texts and examine his progress every week, the Bible and much else is taught at school according to a tradition different from that of the parents by a teacher whose training and status are higher than those of the father¹. In many cases the teacher is a woman, especially in the lower grades. All these changes have several effects: (a) they diminish the close relationship between children and parents and the time they spend together; (b) they shift the youths' main focus of social interaction and their primary frame of reference to the school and other social frameworks and activities of their own age-group; (c) they undermine the authority structure of the family. This process is aggravated as the parents are often unable to perform even those functions which are left within their province, and of which they might on principle approve, such as taking part in the affairs of the school or helping the children to prepare their lessons.

A further discrepancy with the background we have described results from the formation of youth groups. True enough, the period of 'moratorium' is not very long in the moshav. Except for those sent to (usually agricultural) boarding schools, most youths enter the production process at a very early age. Since such work is carried on within the family, it in fact strengthens its interaction and may serve to counteract the processes mentioned above. On the other hand, however, youth culture in general, and youth movements in particular, are an integral feature of the Israel scene, over and above the grade structure of the schools themselves. The reasons for this probably lie in the cultural difference between the parents, the majority of whom immigrated into the country, and their children, who grew up in it. In consequence the educational experience of moshav youth, even after school, is quite different from that of their parents; some of them spend a few years in agricultural boarding schools, all of them go into the army, and most of them are also for some time at least members of some youth movement or organization. All this tends to crystallize the youth of the villages into a distinct social stratum, with attitudes, interests and way of life of its own. The most conspicuous representatives of this new stratum are the heads of the young independent households, but some of the young people still living with their parents also belong to it, although often they have to comply in their behaviour with the wishes of their parents.

To show the way in which the family is influenced by its younger members, we shall again refer to the survey carried out among moshav youth who returned home from agricultural boarding schools.² The following pages present selected data from this study, with our analysis and interpretation of them.

One of the principal objects of the study was to examine adjustment processes of the young people returning to their homes and families after a prolonged period in the agricultural school. The nature and scope of this study could not permit investigation into the deeper aspects of such a return crisis. The method of a single open interview, as well as other factors, focused the attention solely upon the *external* expressions of non-adjustment, such as desertion of the home or clashes with other members of the family.

On the basis of the external expressions of non-adjustment the youngsters were classified into four categories, in keeping with the relations existing between themselves and their parents after their return from the agricultural institution. (This classifica-

1. There are in Israel two types of public school: the 'State' and the 'State-religious'. The latter include a great deal of religious instruction taught by modern teaching methods.

2. T. Parnass, *op. cit.*

tion, it must be noted, was based entirely upon the testimony of the youngsters themselves, and was not verified from any other source.) The four categories are as follows.

Harmonious relations. In this category there may be differences of opinion but these are generally settled with mutual consideration. Sixty-four out of the 115 youngsters maintain harmonious relations with their parents.

Submission to parental authority. This group includes homes in which the traditional structure of authority remained unchanged. The youngster is subjected to full parental authority, which he is expected to obey implicitly, without his views being given any consideration whatsoever. Twenty-seven out of the 115 youngsters, it seems, have re-adjusted themselves to this sort of relationship in their daily conduct, on the farm, in their social life and within the family (despite the fact that in the interviews some of the young people voiced their dissatisfaction with and resentment of their status within the family).

Parental non-interference. In this category were included families where fathers had been unsuccessful in re-imposing their authority over the sons after the return of the latter from the institution. An unbridgeable gulf is the result, the youngsters refusing to give way and the parents choosing a policy of non-interference. The author found such a relationship in twelve cases.

Overt conflicts and rebellion. In this category parents and children were violently opposed to each other, with no prospect of any solution in sight. The youngsters refuse to obey their parents, quarrel with them and are openly rebellious. This category also includes twelve of the 115 young people.

The large proportion of boys who are living in harmonious relations with their parents is surprising. An important factor in this context is the sense of family responsibility and respect for parents, which were a feature of the parents' original patterns of culture. Even when the youngsters make no secret of their resentments and frustrations as a result of their relations with their parents, they do not leave the moshav or desert their parents. Many youngsters who during the interview questioned the authority of the parents, because of their ignorance and backwardness, nevertheless continued to respect them and took care not to accentuate existing differences. Considerations of this nature underlie the attitude of young people in the first—'harmonious relations'—group no less than that of those in the second who 'submit to parental authority'.

Available data indicate that there is a certain connexion between family relationships and the status of the boy on the farm. It is difficult to determine the point when the contribution made by the boy towards the support of the family influences the attitude of his parents towards him, and when the relations between parents and sons influence the measure of responsibility allowed the latter in the conduct of the farm. At all events, we found that in 70.3 per cent of the cases where harmonious relations exist between parents and sons, the sons are active in the conduct of the farm. This compares with 50 per cent of the cases in which the relations are not harmonious (in the 'submission to parental authority', 'parental non-interference' and 'overt conflicts and rebellion' groups).

TABLE 36. Sons' relationships with parents by degree of participation in management of the farm

Relationship	Sons' participation in farm management		Total number of boys
	Very active	Not active	
	%	%	
Harmonious	70.3	29.7	64
Not harmonious	50.0	50.0	51

Closer scrutiny of the nineteen boys in harmonious families whose role in the conduct of the family farm is a passive one shows that thirteen of them submit to parental authority in every sphere. However, the comparatively high proportion (50 per cent) of youngsters who despite disharmonious relations continue to play an active part in the cultivation and management of the farm proves that the struggle for authority and for a different way of life does not in many cases prevent the youngsters from applying their agricultural proficiency to the development of the family farm.

The working capacity of the father determines in large measure the amount of time a young man can devote to outside employment and to work on the farm, respectively. Normally the fathers prefer to work on the farm and in case of necessity the sons go out to work elsewhere. Sixty-five out of seventy-seven fathers capable of working (seventeen of the youngsters have lost their fathers, while another twenty-one of the fathers are incapable of doing manual labour), that is, 87 per cent, are employed chiefly on the farms. Forty per cent of the youngsters at present in the moshavim who have fathers capable of working are employed exclusively or mainly outside their own farms, as against no more than 13 per cent of the fathers. Needless to say when the father is incapacitated the boy works more on the farm and less elsewhere. Only 13 per cent of the boys whose fathers are incapable of working are wholly or partly engaged in outside work (cf. Table 37).

TABLE 37. Work capacity of fathers by extent of outside employment of sons

Work capacity of father	Employment of sons		Total number of father/ son units
	Mainly on farm	Mainly outside	
	%	%	
Father capable of work	60	40	77
Father incapable of work	87	13	21
TOTAL			98 ¹

1. As seventeen of the fathers are dead this survey could not be extended to cover all 115 young people.

The capacity of the father also determines the extent to which the boy is active and undertakes responsibility on the farm. Of the fifty-nine lads whose fathers are below 55 years of age, 38 per cent are responsible for the management of the family farm, while of those whose fathers are older, 70 per cent carry a similar responsibility. The younger the parents the more capable they are of adjusting themselves to agricultural work and of accepting responsibility for farm management. It must be noted, however, that sometimes the father ceases to be active at a very early age (after 45 there was a sharp increase in the number who had handed over the reins of farm management to their sons). Thus in the 38 to 45 age-group (counting fourteen fathers) not a single case was found of a graduate solely responsible for management of the farm, and only two (the father of one being bedridden) who were joint managers; but in the 45 to 54 age-group (counting forty-five fathers), sixteen youngsters were sole or joint managers (together with their fathers). Generally, in such cases, family authority is weakened as the father is no longer capable of constituting an appropriate model for accepted conduct in the new society. He is no more the adviser and mentor and cannot serve as the object of identification for his sons.

The lack of knowledge and skill, unwillingness to change and unfamiliarity with hard physical labour create circumstances in which the parents tend to forsake agricultural work and to hand it over to their sons as soon as possible. In short, the comparatively early age at which the fathers tend to give up certain tasks on the one hand, and

the agricultural proficiency of the graduates on the other, together explain the willingness of the former to hand over responsibility for the management of the farms to the latter.

Thirty-three of the 115 youngsters at present in the moshavim have an older brother or brother-in-law living together with them in the same house. Twelve of these youngsters (i.e., 30 per cent) formally or actually manage the farm, as compared with 53.5 per cent of those who have no brother or brother-in-law living with them.

In families of communities from Middle Eastern and North African countries, an older brother or even brother-in-law exercises considerable authority over younger members of the family living in the same house. Education has not yet been recognized as a factor equal to, or of more weight than, seniority. Status in the family is governed more by the relative age of members of the family than by capacity.

Age is also a determinant of employment outside the farm. Of thirteen graduates who have finished their three-year course and have an older brother at home, in only two cases does the latter seek employment outside the farm. None of these older brothers have had any agricultural training, but their presence in the home prevents the graduates from occupying the position due to them in the management of the family farm.

The motives of the parents in sending their children to agricultural institutions were many and various, but the idea was not necessarily to give them a farm training. The majority of the parents were completely ignorant of the character of the school to which they were sending their children, while very few made any inquiries about it before they took their final decision. Furthermore, few parents took any interest in the school or its curriculum, while their children were studying there. The majority paid no more than two or three visits throughout the course, and then only to participate in celebrations to which they had been invited. (This, of course, does not apply to parents residing close to the institutions where their children were undergoing training.) Even correspondence with the children was of a very desultory nature. To this day, it seems, the parents have but the vaguest conception with regard to the places where their children were trained.

Various bodies and individuals were responsible for the dispatch of the youngsters to the agricultural schools—Youth Aliyah, the local school teacher or the social instructor. Sometimes it was through the initiative of the young person himself, who heard reports of these institutions from friends trained there. In the period dealt with in this study the higher primary grades were still lacking in many of the village schools, and parents who wanted the children to complete their elementary education agreed to send them to an agricultural institution. A considerable number of parents explicitly stated that they agreed to send their children to these schools not so much because they wanted them to learn farming, but for economic reasons, to enable them to acquire suitable vocational training, or to receive general education. In all these cases the parents took into consideration the possible benefit which might result from their children's schooling for future absorption in the city, and not necessarily in the moshav. Only a small group among the parents (sixteen out of the fifty-four whose answers were obtained) emphasized their preference for agricultural training as such.

The attitude of the parents towards the institutions has changed for the better since the youngsters have come home. The majority of these now occupy important positions on the farm, towards the expansion and improvement of which they have already made an important contribution. The outside employment of the youngsters connected to some extent, at least, with the experience gained in the agricultural school—has increased the family's income and improved its position. Perhaps the changed attitude of the parents themselves towards agricultural labour is also a factor in the more positive appreciation of the training their sons have undergone. Now that their farms are in the process of consolidation, many of the parents have become reconciled to farming as a livelihood. This is reflected in many of the interviews. The majority of the parents

expressed their satisfaction at the assistance furnished by the youngsters, ascribing it to the training they received in the agricultural school.

There are certain objective factors preventing full use of the proficiency acquired in the agricultural school. In some moshavim the lands have not yet been improved, while the main branches upon which the farms are to be based may not yet have been allocated. In certain cases the holdings are very small, both in area and in the number of branches they comprise, and do not call for any expert knowledge of management. Most of these farms, in any case, are not yet fully developed.

Yet in spite of all these drawbacks, the lads are steadily consolidating their position on the farms. Of the fifty-seven youngsters who returned from the institutions only a year ago, 26 per cent are formally and actually responsible for the management of the family farm. But of the twenty-three youngsters who returned three years ago 70 per cent perform similar functions. This process of consolidation is also dependent upon the age of the youngster, as well as that of his brothers. With the passage of time, older brothers may leave home, as a result of marriage or enlistment in the army, in which case the graduate of the agricultural institution would probably take over the management of the farm.

Thus it seems, from the data adduced, that in a considerable number of families included in the study no drastic changes have occurred as yet in the pattern of interaction, as regards the unit's feelings of mutual solidarity and the acceptance of the father's authority. In so far as there has been a conflict and a shift in dependence between the generations, it has arisen in most cases from instrumental considerations. The transfer of economic authority and the acceptance of the son's professional standing has resulted in the majority of the households from a mutually recognized necessity, namely the father's ignorance of farming, his limited working capacity, and so on. These changes, however, have not signified any deep intergenerational struggle, concerning the family pattern and its ultimate goals. To sum up: the youths have pushed for change primarily in those spheres which are absolutely essential for the proper cultivation of the family farm; and in this respect they have largely received the approval of the parents. They have not adopted, on the other hand, any far-reaching ideology of change as such, and the traditional family continues to constitute their membership and reference group alike. For this reason, the innovations which the youths have introduced have as yet been chiefly specific in character and limited in scope, and have been carried out mostly on the basis of family continuity.

The changing status of youth has influenced in a great many ways the structure of the village. As in the case of the family, the changes have occurred gradually. They are manifested primarily in changes of behaviour towards such office-holders as the members of the team, the elected leadership of the village and the authority of the hamula, rather than in formally defined changes of such offices and the authority attached to them, or in open rebellion against the rule of the hamulas.

The changes are most apparent in moshavim where a number of young people who had grown up in the moshav since adolescence (we refer here to moshavim founded since 1949) became independent farmers. But the process of changing relationships in the village starts earlier, and can be perceived also in places where young people, nominally still subject to paternal authority, have as a matter of fact taken over the management of a number of farms.

The data collected point to a certain tension between the graduates and the agricultural instructors. Frequently this tension takes the form of harsh and aggressive criticism on the part of the youngsters. In other cases the parties prefer to ignore each other's existence. But even where the young people maintain normal relations with the agricultural instructor (which is the case with about half of them) they refuse to regard the former as

the ultimate authority. Sometimes when there is a difference of opinion over some technical point between the instructor and the youngster, notebooks or volumes taken from the institutions are referred to. Normally the decision taken is in line with what is written in the book. Thus while the instructors regularly visit the farms cultivated by the rest of the villagers, the youngsters who are familiar with their own farm problems and sufficiently confident to take decisions upon their own responsibility call in the instructor only when something new has arisen, such as the treatment of unfamiliar pests or diseases, improvement of methods of sowing, etc.

A number of the graduates go even further. They reported cases where as a result of the advice of the instructor losses had been incurred on the farm. They also recalled successful cultivation of certain crops on their own and neighbours' farms when the instructor's advice had been rejected and their own ideas had prevailed. As a result, these youngsters told us, neither they nor their neighbours had recourse to the aid of the instructor, who as a result ceased calling at their farms.

Examination of the replies of these youngsters who no longer maintain any contact with the agricultural instructors (45 per cent of those who completed two or more years of their course) leads us to assume a concealed struggle for positions of influence which involves, to some extent at least, the relegation of the instructor. Since this is a sign of increasing independence on the part of the farmers, one would expect these developments to be encouraged. After all, it is the avowed purpose of the absorption team to make itself redundant. But, as a matter of fact, the attitude of the instructors seems to be rather ambivalent on this issue. When asked for their opinions on the graduates, they praise their diligence and proficiency. At the same time, however, they do not seem to make any systematic effort to clarify their relationship with the young farmers, smooth out differences and prepare for the transfer of authority to them.

This ambivalence and avoidance of facing the prospect of the transfer of authority are not only psychological reactions to possible loss of status. As has been shown above, there is a great deal of social pressure on the instructor to act through the channel of the traditional elders of the hamula. Apart from his personal problems of losing his status and, or his job, he is faced, therefore, with the choice of aligning himself with one part of the village at the risk of antagonizing the other. The young people expect him to join forces with them in carrying on at greater speed the changes originally initiated by the instructor himself at the cost of alienating the traditional majority; or else he leaves the discontented youth to themselves, even at the risk of antagonizing them, but maintains proper relations with the traditional and backward majority, on the assumption that after all these need his instruction more than the young people. It seems that most instructors, although they do not pose themselves the question of choice very consciously, tend in practice to make the second choice.

Diverse sociological and educational theories stress the enhanced importance of age-groups in the period of adolescence, in relation to other factors of socialization, namely, the family and the school. This importance is even more marked in respect of immigrant youth, because of the inadequate capacity for socialization of the immigrant family, and the inability of the parents to serve as adequate objects of identification for their children. For these young immigrants the school cannot be as effective educationally as it is for locally-born children, as their homes provide neither sufficient preparation nor effective support for school work. Thus the young immigrants have a greater need than other young people for an alternative framework, in which various roles and activities are undertaken in a spirit of solidarity, mutual identification and social response. It is only in such a framework, with its spontaneous atmosphere, that normal social and cultural changes can come about, and it is only a sense of belonging to such a group, the members of which share the same problems, that can inspire the self-confidence facilitating cultural change and preventing hostility and resistance to the absorbing society.

It is of importance to appreciate that it is not the short-lived age-group which can respond most effectively to these problems, but the age-group which, despite its freedom and cordiality, is organized and formed by members of the absorbing society. Education under the auspices and in the institutions of Youth Aliyah endeavours (and in the majority of cases succeeds) in consolidating such activity within the framework of the youth group. The influence of education within a group framework is reflected in the need felt by the pupils that this framework should continue to exist and operate even after their return to the moshav. But in the moshav a major problem emerges, for they do not find an organized group framework connected through its instructors with the more comprehensive society, like the one which existed in the institutions; they encounter the spontaneous and short-lived groups whose activities are puerile, and whose purpose, usually, is low-level entertainment.

There is a vast disparity between the intensive and fully organized social life of the institution and the vacuum into which they are thrust upon completion of their studies. Accustomed to relatively rich and well organized social and cultural activities, yet not ripe enough and, perhaps, not trained to organize such activities themselves, they face upon return to the moshav a real crisis. In the course of meetings with them they very forcibly voiced their need for more formal organization, led and directed by persons deeply rooted in Israel society—i.e., people from outside the moshav—who could serve as leaders and are capable of uniting the members of the group.

In most of the moshavim, youth movements do not operate and there are no social instructors. The initial enthusiasm that accompanied the effort to get veteran settlers of the older-established moshavim to go out to the outlying immigrants settlements to organize their social and cultural life has passed. In some cases the immigrants' moshavim are almost completely cut off from all cultural life; they may not even subscribe to a daily paper. The only framework in some way organized from outside is the paramilitary organization Gadna (Gedudei Noar ('Youth Corps')). In some moshavim Gadna activities are held once or twice a week. The graduates of the agricultural institutions are keenly interested in these activities, in which they participate regularly. Some of them have taken part in special Gadna courses, and it is obvious that they have a great liking for these functions. It seems that this enthusiasm is related to their need for some formal organization. However, Gadna work cannot entirely satisfy the need of the graduates for social activity, and in the course of time they tend to revert to the accepted forms of entertainment in the clubhouses (which do not exist in all moshavim). In the majority of cases, however, even this institution suffers from a lack of initiative, and many are completely paralysed—the only social activity is a fortnightly film show. The clubhouse also houses the moshav library, but in the main it serves as a meeting-place for the boys and girls of the moshav. They meet several times in the week (mainly on Saturdays) to chat, play and dance. These activities are usually condemned by the traditional elders of the village who regard all social activity common to both sexes as immoral. The most important entertainment of the young people is the cinema. The boys and girls of a moshav or town visit the cinema twice a week. In the more outlying districts they visit moshavim in the vicinity whenever there is a film show. The young people also engage in sport, which apparently plays an important role in their lives. It is instructive that a major complaint against the moshav institutions was that they had allocated no funds for the purchase of sporting equipment. In a number of moshavim we were informed of a bitter struggle waged between graduates and settlers in regard to football matches staged on the Sabbath.

This lack of satisfaction with the conditions among the best-educated young people in the traditional type of moshavim may be either an important leverage for change or a disruptive force, according to whether this desire to change is or is not channelled towards objectives acceptable to the moshav as a whole. This, in turn, depends on

whether at least some of the young people are given a share in the leadership of the village. Few young people possess the patience and breadth of view necessary for leadership in such a delicate situation, and even fewer traditional leaders are willing to share their authority with people holding different views from their own. On the other hand, however, the superiority of these young people due to their relatively good education is so obvious that they do obtain leadership positions of some sort in some of the *moshavim*, and as they grow a little older will, presumably, attain similar positions in other *moshavim* as well.

Even in places where they do obtain public office, this is usually of secondary importance. There is a growing tendency to appoint the graduates of agricultural schools (especially those who have completed the full three-year course) to village cultural and youth committees responsible for the running of the clubhouse. For example, in the study quoted here fourteen of the 101 boys who went to the institutions for two or more years have been appointed to offices of this character.

The number of youngsters who are showing—or showed upon their return from the institutions—a readiness to undertake unofficial functions among the youth of the village is even greater. This group, which numbers thirty-two boys, includes nine who are active in the *Gadna*, sport, etc.; eleven who were active in this sphere and have discontinued their activity for reasons which will be discussed below; and twelve others who indicated their keenness to undertake social duties among the youth and in the institutions of the village. Most of these youngsters completed the full three-year course, though there were also some who had discontinued their training after two years. The graduates generally constitute the moving spirit behind every effort of the village youth to organize themselves and conduct social and cultural activities. They are particularly active in these fields immediately after their return from the agricultural schools; later this keenness is blunted for a variety of reasons, chiefly because they are not supported by any outside factor or institution. Small wonder then, if as a result of their youth and their standards of education, high only in comparison with those of the villagers, their activities should lack real cultural content and be restricted to the organization of parties on the various festivals, sporting activities and the like. Their own inability to infuse more significance into their activities is the cause of much chagrin to the youngsters themselves.

In spite of such rather modest success, the majority of the graduates who have completed three years of training in the agricultural schools have gained a position of respect and influence among the youth of their villages, and their authority is recognized not only in the management of the farms, but also in social affairs. This is perhaps one of the initial signs of the emergence of a cultural and political élite, the criteria of membership in which are education and familiarity with the Israel way of life, and not one's standing in the *hamula*.

An important factor, both for the *moshav* and for the young people themselves, is the number of graduates who have returned to their home *moshavim*. The influence of the graduates among the youth of the village grows with their numbers, and vice versa. When their number is small they tend to become assimilated among the local youth, not showing any initiative in organizing the latter or winning their respect. Many of the young people have complained about the small number of youngsters of their own age in the *moshav*. Twenty-two out of the 115 young people who were interviewed in that research stated that the number of youngsters of their own age did not exceed three or four. The fact that many girls do not take part in the social functions of the youth, and early marriage, further reduce the potential number of members in these age-groups and prevent the crystallization of social life in the *moshavim*. In a few other *moshavim*, finally, where the number of youth is considerable, the settlers were so opposed to activities in the club or the *Gadna* in which both girls and boys shared, that they paralysed social life among the young people.

For all these reasons it is difficult yet to predict to what extent the youth now growing up in the traditional moshavim will enter the framework of the hamulas or change them into something more modern. There is, however, some indication that most of them intend to stay in the moshavim. This was for example the proclaimed intention of eighty-six out of the 115 graduates of agricultural schools who returned to the moshav although it is not clear whether these replies to questionnaires reflect well-considered mature plans or only vague ideas about the future.

CONCLUSION

The span of time is too short and our data too few to offer at this stage any definitive conclusions on youth as the agent of change. All we can do is to make a preliminary evaluation based on the material available.

The comparison between the changes in the status of youth within the family and outside it seems highly suggestive. First, there does not necessarily exist an analogy between youth's position in the traditional household and its position in the social structure of the village in general. Indeed, in the latter, the place of the youth is still in many cases marginal; and a young man still has to fight for greater freedom of action and for the recognition of his professional qualifications.

Secondly, while on the farm a young man fulfils important roles of production and management, in the moshav he has mostly been confined to recreational and cultural activities within his own circle. Only much later, and in fewer cases, has he been able to assume such roles as secretary, treasurer, or vocational instructor. At the same time, these processes already constitute an important change in the structure of the hamula, and thus also in the social structure of the village as a whole. It seems that this change occurs as a two-step process.

During the first phase, which has already taken place in most of the traditional villages known to us, some public roles are allocated to the young. This allocation, however, is contingent upon loyalty to the hamula, and representation of its interests. In order to secure this loyalty while also taking advantage of the special qualifications of the youth, the hamula elders have here been willing (or sometimes been forced) to give up some of their positions of power. They have, however, taken care not to relinquish those roles which constitute the foci of the over-all authority and social control, such as chairmanship of the council, co-ordination of outside employment, and others. Their continued tenure of these central positions, together with their traditional (ritual) roles, thus enable them to maintain their status almost without any real opposition.

A good example of this phase is the situation in moshav Kavaa. During 1955-56, that is five or six years after settlement, considerable pressure was brought to bear by the youth on the village leaders. The older youths demanded a more efficient village organization and their admittance to suitable public roles; the younger ones wanted freer forms of recreation in the moshav club, sporting activities on the Sabbath, and so on. The heads of the ruling hamula adjusted themselves to the situation and modified their absolute rule by admitting to the council two young members and entrusting them with the secretaryship and the co-ordination of youth activities in the village. However, the traditional head of the council and his brother (the local rabbi) remained (and are to this day) the most honoured and powerful figures in the moshav. Nor has there been any far-reaching change in the over-all traditional life of this village.

The second, more advanced, stage of development has in our sample been reached by two traditional villages only, namely Oranim and Choresht. Here changes are evident in the hamula pattern itself. There are clear indications that these groups no longer serve as the paramount criterion of social relations. A high incidence of exogamous marriages and (what is even more important) the emergence of specific, chiefly economic, interest

groups¹ have here cut across the traditional kinship-oriented crystallizations. This development has coincided with increased activity on the part of the youth, and has further enabled them (as well as settlers without extended family connexions in the place) to be elected to such central positions as chairmanship of the council, external and internal secretaryships, etc. The orientation of these roles, furthermore, has now begun to be less rigid and less committed to the traditional frameworks. The hamula is still vital and salient; its influence, however, is now exercised more discreetly, and its position depends more upon the personal qualifications of its heads and representatives, than upon its traditional prestige. While earlier the hamula and its representatives on the council were mutually committed to an absolute support of each other, now there is at least some possibility of adopting policies and enlisting support outside of the traditional group. This freedom of choice is, as yet, limited chiefly to *ad hoc* matters, rather than to issues of a more fundamental nature. Nevertheless, the fact remains that division along traditional lines is no longer automatic or all-embracing. At the same time, the new council itself has not yet emerged as a cohesive group, committed to mutual support and loyalty in its work. More often than not, such support will be withdrawn from members representing rival groups. An exception to this may be found among the younger members of the councils who, at least among themselves, have created a broader solidary framework.

Finally, something like a new social stratum seems to be emerging. It is not identical with the younger generation, but the youth does constitute its central core. As far as can be seen at this stage, the following are the special characteristics of this group.

1. There is a preference for social relations and recreation carried out separately within the group itself, rather than within the traditional kinship frameworks.
2. Members of this group have begun to constitute the mainstay of economic activity and development. Whenever they become the owners or actual managers of farm units, these units turn out to be the most prosperous in the village. The crystallization of the economic level and interest into a status criterion is accordingly in the making.

In the preceding pages we have discussed some of the processes of internal change in traditional villages, taking place within the family, the hamula and the community as a whole. We have emphasized in particular the changes within the family as reflected in the reallocation of roles between husband and wife and between father and sons; and we have hinted at the implications of this process on the wider social structure, as regards the criteria for selection to public office and as regards new social and economic plans spearheaded by the younger generation.

However, the great importance which we have attached to the young generation as an agent of change and as a source of a new type of leadership, should not be taken to mean that youth is the *only* dynamic factor in this respect. In fact, change-oriented leadership is not to be found among this group exclusively, and does not thus depend solely on the integration and activity of the young with their community. In some cases in which there were as yet few or no grown-up children, leaders with a flexible outlook and capable of adjustment emerged among the older generation. The patterns of change have, however, been the same whether initiated by the youth or by other leaders. And in neither case has the evolution of the village structure proceeded beyond the level here described.

1. Based on such considerations as specialization in different branches, common marketing interests, etc.

